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Abstract 
The thesis is a collection of three separate papers on accounting consequences. 
Specifically, the papers examine the relation between accounting and employment, risk and 
valuation.  
The first chapter (solo-authored) documents that approximately 20% of large US 
public firms choose to disclose employment information quarterly, at a higher frequency than 
mandated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I use these voluntary 
disclosures to examine whether managers modify their firms’ workforces to manage earnings. 
Using firm-level analysis, I find that managers alter their firms’ workforce in the short-run to 
meet financial reporting benchmarks. I separately investigate the decision to voluntary 
disclose employment information more frequently than mandated by the SEC. I show that 
providing quarterly employment disclosures is associated with managerial myopic behavior. 
Overall, in the first chapter I present evidence that more frequent disclosures of workforce 
information provide valuable insights into firm operations and managerial decisions. I 
demonstrate that financial measures may govern decisions regarding real resource allocations, 
specifically, the firm’s workforce size.  
The second chapter (co-authored with Brian Burnett and Paige Patrick) investigates 
the effect of adopting more principles-based standards on litigation risk. A common perception 
is that principles-based accounting standards, such as International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), allow for more managerial discretion over financial reporting. This suggests 
that adopting principles-based standards may alter the litigation risk exposure of companies 
and their directors and officers. We study changes in litigation risk in Canada following IFRS 
adoption in 2011. Canada switched its reporting standards from Canadian Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) to IFRS, which is considered more principles-based. We 
examine the effect of IFRS adoption on litigation risk using two established proxies for 
litigation risk: Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, which Canadian firms are 
mandated to disclose, and excess cash holdings. We document that more principles-based 
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accounting standards reduce litigation risk and provide evidence for a benefit of adopting such 
standards, in the form of lower insurance premiums.  
The third chapter (co-authored with Bjorn Jorgensen) develops an accounting-based 
valuation model for an economy with multiple firms and demonstrates the effect of cross-
holdings on firms’ prices. We illustrate how market values appear distorted when firms have 
mutual minority interest equity investments. We discuss possible empirical implications for 
valuation of multiple firms and articulate why corporate equity investments may distort firms’ 
market-to-book ratios. Overall, we show how the accounting treatment for corporate equity 
investments may alter prices and provide theoretical predictions regarding the mechanism and 
magnitude of these distortions. We also model linear information dynamics in a setting with 
multiple firms, allowing for inter-firm information transfers for firms with and without cross-
holdings. Our analysis illustrates how inter-firm accounting information shape prices. 
Moreover, we describe possible implications of our model for firms that exhibit variation in 
reporting dates or reporting frequency.  
 
 
  
6 
 
Contents 
Declaration of Authorship 1 
Acknowledgements 2 
Abstract 4 
List of Figures 10 
List of Tables 11 
  
1. Voluntary Employment Disclosures and Real Earnings Management 12 
1.1 Introduction 12 
1.2 Employment and Real Earnings Management 16 
1.2.1 Firms’ Employment Policies 16 
1.2.2 Real Earnings Management and Employment  18 
1.2.3 Voluntary Employment Disclosure and Myopic Behavior  20 
1.3 Data and Methodology 23 
1.3.1 Employment Data 23 
1.3.2 Normal Employment Model  28 
1.3.3 Selection of Suspect Firm-quarters  31 
1.4 Empirical Analysis 32 
1.4.1 Choice Model Estimation 32 
1.4.2 Abnormal Employment Estimation 33 
1.4.3 Real Earnings Management  34 
1.4.4 Subsequent Performance  38 
1.5 Voluntary Employment Disclosure and Managerial Behavior  40 
1.6 Conclusion 41 
1.7 Appendix 43 
1.7.1 Variable Descriptions 43 
1.8 Figure 45 
1.8.1 Changes in Disclosure Policy (Non-Financial Firms) 45 
1.9 Tables  46 
1.9.1 Descriptive Statistics 46 
1.9.2 Number of Firms and Disclosing Firms by Industry Division 47 
1.9.3 Descriptive Statistics: Disclosure Choice Model 48 
7 
 
1.9.4 Regression Results: Estimation of the Disclosure Choice Model 49 
1.9.5 Descriptive Statistics: Disclosing Firms 50 
1.9.6 Regression Results: Estimation of the labor model 51 
1.9.7 Comparison of Suspect Firm-quarters with the Rest of the Sample 52 
1.9.8 Comparison of Suspect Firm-quarters with the Rest of the Sample, 
Full Interaction 
53 
1.9.9 Regression Results: Future Performance 54 
1.9.10 Regression Results: Probability of Just Meeting or Beating Earnings 
Benchmarks 
55 
2. IFRS Adoption and Litigation Risk: Evidence from Directors’ and 
Officers’ Liability Insurance 
56 
2.1 Introduction 56 
2.2 Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) Liability Insurance 61 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 64 
2.4 Research Design 67 
2.4.1 The Canadian Setting 67 
2.4.2 Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US 68 
2.4.3 Specifications 69 
2.4.4 Sample Selection and Data Description 74 
2.5 Empirical Results  77 
2.5.1 Univariate Results 77 
2.5.2 Regression Analyses of D&O Insurance Policy 79 
2.5.3 Regression Analyses of Excess Cash 81 
2.6 Robustness Tests 82 
2.7 Conclusion 84 
2.8 Appendix 86 
2.8.1 Variable Descriptions 86 
2.9 Tables 88 
2.9.1 Sample Formation 88 
2.9.2 Descriptive Statistics 89 
2.9.3 Univariate Tests of Changes in D&O Coverage and Premiums After 
IFRS Adoption 
91 
2.9.4 Univariate Tests of Changes in Excess Cash After IFRS Adoption for 
Firms That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
92 
2.9.5 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on D&O Coverage and 
Premiums for Canadian Firms Not Cross-listed in the US 
93 
8 
 
2.9.6 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on D&O Coverage and 
Premiums for Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US 
94 
2.9.7 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Excess Cash for 
Canadian Firms Not Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O 
Insurance 
95 
2.9.8 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Excess Cash for 
Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O 
Insurance 
96 
2.9.9 Descriptive Statistics for New York State Incorporated Firms 97 
2.9.10 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Premiums for 
Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US Compared to Firms Incorporated in 
New York State 
98 
3. Accounting-Based Valuation for Multiple Firms: The Case of Cross 
Holdings 
99 
3.1 Introduction 99 
3.2. A Valuation Model with Corporate Equity Ownership 105 
3.2.1 Formal Model of Cross Holdings 105 
3.2.2 Implication for Empirical Research: The Case of Cross Holdings 113 
3.2.3 Price and Book Values: The Effect of Cross Holdings on Financial 
Ratios 
120 
3.3. Uncertainty and Linear Information Dynamics  121 
3.3.1 Inter-Firm Information Transfers: Multiple Firms  122 
3.3.2 Linear Information Dynamics and Firm Valuation: The Case of Two 
Firms  
125 
3.3.3 Linear Information Dynamics and Firm Valuation: Cross Holdings  128 
3.4. Conclusion 130 
3.5 Appendices 133 
3.5.1 Variable Definitions 133 
3.5.2 Illustration of Two Firms with Cross Holdings Using the Fair Value 
Method 
135 
3.5.3 Illustration of Two Firms with Cross Holdings Using the Equity 
Method 
139 
3.5.4 Market-to-Book and Return-on-Equity Ratios 142 
3.5.5 Linear Information Dynamics 145 
3.5.6 Linear Information Dynamics – Empirical Application 155 
3.6 Figures 164 
3.6.1 Cross Holdings and Firm Value 164 
3.6.2 Circular Ownership Structure Illustration 165 
9 
 
3.7 Table 166 
3.7.1 Two Firms - Fair Value Method 166 
3.7.2 Two Firms -Equity Method 167 
3.7.3 Market-to-Book Ratios 168 
3.7.4 Return on Equity 169 
Bibliography  170 
  
  
  
10 
 
List of Figures 
1.8.1 Changes in Disclosure Policy (Non-Financial Firms) 45 
3.6.1 Cross Holdings and Firm Value 164 
3.6.2 Circular Ownership Structure Illustration 165 
  
11 
 
List of Tables 
1.9.1 Descriptive Statistics 46 
1.9.2 Number of Firms and Disclosing Firms by Industry Division 47 
1.9.3 Descriptive Statistics: Disclosure Choice Model 48 
1.9.4 Regression Results: Estimation of the Disclosure Choice Model 49 
1.9.5 Descriptive Statistics: Disclosing Firms 50 
1.9.6 Regression Results: Estimation of the labor model 51 
1.9.7 Comparison of Suspect Firm-quarters with the Rest of the Sample 52 
1.9.8 Comparison of Suspect Firm-quarters with the Rest of the Sample, Full 
Interaction 
53 
1.9.9 Regression Results: Future Performance 54 
1.9.10 Regression Results: Probability of Just Meeting or Beating Earnings 
Benchmarks 
55 
2.9.1 Sample Formation 88 
2.9.2 Descriptive Statistics 89 
2.9.3 Univariate Tests of Changes in D&O Coverage and Premiums After IFRS 
Adoption 
91 
2.9.4 Univariate Tests of Changes in Excess Cash After IFRS Adoption for Firms 
That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
92 
2.9.5 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on D&O Coverage and 
Premiums for Canadian Firms Not Cross-listed in the US 
93 
2.9.6 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on D&O Coverage and 
Premiums for Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US 
94 
2.9.7 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Excess Cash for Canadian 
Firms Not Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
95 
2.9.8 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Excess Cash for Canadian 
Firms Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
96 
2.9.9 Descriptive Statistics for New York State Incorporated Firms 97 
2.9.10 Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Premiums for Canadian 
Firms Cross-listed in the US Compared to Firms Incorporated in New York State 
98 
3.7.1 Two Firms - Fair Value Method 166 
3.7.2 Two Firms -Equity Method 167 
3.7.3 Market-to-Book Ratios 168 
3.7.4 Return on Equity 169 
  
12 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Voluntary Employment Disclosures and Real Earnings 
Management 
 
Daphne Hart* 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the employment policies of public firms. While the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates annual disclosures of a public firm’s number of 
employees, approximately 20% of large US firms voluntarily disclose employment quarterly. 
Using these voluntary quarterly disclosures, I study whether managers modify their firms' 
workforce to meet earnings benchmarks and whether the decision to disclose is associated 
with myopic managerial behavior. 
In the past decade, technological advances fueled rapid growth in service industries, 
reducing the share of capital-intensive industries in the economy (Lee and Wolpin 2006). 
Many public firms rely on human capital for their operations and state they view their 
employees as an important asset. Nonetheless, the information available to investors and other 
stakeholders about the way firms manage their workforces is limited. 
                                                          
*I thank Vasiliki Athanasakou, Bjorn Jorgensen, and Wim Van der Stede for their guidance and support. 
I also thank Jan Bouwens, Maria Correia, Thomas Gilliam, Katherine Gunny, Ana Simpson and 
workshop participants at Bocconi University, Cambridge University, Cass Business School, Hebrew 
University, IESE Business School, London School of Economics and Political Science, Oxford 
University, Pompeu Fabra University, Tilburg University, University of Illinois at Chicago and 
University of Warwick for their comments and suggestions. 
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The SEC requires public firms to disclose their number of employees annually. The 
Business and Financial Disclosure required by Regulation S–K includes a narrative 
description of a registrant’s business. Under Regulation S-K, firms must disclose their number 
of employees in their annual financial statements.1 Firms are not required to disclose any 
information about their workforce in their quarterly financial statements. Nonetheless, some 
firms choose to provide this information voluntarily, with quarterly frequency.2 
Using a hand collected sample of the largest 500 firms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ 
from 2006 until 2016 (44 quarters),3 I document that 20.5% of them provided information 
about the size of their workforce in interim financial reports. The choice to provide quarterly 
employment information appears relatively sticky over time.4,5 I use these voluntary 
disclosures in two ways. First, I examine whether managers appear to alter the workforce to 
manage earnings. Second, I investigate the relation between providing voluntary employment 
information at higher frequencies and managerial short-termism.  
A firm’s economic activity can be represented in price terms (costs, wages, and 
interest) or in volume (labor and capital). The literature uses labor costs to estimate managers’ 
asymmetric responses to changes in operations and to detect managerial opportunism 
(Dierynck, Landsman, and Renders 2012, Hall 2016). Annual net changes in the number of 
employees (net hiring) are also used to proxy for investment in labor. Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) 
examine whether reporting negative earnings influences investments in employees and find a 
discontinuity in a histogram of net hiring around zero earnings. Jung, Lee, and Weber (2014) 
                                                          
1 17 CFR 229.101 - Description of business, Item 101(c)(1)(xiii). 
2 Interestingly, Beatty and Liao (2017) document that around 20% of US multinationals’ 10-K filings 
voluntarily disclose domestic and foreign headcount separately. Their analysis suggests that voluntary 
geographic headcount disclosure choice with annual frequency, depends on both political pressure and 
employee backlash. 
3 I limit the sample to the largest 500 firms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ in the sample period that 
report under US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Out of 749 firms for which data 
is available, 154 provide information about their workforces in their interim reports and 143 firms have 
consecutive disclosures that permit constructing quarterly time series. 
4 In each period, a firm may choose to initiate or cease disclosing the number of employees quarterly. 
For example, Pfizer Inc. started providing quarterly employment information in the first quarter of 2010 
and ceased quarterly disclosures in the third quarter of 2013.  
5 During the sample period, disclosing firms voluntarily disclosed their workforce size for 28 quarters 
on average. 
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use firms’ net hiring to construct a measure of investment efficiency. I extend prior literature 
and proxy for firm’s real activities using quarterly workforce data. Quarterly data enables 
observing managerial decisions, as opposed to inferring them from reported expenses (Cohen, 
Mashruwala, and Zach 2010). Having more granular data permits studying changes in the flow 
of the size of the work force in the short-run and examining whether managers use employment 
to manage earnings.6 
A manager could alter the workforce to achieve short-term reporting goals. On the 
one hand, managers may decrease the workforce by firing or simply not hiring new employees. 
This reduces expenses and cash outflows, thus increasing reported earnings. On the other hand, 
managers may choose to increase production to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS) under 
absorption costing or to channel stuff (Roychowdhury 2006). These latter practices likely 
require hiring additional employees in the short-run, particularly in human capital-intensive 
industries like services and high-tech. If managers engage in real earnings management 
through net hiring, abnormal patterns in employment should mirror the findings of prior 
literature (Roychowdhury 2006, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012). 
I document that if firms just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, or report small earnings 
growth, they have larger abnormal workforce, while if they report small positive earnings, 
they have smaller abnormal workforce. These results are consistent with managers employing 
different producing and employment practices to achieve different reporting goals. 
Better understanding firms’ employment policies is important as labor market 
frictions generate substantial costs for firms, employees, and the economy. Moreover, the 
relationship between employers and employees shape labor laws and employment incentives 
schemes. Nonetheless, scant empirical research investigates firms’ employment decisions, 
                                                          
6 The annual number of employees disclosed in firms’ annual reports (10-K form), provides information 
about the net change in the workforce over the fiscal year but not within the year. Firms may report the 
same number of employees in consecutive years, although, during the year, their workforces may 
fluctuate substantially. For example, based on Caterpillar Inc.’s annual number of employees, it appears 
that the firm’s net hiring in 2012 was 0.2%. Nonetheless the quarterly employment disclosures suggest 
that Caterpillar increased its labor force by 1.7% and 4.4% in the first two quarters and decreased it by 
2.8% and 2.9% in the last two quarters of 2012. 
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partly because firm-level employment data is scarce.7 The data set I constructed is based on 
voluntary disclosure of large pubic firms, which may limit the generalizability of this paper’s 
findings.  
I separately investigate the decision to provide quarterly employment disclosures, at 
a higher frequency than mandated by the SEC. To signal firm quality, managers may choose 
to increase transparency by providing employment information in interim reports (Verrecchia 
1983, Dye 1985). If earnings management is a purposeful intervention (Schipper 1989) that 
could be inferred from abnormal employment levels, then voluntarily quarterly disclosure may 
act as a disciplining mechanism. Thus, quarterly disclosures would be associated with fewer 
incidences of just meeting earnings benchmarks. Nonetheless, higher disclosure frequency 
may also indicate that managers focus on shorter horizons, implying a positive association 
between quarterly employment disclosures and incidences of just meeting earnings 
benchmarks. 
I find that providing quarterly employment disclosures is associated with a higher 
likelihood of just meeting or beating analyst forecasts and reporting small earnings growth. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the disclosure decision reveals managerial 
characteristics and that quarterly disclosing firms manage earnings more often.  
This paper extends the literatures on real earnings management and voluntary 
disclosure in three ways. First, this paper is the first to document that changes in employment 
may be governed by earnings benchmarks. Managers respond to accounting-based 
performance targets by changing real decisions. The analysis validates that real earnings 
management is manifested in firms’ hiring and firing decisions. Consistent with the work of 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), these findings imply that managers take real actions, 
such as delaying or expediting firing and hiring, to meet short-term reporting goals and smooth 
earnings. Second, I present an alternative approach to measuring real earnings management 
                                                          
7 Although firms disclose their workforce size annually, these annual disclosures do not allow capturing 
fluctuations in the workforce within the financial year. Data on changes in workforce size at the firm 
level is not readily available, although some firms voluntarily disclose information regarding their 
employees’ turnover rate in their SCR reports.   
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based on firm-level analysis. Prior literature defines abnormal behavior based on deviations 
from industry mean. Using time-series analysis, my estimation is based on deviations from 
each firm’s predicted normal levels. Third, the paper suggests that disclosure choices are not 
independent of subsequent managerial actions. In this setting, the employment disclosure 
frequency decision is informative about managerial actions, implying that more frequent 
disclosures may indicate a stronger focus on short-term performance.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews prior studies on 
employment policy and real earnings management. Section 1.3 describes the data and the 
estimation models. Section 1.4 presents the analysis results. Section 1.5 examines the 
disclosure choice and discusses the relation between the disclosure choice and managerial 
actions. Section 1.6 concludes. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.7.1. 
 
1.2 Employment and Real Earnings Management 
1.2.1 Firms’ Employment Policies 
Firms require capital and labor to provide goods and services. While ample research 
investigates capital investment decisions and asset management, scant empirical research 
studies their employment decisions and workforce management. One potential reason for the 
smaller number of papers on employment is the lack of transparency and data about 
corporations’ employment practices. The private sector provides around 85% of the nonfarm 
employment in the US,8 and large public firms such as Walmart, Amazon and IBM employ 
hundreds of thousands. Nonetheless, the only information readily available on public firms’ 
workforces is the number of employees disclosed in annual reports. 
The literature relies on layoff announcements to gain insights into firms’ employment 
decisions. Companies announce planned layoffs when they are material; that is, when layoffs 
are likely to influence a significant part of the workforce and when they are part of a substantial 
                                                          
8 As of May 2018, see BLS, Table B-1: Employees on nonfarm payrolls by industry sector and selected 
industry (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t17.htm). 
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restructuring or strategic shift. Generally, firms are not required to publicly announce layoffs,9 
and thus the announcement may be a signal used by managers to communicate private 
information. Elayan et al. (1998) find that layoff announcements convey negative information 
to the market about firms’ investment and growth opportunities as well as future cash flows. 
While, Hillier et al. (2007) suggest that layoff announcements are not followed by changes to 
operating performance. Hillier et al. (2007) cannot reject that operating performance remains 
unchanged following layoff announcements by U.K. firms, although, they do find significant 
improvements in operating efficiency, as measured by sales and operating profit per employee. 
Layoff announcements are not always equivalent to actual downsizing, and their 
timing may not be random. Chen et al. (2001) show that layoff announcements made by U.K. 
firms are not followed by a reduction in total employment in the subsequent three years. 
Hallock (2006) studies layoff announcements by Fortune 500 firms between 1970 and 1999. 
He analyzes over 4,600 layoff announcements and 40 interviews conducted with senior 
managers in these firms. Consistent with Yermack (1997), Hallock (2006) reports that some 
managers admit to timing the layoff announcements to benefit senior managers10 and that 
layoffs were announced and carried out to permit starting a financial period (year or quarter) 
“clean.”11 Hallock (2006) also documents that some managers overstate the number of 
employees to be laid off to avoid announcing bad news twice. Overall, empirical and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that managers may time workforce changes to contribute to better 
performance in subsequent periods. 
                                                          
9 Public firms must disclose material events to shareholders. Thus, firms may be required to disclose 
planned layoffs, especially if they are done as part of plant closures. Moreover, the Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act) mandates employers with 100 or more full-time 
employees to provide 60 calendar-day advance notification of plant closings and mass layoffs of 
employees, subject to certain exemptions.  
10 In a related study, Hallock (1998) examines the relation between layoff announcements and executive 
compensation. He shows that firms announcing layoffs tend to pay their CEO more in subsequent years. 
However, controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, the higher pay for laying off employees is not 
statistically significant. 
11 Managers reported that, given flexibility in timing layoffs announcements, they tend to focus on fiscal 
quarter-ends: “The idea being that they may have already been suffering financially and therefore would 
take an additional ‘bath’ and count charges such as severance in a quarter that was already bad. They 
could then go into the new quarter (or year) ‘fresh.’” (Hallock 2006, p. 147) 
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1.2.2 Real Earnings Management and Employment  
Managers may modify resource allocation to achieve financial reporting objectives. 
Graham et al. (2005) state that managers are willing to take real economic actions to maintain 
accounting appearances. These actions include reducing R&D, advertising, and maintenance 
expenses to meet earnings targets. Roychowdhury (2006) finds that managers manipulate real 
activities to avoid reporting annual losses. He argues that managers use price discounts, 
overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. 
Cohen et al. (2010) likewise document that managers temporarily reduce advertising spending 
to improve reported quarterly and annual earnings. Bens, Nagar, and Wong (2002) 
demonstrate another manipulation channel in which managers shift resources from real 
investments toward stock repurchases around employee stock option exercise.  
Real earnings management entails changing the firm’s capital and labor, but, absent 
empirical investigation, its effect on a company’s workforce is unclear. On the one hand, a 
reduction in discretionary expenses and investments could decrease headcount, due to 
understaffing, layoffs or impede new hires. A manager may administrate headcount reductions 
to rapidly decrease cash outflows. On the other hand, efforts to increase revenues, such as 
channel stuffing and overproduction12 might induce over hiring, delay employment 
termination and expedite new hires. In order to accelerate revenues, a manager may increase 
headcount and sustain over-employment (Benson 2015), especially when the firm relies on 
personnel to provide goods and services.13  
Firing or hiring employees as a form of real earnings management is not fully explored 
by prior research. Several studies document patterns that are consistent with firms changing 
their workforces to meet financial reporting benchmarks. First, Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) use 
                                                          
12 Overproduction allows the manager to spread the fixed costs (which typically include some labor 
costs) over a higher number of units such that COGS decreases (assuming marginal costs do not 
increase). In subsequent periods, the firm incurs production and holding costs on the produced items 
that were not recovered in the same period through sales.  
13 Higher employment level supports higher revenues in the short-run when marginal revenue is 
positive.  
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annual number of employees to show a discontinuity of net hiring around the zero earnings 
benchmark. They hypothesize that reporting an accounting loss acts as a trigger to abandon 
investments and divest resources, and thus attribute the discontinuity to small loss firms having 
lower than expected net hiring. Building on their work, Jung et al. (2014) illustrate that higher 
quality financial reporting is associated with more efficient net hiring. 
Second, Dierynck et al. (2012) study private Belgian firms and focuse on their cost 
structure. They report that around the zero earnings benchmark, firms are more likely to 
modify their labor force (symmetric labor cost behavior). However, more profitable firms, less 
pressured by the earnings benchmark, react to decreases in activity by reducing the number of 
hours worked, instead of reducing headcount because of the costs associated with layoffs 
(asymmetric labor cost behavior). Hall (2016) also investigates labor cost behavior. Using 
public and private banks’ labor costs, he documents that public banks have a more flexible 
cost structures, that is, their elasticity of labor costs to revenues is higher. Hall (2016) also 
examines whether changes in labor costs are a form of real earnings management. He finds 
that banks substitute between labor cost reduction and accrual earnings management (high 
abnormal loan loss provisions) in response to financial reporting and regulatory pressures. 
Finally, Serfling (2016) predicts that firing costs create frictions that constrain firms 
from laying off employees, leading them instead to alter their financing structure. To test his 
prediction, he exploits a shock to firing costs, the staggered adoption of one of the Wrongful 
Discharge Laws (WDL) exemption, the good faith exemption, by US state courts.14 He shows 
that, when firing costs increase, the elasticity of earnings to sales increases, earnings 
persistence declines, and firms are less likely to discharge workers after a decline in earnings.  
                                                          
14 Prior to my sample periods, these laws were gradually adopted by state courts, starting with California 
in 1959 and most recently with Louisiana in 1998. State courts recognized three exemptions to the 
termination “at will” employment tradition. These are (i) good faith, (ii) implied contract, and (iii) 
public policy. Of particular interest is the good faith exemption, as it protects employees from 
termination for any reason other than for a “just cause” (Bai, Fairhurst, and Serfling 2017), thus 
increasing the legal risks and potential costs of firing. 
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The empirical evidence suggests that managers modify the number of employees and 
labor costs to meet financial reporting benchmarks. Managers may use temporary labor 
adjustments to improve their profitability and efficiency measures. The real earnings 
management literature reports that managers may alter discretionary expenses and production 
schedules. When managers decrease discretionary expenses, reduce R&D or postpone 
maintenance, they likely eliminate jobs or postpone new hires.15 This in turn will result in a 
smaller workforce. In contrast, when managers over produce or increase marketing, 
production, and distribution, they likely need additional workers. Thus, firms may add 
positions and postpone layoffs.  
The earnings management literature identifies firms with earnings right at or just 
above benchmarks as more likely to manage earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, 
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999, Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002). I follow prior 
literature and define firm-quarters as suspect of “earnings management” if they just meet or 
beat zero earnings, zero earnings growth, or analyst consensus forecast. My first hypothesis is 
as follows (stated in the null form): 
H1: Other things being equal, suspect firm-quarters do not exhibit unusually high or 
low employment levels. 
1.2.3 Voluntary Employment Disclosure and Myopic Behavior  
If workforce size or workforce growth rate is informative about the firm’s underlying 
economic activity, one might expect all firms to disclose their workforce quarterly (Grossman, 
1981). However, not all firms choose to provide employment information quarterly. 
                                                          
15 Employment is the outcome of a successful match between a firm and an employee (Pissarides 2000). 
The match is not permanent, and it may be broken by the firm or the employee. A match breaks when 
the firm lays off an employee or when an employee voluntarily leaves. For the United States, the 
monthly separation rate in the private sector was estimated as 3.4% in 2003, implying that around four 
out of 10 employees left their companies in 2003. This rate is close to the estimated hiring rate (Silva 
and Toledo 2009), suggesting firms are likely to extract effort and resources to maintain their workforce 
over time.  
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An extensive literature investigates managers’ decision to voluntary disclose 
information. Managers may possess superior information about their firms, even in efficient 
capital markets (Healy and Palepu 2001). They may choose to disclose their private 
information to outsiders or may choose to withhold this information to achieve some economic 
benefit. The analytical literature demonstrates the conditions under which rational managers 
choose to voluntarily disclose private information (Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1985). 
 In the absence of voluntary disclosure, rational investors infer that managers possess 
negative information. Dye (1985) articulates three general conditions under which voluntary 
disclosure does not happen: when a principal-agent conflict arises, when uncertainty exists 
about whether the manager is informed, or when some of the information is proprietary. In my 
setting, a manager knows the size of the firm’s workforce. Furthermore, the cost of obtaining, 
verifying and disclosing the number of employees on a quarterly basis is probably low. 
Nonetheless, the number of employees could be seen as proprietary information that managers 
would want to refrain from disclosing more frequently than mandated to limit potential 
damage to their competitive position (e.g., Wagenhofer 1990, Darrough and Stoughton 1990, 
Darrough 1993).  
 Einhorn and Ziv (2012) consider the joint problem of voluntarily disclosing and 
disclosing truthfully, a setting that mirrors the joint decision to disclose information and 
manage earnings. Einhorn and Ziv (2012) show that in equilibrium, the decision to voluntarily 
disclose is robust to the relaxation of the truthful disclosure assumption. Overall, work on 
voluntary disclosure suggests that the decision to disclose the number of employees quarterly 
may be motivated by information asymmetry and proprietary cost considerations, implying 
the decision should be independent from engagement in earnings management.   
Nevertheless, managers that manage earnings by changing their workforce size, may 
wish to avoid disclosing information about their employees. If earnings management is a 
purposeful intervention (Schipper 1989) that could be inferred from abnormal employment 
levels, then managers may prefer to refrain from providing voluntary employment disclosures.  
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Moreover, if abnormal employment levels could be deduced from quarterly 
employment disclosures, managers may use these employment disclosures to signal firm 
quality. Managers may increase transparency by providing employment information in interim 
reports (Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1985). These voluntary disclosures may also act as a 
disciplining mechanism, as a manager that provides voluntary employment disclosures is 
unable to change the workforce to manage earnings without disclosing these workforce 
changes to stakeholders. As such, voluntarily disclosing employment information would be 
consistent with the manager pledging to not manage earnings. Thus, voluntary quarterly 
employment disclosures would be associated with fewer incidences of just meeting earnings 
benchmarks.  
Prior empirical-archival research also investigates the effect of providing more 
frequent disclosures. Butler, Kraft, and Weiss (2007) study the choice of public firms to report 
annually, semi-annually, or quarterly, before the SEC mandated semi-annual and quarterly 
reporting. They find small differences between the stock price behavior of firms reporting 
quarterly and those reporting semi-annually, challenging the notion that higher frequency of 
reporting adds substantial new information. Nevertheless, firms that voluntarily increased their 
reporting frequency exhibit increased timeliness. 
Using a similar setting, Fu, Kraft, and Zhang (2012) show that voluntary and 
mandatory higher reporting frequency reduces information asymmetry and cost of equity, 
while Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam (2018) find a negative association between 
increased reporting frequency and investments, suggesting a real effect of more frequent 
disclosures. Ernstberger et al. (2017) exploit the EU’s Transparency Directive which requires 
all public EU firms to provide narrative disclosures more frequently (on a quarterly basis) 
from 2007. They report that the more frequent disclosures increase real activities 
manipulation.   
 In related work, Edmans, Heinle, and Huang (2016) analytically demonstrate that 
managers may choose to provide less disclosure to avoid myopic pressures. However, 
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managers cannot credibly commit to disclosing less, and thus, in equilibrium, they disclose 
more and under invest in long-run projects. Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) 
argue that, although increased information permits shareholders and boards to better monitor 
managers, the increased monitoring may also incentivize managers to engage in value-
reducing activities, intended to make them appear more able. Finally, Gigler et al. (2014) 
analyze the costs and benefits of increasing the frequency of financial reporting. They 
demonstrate that additional new information could motivate firms to change their business 
decisions such that price efficiency improves but economic efficiency worsens.  
Overall, both empirical and analytical research suggest that more frequent disclosures 
have an impact on resource allocation and are associated with myopic behavior. Providing 
disclosures at a higher frequency may be associated with managers focusing on short-term 
goals. These findings imply that firms that disclose their number of employees more 
frequently, are more likely to manage earnings.16 Thus, voluntary quarterly employment 
disclosures would be associated with more incidences of just meeting earnings benchmarks. 
My second hypothesis is as follows (stated in the null form): 
H2: Voluntary quarterly employment disclosures are not associated with earnings 
management. 
 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
1.3.1 Employment Data 
Regulation S-K requires firms to disclose the number of employees in their annual 
reports as part of the narrative description of the business.17 The SEC does not require firms 
                                                          
16 A positive association may also arise when the manager rationally attempts to decrease information 
asymmetry and shareholders’ perception of the firm’s volatility (Dye 1988, Trueman and Titman 1988). 
17 17 CFR 229.101(Item 101) Description of business. 
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to report the number of employees on a quarterly basis. Nonetheless, some firms choose to 
voluntarily provide information about the size or growth rate of their workforce.18 
Using hand-collected voluntary disclosures on employment from January 2006 until 
December 2016, I construct a data set that covers the largest 500 firms (by market 
capitalization) listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ that report under US GAAP. My sample 
includes 749 firms for which quarterly financial reports are available. For each firm, I search 
the most recent quarterly report available in 2016 for disclosures of the number of employees, 
using search words such as “employ,” “people,” “full-time,” “labor,” “worker,” “workforce,” 
“personnel,” “staff,” “associates,” and “partners.” Firms that disclose employment-related 
information in their most recent quarterly report are defined as disclosing firms for that 
quarter.19 For firms that do not disclose relevant information in their most recent quarterly 
report, I examine their disclosure policy in prior quarters.20 If a firm discloses relevant 
information in prior periods, I also define the firm as a disclosing firm. Otherwise, I define the 
firm as a non-disclosing firm. I review all quarterly reports of disclosing firms and record the 
number of employees reported in each quarter.  
                                                          
18 For example, LinkedIn in its 10-Q form for the period ended March 31, 2016, states: "Our Talent. 
We expect to continue to expand our workforce in 2016. However, such expansion, specifically related 
to our sales and product development teams, will be at a slower rate than in 2015. We expect that the 
increased headcount will result in an increase in related expenses, including stock-based compensation 
expense and capital expenditures related to facilities. As of March 31, 2016, we had 9,732 employees, 
which represented an increase of 27% compared to the same period last year." Furthermore, as part of 
the discussion on risk factors LinkedIn explains: “We continue to experience rapid growth in our 
headcount and operations, which will continue to place significant demands on our management and 
our operational and financial infrastructure. As of March 31, 2016, approximately 33% of our 
employees had been with us for less than one year and approximately 60% for less than two years.” 
19 I note that firms define their number of employees in various ways. Some firms report the total 
number of employees, and others the full-time equivalent. Interestingly, firms tend to disclose additional 
information about their labor force, such as the composition of employees (full-time or part-time; 
permanent or temporary), location (US or Non-US.; by regions), and exposure to labor unions (number 
of workers that are members of unions). Some firms provide only partial workforce information. Apple, 
for example, discloses in some quarters only the number of retail segment employees. 
20 I review prior interim financial reports on EDGAR in intervals of five. That is, I review every 5 th 
quarterly report starting from quarterly financial statements published in the last quarter of 2016 
(between September 2016 and December 2016), and going back until the first quarter of 2006. Thus, I 
review different fiscal quarters in different years. This procedure increases the likelihood of identifying 
firms that initiate or cease employment disclosure during the sample period.  
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Moreover, using EDGAR, I identify the interim financial report in which each 
disclosing firm provide information about its workforce size for the first time. Thirty-nine 
companies disclose their number of employees in the first 10-Q they filled with the SEC. Nine 
companies provide employment disclosures as early as of the first quarter of 1994,21 and out 
of these, five firms disclose their number of employees every quarter from the first quarter of 
1994 until the end of the sample period in 2016 (92 consecutively quarters).     
Overall, 154 firms provide information about their workforce in their interim reports 
during the sample period, and 143 firms (4028 firm-quarter) have consecutive disclosures that 
permit constructing quarterly employment time-series.22 Over a span of up to 44 quarters 
examined, 20.5% of the firms choose to voluntarily disclose the size or growth rate of their 
workforce for at least part of the sample period. Disclosing firms provide information about 
their personnel for 28 quarters on average. Thus, the voluntary disclosure choice appears to be 
sticky, and firms tend to voluntarily disclose repeatedly over time.  
The properties of disclosing firms differ from non-disclosing firms. Panel A of Table 
1.9.1 provides descriptive statistics23 for the annual change in the number of employees for all 
sample firms. The mean (median) change in the number of employees for the full sample is 
6.4% (2.5%). The mean (median) annual change in the number of employees of disclosing 
firms is 9.5% (3.0%), while the mean (median) annual change for non-disclosing firms is 5.7% 
(2.3%). The mean change in the number of employees of disclosing firms is statistically 
significantly higher than the mean change of non-disclosing firms (t=3.804).24 This suggests 
that disclosing firms change their workforce more abruptly from one year to the next.  
Panel B of Table 1.9.1 presents the descriptive statistic for the quarterly change in the 
number of employees for disclosing firms. The mean (median) firm-quarter change (pooled) 
                                                          
21 Companies start filling through EDGAR in 1994. 
22 At least two consecutive quarters. 
23 The annual number of employees and the quarterly and annual financial data are from Compustat.  
24 A nonparametric test, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, suggests that the underlying distributions of the two 
samples are statistically significant different (Z=2.803). 
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in the number of employees is 1.9% (0.5%), and the mean (median) firm increases its 
workforce by 2.2% (1.3%) per quarter on average (cross-sectional). The quarterly change in 
employment is more volatile than the average cross-sectional change (variance of 0.009 and 
0.003, respectively), implying that employment fluctuates more across firms than within firms. 
The maximum (minimum) quarterly change is 174.1% (–45.3%), suggesting that changes in 
employment may reflect acquisition and divesting activities. 
The decision to disclose appears to be associated with industry membership. Table 
1.9.2 presents the number of firms in the full sample and the number of disclosing firms by 
industry division (SIC). Voluntary employment disclosures are most common for firms in 
finance, insurance, and real estate (36% of the sample firms) and in services (32%). These 
industries rely on human capital for their operations and may use these disclosures to provide 
investors with information regarding their current level of economic activity and prospects. 
Furthermore, banks are required to disclose their workforce size on form Y-9C, which 
all banks with assets greater than $500 million must file with the Federal Reserve quarterly. 
This regulatory requirement may explain why financial institutions are more likely to provide 
quarterly disclosures regarding their labor force. Financial institutions also have a business 
model that differs substantially from firms in other industries. Thus, I exclude banks and 
financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500) from the main analyses.  
I proceed by examining changes in the firms’ employment disclosure policy. Figure 
1.8.1 describes the number of firms that change their disclosure policy between 1994 and 2016. 
I define a firm-quarter t as a “Start Disclosure” quarter, if the firm discloses its workforce size 
in quarter t but does not disclose information about its workforce size in quarter t-1. Similar, 
a “Stop Disclosure” quarter is defined as a quarter in which the firm does not disclose 
information about employment, although in the prior quarter t-1, the firm provides information 
on its workforce size.  
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Figure 1.8.1 shows that more firms initiate employment disclosure during the sample 
period. In general, it appears that over time, more firms start providing employment 
disclosures than stop providing such disclosures. The difference between the number of firms 
that start disclosing and the number of firms that stop disclosing in each period, is positive on 
average. During the sample period, 2006-2016, the difference between the number of firms 
that start providing employment disclosures and stop providing these disclosures in each 
quarter, is 0.659 on average (statistically significant different from zero at a 10% level). 
Extending the time period to 1994, the average difference is 0.772 (statistically significant 
different from zero at a 1% level).  
 The main analysis and remaining tests use both disclosing and non-disclosing firms. 
I use the Heckman (1979) procedure to correct for potential sample selection bias from the 
nonrandom choice of providing quarterly disclosures. I estimate a selection model for firm i 
at time t, using the full sample and construct the inverse Mills ratio. The selection model is as 
follows. 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1.7.1.  
The dependent variable (Disclose) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 
provides voluntarily employment disclosure for the fiscal quarter t, and 0 otherwise. In my 
sample,25 firms that choose to disclose quarterly have, on average, higher market 
capitalization, more assets, and are more likely to belong to the high-tech industry.26 Thus I 
expect the likelihood of disclosing the number of employees quarterly (Pr⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)) to 
increase with total assets (TotalAssets) and market value of equity (MVE). Furthermore, as 
                                                          
25 In sections 1.4 and 1.5, I further discuss the characteristics of disclosing and non-disclosing firms. 
26 I follow Kasznik and Lev’s (1995) classification of high-technology industries. A firm is classified 
as high-tech if it is a member of pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833–2836), R&D services (8731–8734), 
programming (7371–7379), computers (3570–3577), or electronics (3600–3674) industries. 
(1.1) Pr⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5∆𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   
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disclosing firms have more intangible assets, I control for the level of intangibles 
(IntangibleAssets) as well as for the ratio of intangibles to total assets (IntangibleRatio). A 
firm that has more intangible assets or a higher ratio is likely relying more on human capital 
for production and growth. Thus, providing quarterly disclosures regarding the number of 
employees would be more informative to the firm’s stakeholders. However, the firm’s 
employment policy or number of employees may also be proprietary information, and this 
would be associated with lower likelihood of voluntary disclosure. 
I also control for characteristics of the firm’s employment policy using two proxies. 
First, I control for the annual percentage change in the number of employees (ΔEmployees). 
Firms that experience larger changes in their workforce from one year to the next may be less 
willing to share the nature or speed of these changes. Nevertheless, these firms may be more 
occupied with personnel management and thus would find it beneficial to share employment 
information with their investors. Second, I use Fortune’s 100 Best Companies To Work For 
list as a proxy for firms’ employer-employee relationship (Fortune). The list, published 
annually, ranks US companies based on employee happiness and perks.27 I use the ranking for 
2005–2016 to identify firms that are more likely to expend resources to attract and retain 
employees. I expect firms on the list will view the quantity and quality of their employees as 
more critical and thus will make more frequent disclosures regarding personnel. 
Finally, I include controls for financial constraint (Leverage), growth opportunities 
(MTB), and asset turnover ratio (TurnoverRatio), as well as fixed effects for industry 
(IndustryFE) and time (TimeFE). I expect firms to have lower likelihood of quarterly 
disclosure if they are financially constrained and have less growth opportunities and lower 
production efficiency.  
                                                          
27 To identify the 100 Best Companies to Work For, Fortune and Great Place to Work survey US 
corporations. Each company’s score is based on Trust Index survey feedback from a random sample of 
employees. People anonymously assess their workplace, including the quality of their leaders, support 
for their personal and professional lives, and their relationships with colleagues. Survey results are 
compared with peer organizations of like size and complexity. In addition, Great Place to Work scores 
a Culture Audit management questionnaire from each company, which reports details such as 
compensation and benefits, hiring practices, recognition, training, and diversity programs (see 
http://fortune.com/best-companies/). 
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1.3.2 Normal Employment Model  
To test my first hypothesis, I investigate patterns in the number of employees to detect real 
activities manipulation. Relaying on the firm’s business model and production inputs, I 
construct a prediction model for the firm’s level of employment in the short-run. I estimate the 
following employment model and use the estimated residuals as proxies for the firms’ 
abnormal employment level.28 Equation (1.2) denotes the normal level of employment. 
  
Firms experience voluntary and involuntary employee turnovers such that even 
maintaining a stable workforce size requires financial and operational resources. Workforce 
changes are costly and these costs come in the form of hiring and training (Barron, Berger, 
and Black 1997, Merz and Yashiv 2007, Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker 2012), severance 
payments, survivor’s syndrome (Cascio 1993), and reorganization costs.29 To minimize costs, 
firms should aim to maintain stable employment levels, particularly when relying on highly 
skilled workers (Ghaly, Dang, and Stathopoulos 2017). Accordingly, their total number of 
employees in the next period (Employeest) depends chiefly on the number of employees they 
already employ (Employeest-1). Furthermore, larger firms that have more assets (TotalAssets) 
likely require more staff. Hence, I expect bigger employers and larger firms to have a higher 
headcount.  
The workforce size is determined by the firm’s economic activity. Firms that have 
higher sales turnover (Sales) and less inventory (Inventory) are expected to have higher 
demand for labor in subsequent periods. Firms that have high levels of noncurrent assets 
                                                          
28 I note that the labor estimation is a dynamic model, where the lagged number of employees is used 
as an explanatory variable. Hence, effectively the estimated residuals are equivalent to abnormal 
changes in the number of employees.  
29 The estimates of the costs of employee turnover vary widely and depend on whether all costs are 
recognized. These estimates fluctuate between 25% and 200% of annual compensation for a departing 
employee (Silva and Toledo 2009). 
(1.2) 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑄4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝑄3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑄2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐸 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸
+ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   
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(NCA) own many tangible and intangible assets. On the one hand, these firms may rely on 
capital-intensive production processes and business models. Thus, high levels of noncurrent 
assets may be associated with lower future employment. On the other hand, more productive 
assets may indicate that these firms need more employees to develop, operate, and maintain 
their assets, thus leading to higher future employment. 
The ratios of intangible assets (IntangibleRatio) and property plant and equipment 
(PPE) to total assets attempt to control for production processes. Firms that have more 
intangible assets and more PPE relative to their total assets likely rely on more personnel. Thus 
I expect a positive association between these two ratios and employment. 
I follow Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and control for short-term liquidity (QuickRatio) 
and long-term financing (Leverage). The quick ratio controls for changes in labor due to cash 
flow shortages and short-term liquidity problems. Leverage controls for financial constraints, 
a reduction in funds available for investment which may hinder labor demand. I also control 
for large changes in the firm’s assets: I expect a positive association between acquiring firms 
(Acquirer) and the number of employees, and a negative association between divesting firms 
(Divestor) and the number of employees. 
Prior literature focuses on financial measures of real earnings management such as 
abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expense and abnormal production 
costs. This literature estimates normal operating cash flows, normal discretionary expense and 
normal production at the industry level, and then defines the difference between the predicted 
normal and actual as abnormal. My approach differs as I use Equation (1.2) to define the 
normal employment level at the firm level. Equation (1.2) is a prediction model of the firm’s 
next period level of employment based on the firm’s current assets, finances and business 
activity.30      
                                                          
30 This approach allows me to control for variation within industry and for firm specific characteristics. 
Firms operating in the same industry may use various technologies and have varied business models, 
which implies different employment policies.   
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I estimate Equation (1.2) using quarterly data. I control for the fiscal quarter 
(QjDummy) and also include time and firm fixed effects. The regression residuals denote the 
abnormal employment, the deviation from the firm’s normal employment level as predicted 
by the model in Equation (1.2). I examine whether firms that just meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks exhibit higher or lower abnormal employment relative to the rest of the sample 
firms.  
1.3.3 Selection of Suspect Firm-quarters  
Prior literature suggests that reported earnings to the right of benchmarks (just at the 
benchmark or slightly above) may indicate that the earnings were likely managed (Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997, Degeorge et al. 1999, Bartov et al. 2002).  
To test the hypothesis about earnings management, I define the following three 
indicators for when earnings management is more likely to occur. 
1. Firm-quarters with small income. These are firm-quarters where a firm just meets or beats 
the zero earnings benchmark. To be consistent with prior literature, I adjust the annual bin 
width used by Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) to quarterly frequencies and define 
firm-quarters as suspect of engaging in earnings management when income before 
extraordinary items (IBEI) scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.00125.  
2. Firm-quarters with small earnings growth. These are firm-quarters where a firm just meets 
or beats the zero-earnings growth benchmark. Again, to be consistent with prior literature, 
I adjust the annual bin width used by Gunny (2010) to quarterly frequencies and define 
firm-quarters as suspect of engaging in earnings management when changes in net income 
scaled by lagged total assets are between 0 and 0.0025.  
3. Firm-quarters that just meet or beat analyst forecasts. These are firm-quarters where the 
difference between actual earnings-per-share and the last analyst forecast consensus31 is 
between 0 and 1 cent (Degeorge et al. 1999, Roychowdhury 2006, Zang 2012). 
                                                          
31 I use the actual EPS and construct the analyst forecast consensus using data provided by I/B/E/S. 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), I define the forecast consensus as the mean of all analysts’ final 
forecasts outstanding prior to the earnings announcement date.  
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 During the sample period, there are 521 (1.85%) firm-quarters just beating or meeting 
the zero earnings benchmark, 4,429 (15.8%) just bearing or meeting the zero-earnings growth 
benchmark, and 2,062 (7.35%) just beating or meeting analyst forecast consensus. 
 
1.4 Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1 Choice Model Estimation  
 Table 1.9.3 provides descriptive statistics for disclosing and non-disclosing firms. 
Disclosing firms seems to be bigger in terms of total assets (TotalAssets) and market 
capitalization (MVE), relative to non-disclosing firms. Disclosing firms have mean (median) 
$27.76 billion ($9.09 billion) in TotalAssets and $28.86 billion ($11.26 billion) MVE, 
compared to non-disclosing firms with $19.28 billion ($9.38 billion) in TotalAssets and $21.03 
billion ($9.92 billion) MVE. The difference in total assets means is statistically significant for 
the parametric test (t=7.66). The difference in market capitalization is statistically significant 
for the parametric test (t=8.99) and for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test 
(Z=6.394), rejecting the null that these two samples have equal means and medians. Also, the 
average disclosing firm has more intangible assets (t=10.1231). Interestingly, the median 
disclosing firm and the median non-disclosing firm appear to have similar intangible assets 
(Z=0.816), and a similar intangible ratio (Z=0.963). 
 Disclosing firms have statistically significantly higher mean (median) annual 
percentage change in the number of employees (ΔEmployees) and are, on average, more likely 
to appear in Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work For list (16% of disclosing firms, relative 
to 8% of non-disclosing firms). Thus, disclosing firms appear to invest more resources in 
managing and maintaining their workforce. Furthermore, disclosing firms are, on average, less 
leveraged (Leverage) and have lower asset turnover ratios (TurnoverRatio). Finally, disclosing 
firms are more likely to belong to a high-technology industry (25% of disclosing firms relative 
to 17% of non-disclosing firms).  
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 Table 1.9.4 presents the Probit estimation of the disclosure choice model. As 
expected, firms with higher labor growth rates (ΔEmployees) and those that appear on 
Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work For list (Fortune) are more likely to provide quarterly 
employment disclosures. The regression results do not support that total assets and market 
capitalization are associated with the disclosure likelihood. Interestingly, the coefficient on 
intangible ratio (IntangibleRatio) is statistically significant and negative, which is consistent 
with the notion that the number of employees may contain proprietary information. 
The estimation of the disclosure choice model is the first stage of the Heckman (1979) 
procedure to correct for potential sample selection bias. The residuals from the disclosure 
choice estimation are used to construct the inverse Mills ratio. I include the inverse Mills ratio 
(Mills) in subsequent regression analysis to control for the choice to provide employment 
disclosures at a higher frequency than mandated by the SEC.   
1.4.2 Abnormal Employment Estimation  
 I estimate the baseline model for normal employment and use the regression residuals 
as a measure for abnormal employment. Table 1.9.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
normal employment model’s variables. The sample size is smaller, compared to Table 1.9.3, 
due to stronger data requirements, as more variables are required for the estimation of the 
normal employment model.  
 Table 1.9.5 presents the descriptive statistics for quarterly data, which covers 87 firms 
(over up to 44 quarters), employing between 150 and 390,000 employees, where the average 
(median) firm employs 40,891 (16,850) employees. Furthermore, the average (median) firm 
has total assets equal to $25.19 billion ($83.70 billion) and quarterly mean (median) sales 
equal $4.05 billion ($1.58 billion).  
 The normal employment model estimation is reported in Table 1.9.6. The coefficients 
on lag employees and log assets (Assets) are significant and consistent with the predication. 
Table 1.9.6 suggests that Leverage is positively associated with quarterly employment. 
Interestingly, both Acquirer and Divestor are associated with lower employment. The 
coefficient on Acquirer is negative and statistically significant, consistent with the view that 
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mergers and acquisitions allow for synergies, and thus permits headcount reductions (relative 
to the underlying economic activity). Overall, the results presented in Table 1.9.6 indicate that 
the normal employment model has strong explanatory power with adjusted R2 =0.96.32  
 I note that the normal employment model is dynamic. The estimation presented in 
Table 1.9.6 is based on a pooled cross-sectional model with firm and time fixed effects as well 
as correction for autocorrelation in the residuals. This estimation is based on lagged variables 
to mitigate confounding effects that arise when using contemporaneous variables. 
Nonetheless, the literature suggests that fixed effect specifications do not remove 
unobservable heterogeneity in dynamic panel data, such that the lagged variable is correlated 
with the error terms (Nickell 1981). Thus the standard estimation approach may yield biased, 
although consistent and asymptotically efficient, coefficients estimates (Kiviet 1995). This 
bias is more severe for moderate time dimensions and moderate number of data panels. To 
address this concern, I also estimate Equation (1.2) using the Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches, which uses lagged variables and first differences as 
instruments and corrects for autocorrelated errors. When I construct the abnormal employment 
measure using this alternative specification and repeat my analysis, the main results are 
unaffected.  
1.4.3 Real Earnings Management  
 The residuals from the normal employment estimation presented in Table 1.9.6 are 
used to proxy for abnormal employment. The abnormal employment measure denotes the 
percentage deviation33 from the predicted labor force size. Hence positive (negative) abnormal 
employment indicates that the firm’s personnel is larger (smaller) than predicted based on the 
                                                          
32 All firms are mandated to disclose annual employment data in their annual reports. As a sensitivity 
test, I also estimate the normal employment level for all firms using annual data. However, due to the 
dynamic nature of employment data, the prediction model for normal employment, does not perform as 
well for annual data (adjusted R2 = 0.66). Thus, I focus on quarterly data in an attempt to capture short-
term changes in the workforce.   
33 The dependent variable in the labor estimation is log of total number of employees. Hence, the 
residuals are the difference of two logs, which is equivalent to the log of the ratio: log(x) - log(y) = 
log(x/y). For ease of presentation, I take the exponential of the residuals and subtract one, which denotes 
the percentage deviation from the predicted number of employees: exp(log(x/y)) - 1 = x/y - 1.  
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firm’s fundamentals. If firms that just meet or beat reporting benchmarks alter their workforce 
to reduce costs, generate higher revenues, or create an appearance of lower marginal 
production costs, then the abnormal employment for these firm-quarters, should exhibit 
different patterns relative to the rest of the sample. I follow Roychowdhury (2006) and 
estimate the abnormal employment (Abn Employment) using the following model: 
 
 
 I control for market value of equity (Size) and book-to-market ratio (BTM), expressed 
as deviations from industry-quarter mean. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995, 1996) and 
Roychowdhury (2006) argue that the estimation of abnormal accruals and abnormal 
measurements of real activities may have measurement errors correlated with firm 
performance. Similarly, my estimation of abnormal employment may have measurement 
errors positively correlated with firm performance. To address this concern, I include as a 
control the concurrent ratio of income before extraordinary items (IBEI) to lagged total assets, 
expressed as deviation from industry-quarter mean (NI).  
 I also include an indicator variable for suspect firms (Suspect). As previously 
discussed, I consider three types of suspect firms: (i) IBEI/Assets suspect equals 1 for firm-
quarters that report IBEI scaled by lagged total assets between 0 and 0.00125 and 0 otherwise 
(IBEI/Assets suspect). (ii) ΔEarnings/Assets suspect equals 1 for firm-quarters that report 
changes in net income scaled by lagged total assets between 0 and 0.0025 and 0 otherwise 
(ΔEarnings/Assets suspect). (iii) Analyst consensus suspect equals 1 for firm-quarters for 
which the difference between actual earnings per share and the last analyst forecast consensus 
is between 0 and 1 cent and 0 otherwise (Analyst consensus suspect). 
(1.3) 𝐴𝑏𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ,𝑡  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  
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 Table 1.9.7 reports the cross-sectional analysis.34 Column 2 indicates that suspect 
firms that report small profits (IBEI/Assets suspect) have lower abnormal employment (Abn 
Employment) compared to the rest of the sample. These suspect firms’ number of employees 
is smaller on average by 5.5% quarterly. These differences are statistically and economically 
significant, as this implies under-employment of 2,249 employees for the average firm. 
 Column 3 reveals that suspect firms that report small earnings growth 
(ΔEarnings/Assets suspect) are associated with higher abnormal employment (Abn 
Employment). Firms that report small quarterly earnings growth, employ on average 3.0% 
more employees. This result is statistically significant at a 1% level as well as economically 
significant, as it implies over-employment of 1,227 employees for the average firm.  
 Finally, Column 4 presents a positive association between Analyst consensus suspect 
firms and Abn Employment. Firms that just meet or beat analyst consensus appear to have 
more employees. These firms employ on average 2.6% more employees.  
 Overall, the results presented in Table 1.9.7 suggest that firms alter their workforce to 
meet reporting benchmarks, and thus, I reject the null that suspect firm-quarters do not exhibit 
unusual employment levels. Interestingly, firms that report small profits appear to have 
insufficient number of employees. This finding is consistent with the findings of Pinnuck and 
Lillis (2007), who document a discontinuity in net hiring around zero earnings and argue 
reporting negative earnings disciplines firms’ investments in employees. Nonetheless, this 
finding may also indicate that firms reduce the number of employees to reduce expenses and 
avoid reporting losses. 
 Furthermore, firms that report small earnings growth or just meet or beat analyst 
forecasts appear to have excess staff. This suggests firms may use different practices to meet 
different benchmarks. The analysis implies that firms may increase their workforce to generate 
                                                          
34 Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure (untabulated) yield similar results.   
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more sales and revenues (accelerate sales, channel staffing, over-production) to meet or beat 
market expectations.35  
Roychowdhury (2006) argues that firms engaging in earnings management by 
manipulating sales, discretionary expenditure and production, have lower abnormal operating 
cash flows.36 If managers alter their sales and production schedules to meet earnings goals, 
employment levels should mirror these earnings management activities. Thus, the association 
between abnormal employment and abnormal cash flows should be negative for firms 
engaging in real earnings management.  
I estimate a fully interacted model to examine the association between abnormal cash 
flows (Abnormal CFO) and abnormal employment (Abn Employment) for suspect firms. 
Column 1 of Table 1.9.8 presents the baseline estimation. The association between abnormal 
employment and abnormal cash flows is negative. The results for the fully interacted model 
are presented in Column 2 - Column 4 of Table 1.9.8. These results suggest that firms with 
higher (lower) abnormal cash flows that report small earnings growth or just meet or beat 
analyst forecast, are associated with lower (higher) abnormal employment.37 Consistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006), suspect firms with lower abnormal cash flows are associated with 
higher abnormal employment, suggesting that these firms change their resource allocation to 
meet earnings benchmarks.     
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Prior literature suggests that firms may trade-off between accrual-based earnings management and 
real earnings management (Zang 2012). In untabulated results, I include discretionary accruals, 
estimated following the modified Jones (1991) model, in the baseline model for normal employment. I 
construct the abnormal employment measure using this specification and repeat my analysis. The main 
results are unaffected.       
36 I follow Roychowdhury (2006) and define abnormal cash flows as the deviations from the predicted 
values from the corresponding industry-year regression: (Operating cash flowst /Assetst-1) = α0 + 
α1(1/Assetst-1) + α2(Salest /Assetst-1) + α3(ΔSalest /Assetst-1) + εt. 
37 Untabulated results suggest that firms exhibiting higher abnormal production and report small 
earnings growth or just meet or beat analyst forecast, are associated with higher abnormal employment. 
Furthermore, firms exhibiting lower discretionary expenses and report small earnings growth or just 
meet or beat analyst forecast, are associated with lower abnormal employment.   
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1.4.4 Subsequent Performance  
The labor market has frictions and workforce adjustments are costly for firms. Oi (1962) 
argues that labor is a quasi-fixed production factor, where the fixed employment costs arise 
from investments in hiring38 and training.39  
While over- or under-employment permit managers to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks, the potential costs of abnormal employment are borne by the firm in the long-
run. Search and training costs, labor market reputation and production efficiency are not 
directly observable in financial statements, however, they are likely to influence the firm’s 
future productivity.  
Abnormal employment may generate substantial costs for firms in the short and long-
run, mainly as hiring costs are considered convex (Blatter et al. 2015). Training costs exhibit 
some economics of scale (Blatter et al. 2015), nonetheless, short-term changes to the labor 
force may lead to tacit knowledge loss, as well as lower returns on training and reduced 
productivity.  
If abnormal employment captures deviations from firms’ long-term employment 
levels, the costs associated with these deviations should be reflected in future firm 
performance. I follow Gunny (2010) and examine future firm performance using the following 
model:  
                                                          
38 Hiring costs are those costs that do not affect the worker’s productivity (Oi 1962). Such costs include 
searching and recruiting employees, conducting interviews and examinations, and various admin costs 
related to processing applications and payroll records. Barron et al. (1997) analyze the 1982 
Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) survey and the 1992 Small Business Administration 
(SBA) survey. These surveys asked employers a series of questions concerning hiring and training new 
employees. Based on these two surveys, they find that an employer spends 11.24-15.99 hours per each 
hire. Their findings imply that the average time spent on filing a vacancy is 2.2 percent to 3.2 percent 
of quarterly hours worked, which according to Silva and Toledo (2009) is equivalent to 3 percent to 4.5 
percent of the quarterly wage of a new hire. 
39 Training expenses are direct investments in human capital, enhancing general and firm-specific skills, 
and are designed to improve the worker’s productivity (Oi 1962; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999; 
Kessler and Lülfesmann 2006). Barron et al. (1997) document that the average training cost of a newly 
hired worker is equivalent to 55% of their quarterly wage. These findings are consistent with Dolfin 
(2006), who studies the EOPP survey data. She shows that a new employee spends 201 hours in training 
activities during the first three months on the job, and that existing employees spend on average 146 
hours training a new employee. Furthermore, Bishop (1997) and Silva and Toledo (2009) report that 
the starting productivity gap between a new employee and an incumbent employee is around 40%. This 
gap is closed after on-the-job training period and learning by doing. 
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In contrast to Gunny (2010), I do not examine suspect firms directly, but focus on a 
potential measure of real earnings management defined as absolute abnormal employment 
(Abs(Abn Employment)), the absolute percentage deviation from normal employment level. I 
use the absolute value of abnormal employment as both over- or under-employment may 
generate costs for the firm.   
Column 1 of Table 1.9.9 reports the estimation of Equation (1.4), where future 
performance is denoted by future operating cash flows, expressed as deviations from industry-
quarter mean. The results presented in Column 1 of Table 1.9.9 indicate that absolute abnormal 
employment is associated with lower future cash flows (CFO). In columns 2 and 3 of Table 
1.9.9, future performance is given by future operating income (Operating Income) and future 
operating expense (Operating Expense), respectively, expressed as deviations from industry-
quarter means. Absolute abnormal employment does not appear associated with higher future 
operating income, however, absolute abnormal employment is associated with lower future 
operating expense.  
Overall, the analysis presented in Table 1.9.9 suggests that short-term labor 
adjustments, captured by the absolute value of abnormal employment, are associated with 
future costs for firms. Furthermore, these adjustments may not contribute to higher subsequent 
economic activity as reflected by operating income and operating cash flows.  
 
 
 
(1.4) 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐴𝑏𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 ,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑄4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑄3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑄2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡    
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1.5 Voluntary Employment Disclosure and Managerial Behavior  
The analysis presented above is based on a voluntary disclosure setting. Only some 
firms disclose their number of employees quarterly, more often than mandated by the SEC. 
The descriptive evidence suggests that firms’ choice to disclose information about their 
workforce size more often, does not appear random. Some firms provide quarterly 
employment disclosures starting from their initial public financial statement. Other firms have 
been disclosing their workforce size every quarter since the firm’s first EDGAR filling. The 
decision to provide more frequent (quarterly) employment disclosures may be correlated with 
firm characteristics, as previously discussed in the choice model in section 1.4.  
On the one hand, disclosing employment information at a higher frequency than 
required by the SEC may reveal managerial actions, such as earnings management through the 
firm’s workforce. Hence, managers may choose to provide voluntary employment disclosures 
to signal firm quality and limit real earnings management activities. Nevertheless, managers 
may also withhold voluntary employment disclosures to council real earning management 
activities. Overall, these arguments suggest a negative association between voluntary quarterly 
employment disclosures and earnings management. 
On the other hand, disclosing employment information at a higher frequency than 
mandated by the SEC may bring managers to focus on shorter horizons (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2012, Gigler et al. 2014). Prior literature suggests that more frequent disclosures 
have an impact on resource allocation and induce myopic behavior. Thus, firms that provide 
quarterly employment disclosures may be more prone to managing earnings, suggesting a 
positive association between voluntary quarterly employment disclosures and earnings 
management.  
To test these predictions, I examine the relation between more frequent employment 
disclosures and earnings management. I estimate the probability of a firm to be considered as 
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a suspect firm, using the three types of suspect firms as previously defined. I estimate the 
following regression. 
 
 I control for changes in firm size (Assets) and include a dummy variable for firms that 
meet or beat the earnings benchmark repeatedly (HabitualBeater) as these firms have stronger 
incentives to maintain their track record (Bartov et al. 2002, Kasznik and McNichols 2002, 
Zang 2012). I also attempt to control for firms’ financing needs, as Richardson, Tuna, and Wu 
(2002) suggest that attracting external financing at a lower cost is a primary motivation for 
earnings manipulation. 
 Table 1.9.10 present the estimation of Equation (1.5) using quarterly data for 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms. Firms that provide quarterly employment disclosures 
(Disclose) are not associated with higher likelihood of managing earnings, as measured by 
IBEI to lagged total assets. Just meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark is not 
associated with the disclosure decision. Nonetheless, firms that provide quarterly employment 
disclosures are more likely to report small profit growth and just meet or beat the analyst 
forecast.  
 These findings provide some support for the notion that firms that provide more 
frequent disclosures are more focused on short-term reporting goals and more sensitive to 
capital market pressures.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter documents that 20.5% of large public US firms voluntarily disclose their 
number of employees in their interim financial reports. These firms choose to provide 
information regarding their personnel more often than is required by the SEC.  
(1.5) 𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝑖 ,𝑡 = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 ,𝑡 +
𝛽5∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑄3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑄2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹𝐸 +
𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   
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I use the voluntary disclosures of the number of employees to study whether managers 
alter their workforces to manage earnings. My findings are consistent with managers 
decreasing workforce size to avoid reporting losses and increasing it to support revenue 
increasing activities, which, in turn, permits reporting small earnings growth and meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts. Thus, financial performance measures appear to induce fluctuations 
to non-financial variables. 
 My analysis of firms’ employment policies is based on a voluntary disclosure setting, 
which may limit the generalizability of my results. I separately examine whether the decision 
to provide quarterly employment disclosures is informative about managerial actions. The 
literature suggests that frequent financial reporting induces myopic behavior and causes 
investors and firms to become too focused on short-term performance (Kraft et al. 2018). 
Consistent with the literature, I document a positive association between providing more 
frequent employment disclosures and the likelihood of reporting small earnings growth and 
just meeting or beating analyst forecasts.  
 Overall, this chapter demonstrates another channel for real earnings management. 
Managers appear to change their firms’ workforces to meet short-term reporting goals. This 
practice may destroy value over time, as hiring and firing employees is costly, and may reduce 
production efficiency. Furthermore, this form of real earnings management may introduce 
noise into labor-market matching and increase labor market fluctuations. My analysis suggests 
that higher frequency reporting and capital market pressures may create distortions in the labor 
market and increase inefficiencies—an insight that may contribute to discussions regarding 
the costs and benefits of more frequent disclosures.  
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1.7 Appendix 
APPENDIX 1.7.1  
Variable Descriptions 
Discloset An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm provides voluntarily 
employment disclosure for the fiscal quarter t. 
TotalAssetst Total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
MVEt Market value of equity the end of the fiscal quarter t 
IntangibleAssetst Total intangible assets at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
IntangibleRatiot Total intangible assets to total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
ΔEmployeest Annual percentage change in the number of employees during the 
recent fiscal year. 
Fortune An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm is listed on Fortune’s 
100 Best Companies to Work For between 2005 and 2016, and 0 
otherwise. 
Leveraget The ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
MTBt The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end 
of the fiscal quarter t. 
TurnoverRatiot The ratio of sales to lagged total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter 
t.  
Employeest Log of the total number of employees a firm discloses in its interim 
financial report for fiscal quarter t.  
Salest Total sales turnover at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
Inventoryt Total inventory at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
NCAt Total noncurrent assets at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
PPEt Total property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets at the end 
of the fiscal quarter t. 
QuickRatiot Quick ratio at the end of the fiscal quarter t, defined in Penman (2004). 
(Cash and Short Term Investments + Receivables)/ Current Liabilities 
Acquirert-1 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if in the prior quarter the book 
value of total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter increases by more 
than 25% from the beginning of the fiscal quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
Divestort-1 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if in the prior quarter the book 
value of total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter decreases by more 
than 25% from the beginning of the quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
QjDummyt An indicator variable set equal to 1 for fiscal quarters j={2,3,4}, and 
0 otherwise. 
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Millst Inverse Mills ratio using the residuals from the disclosure choice 
estimation. 
IBEI/Assets suspectt An indicator variable set equal to 1 if income before extraordinary 
items (IBEI) scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.00125, 
and 0 otherwise. 
ΔEarnings/Assets 
suspectt 
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if changes in net income scaled by 
lagged total assets are between 0 and 0.0025, and 0 otherwise. 
Analyst consensus 
suspectt 
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the difference between actual 
earnings-per-share and the last analyst forecast consensus is between 
0 and 1 cent, and 0 otherwise. 
Hightech An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firms it is a member of 
pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833–2836), R&D services (8731–
8734), programming (7371–7379), computers (3570–3577), or 
electronics (3600–3674) industries. I follow Kasznik and Lev’s 
(1995) classification of high-technology industries.  
Assetst Log of total assets at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
Sizet MVEt expressed as deviations from industry-quarter mean, at the end 
of the fiscal quarter t. 
BTMt The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end 
of the fiscal quarter t, expressed as deviations from industry-quarter 
mean. 
NIt Income before extraordinary items (IBEI) to lagged total assets, 
expressed as deviation from industry-quarter mean, at the end of the 
fiscal quarter t. 
Abnormal CFOt As in Roychowdhury (2006), abnormal cash flows is the deviations 
from the predicted values from the corresponding industry-year 
regression: (Operating cash flows)t/Assetst-1=α0 + α1(1/Assetst-1) + 
α2(Salest /Assetst-1) + α3(ΔSalest /Assetst-1)+εt  
CFOt Operating cash flows, expressed as deviations from industry-quarter 
mean, at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
Operating Incomet Operating income, expressed as deviations from industry-quarter 
mean, at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
Operating Expenset Operating expense, expressed as deviations from industry-quarter 
mean, at the end of the fiscal quarter t. 
ZScoret 
 
A measure of financial health modified from Altman’s Z-score 
(Altman 1968, Mackie-Mason 1990) and annualized based on past 
four quarters 
Returnt The one quarter holding period return on an investment in firm j's 
common stock. 
ΔCurrentLiabilitiest 
 
The change in total current liability over lagged total assets, at the end 
of the fiscal quarter t 
HabitualBeatert An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm beat or meet an earnings 
benchmark in the past two quarters, and 0 otherwise. 
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1.8 Figure 
FIGURE 1.8.1  
Changes in Disclosure Policy (Non-Financial Firms) 
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1.9 Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 1.9.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Annual Percentage Change in the Number of Employees 
             
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. Dev 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Non-Disclosing Firms  5,745 0.057 0.023 0.276 -0.888 7.290 
Disclosing Firms 1,410 0.095 0.030 0.521 -0.738 17.000 
Full Sample 7,155 0.064 0.025 0.339 -0.888 17.000 
       
Panel B: Quarterly Percentage Change in the Number of Employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Pooled 3,812 0.019 0.005 0.09 -0.453 1.741 
Cross-sectional 143 0.022 0.013 0.03 -0.453 1.741 
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TABLE 1.9.2 
Number of Firms and Disclosing Firms by Industry Division  
 
Industry 
Disclosing 
Firms 
% Disclosing 
Firms  
 
Non-Disclosing 
Firms  
% Non-Disclosing 
Firms  
 
Full Sample 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 0% 1 100% 1 
Mining 9 16% 46 84% 55 
Construction 1 10% 9 90% 10 
Manufacturing 44 16% 229 84% 273 
Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary service 
18 16% 98 84% 116 
Wholesale Trade 2 17% 10 83% 12 
Retail Trade 1 2% 49 98% 50 
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
49 36% 88 64% 137 
Services 30 32% 65 68% 95 
Total 154 21% 595 79% 749 
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TABLE 1.9.3 
Descriptive Statistics: Disclosure Choice Model  
Disclosing Firm-quarters  
(N=2,523) 
 
Non-disclosing Firm-quarters 
(N=21,286)   
 
Differencea: (Disclosing) - (Non-
disclosing)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
TotalAssets 27,758.88 9,090.30 19,278.36 9,380.57 8,480.52*** -290.27 
MVE 28,857.74 11,264.25 21,027.88 9916.96 7,829.86*** 1,347.30*** 
IntangibleAssets 6,568.22 1,338.50 4,375.53 1,313.51 2,192.69*** 24.99 
IntangibleRatio 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.03 
ΔEmployees 0.11 0.40 0.06 0.02 0.05*** 0.38*** 
Fortune 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08*** 0.00*** 
Leverage 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.27 -0.04*** -0.04*** 
MTB 0.39 0.33 0.40 0.33 -0.00 0.01*** 
TurnoverRatio 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.17  -0.02 *** 0.01*** 
Hightech 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.08*** 0.00*** 
 
a The significance of the differences in the means (medians) between the suspect firms and other firms is based on t statistics (z-statistics) 
from t-tests (Wilcoxon tests). 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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TABLE 1.9.4 
Regression Results: Estimation of the Disclosure Choice Model 
   
  
Pr(Disclose)t 
Intercept  -2.163*** 
  0.000 
TotalAssetst + 0.000*** 
  0.000 
MVEt + -0.000*** 
  0.000 
IntangibleAssetst ? 0.000** 
  0.032 
IntangibleRatiot ? -0.271*** 
  0.001 
ΔEmployeest + 0.154*** 
  0.000 
Fortune + 0.385*** 
  0.000 
Leveraget - -0.527*** 
  0.000 
MTBt + -0.000*** 
  0.000 
TurnoverRatiot + 0.398*** 
  0.000 
Q1Dummyt 
 
0.022 
  0.636 
Q2Dummyt 
 
0.013 
  0.788 
Q3Dummyt 
 
0.027 
  0.571 
   
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes 
   
N  23,809 
Pseudo R2   0.13 
I report p-values in italics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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TABLE 1.9.5 
Descriptive Statistics: Disclosing Firms 
 
 N  Mean  Median  Std.Dev  Min  Max 
Number of Employees 2,255  40,891.93  16,850.78  57,294.16  150.00  390,000.00 
TotalAssets 2,255  25,194.36  8,370.70  42,362.02  492.13  220,000.00 
Sales 2,255  4,050.01  1,585.00  6,153.61  54.90  37,576.00 
Inventory 2,255  982.00  293.00  2,083.13  0.00  13,921.00 
NCA 2,255  18,129.73  4,430.30  37,128.51  87.57  250,000.00 
IntangibleRatio 2,255  0.23  0.22  0.19  0.00  0.82 
PPE 2,255  0.27  0.17  0.25  0.00  0.93 
QuickRatio 2,255  1.76  1.25  1.66  0.10  13.15 
Leverage 2,255  0.24  0.22  0.17  0.00  0.98 
Acquirer 2,255  0.03  0.00  0.17  0.00  1.00 
Divestor 2,255  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  1.00 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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TABLE 1.9.6 
Regression Results: Estimation of Labor Model  
  Employeest   
Intercept  -0.095  
  0.740  
Employeest-1 + 0.853***  
  0.000  
Assetst + 0.117***  
  0.000  
Salest-1 + 0.000***  
  0.000  
Inventoryt-1 + -0.000**  
  0.021  
NCAt-1 ? -0.000***  
  0.000  
IntangibleRatiot-1 + -0.002  
  0.952  
PPEt-1  + -0.055  
  0.152  
QuickRatiot-1 - -0.002  
  0.420  
Leveraget-1 - 0.109***  
  0.000  
Acquirert-1 + -0.020**  
  0.020  
Divestort-1 - -0.120***  
  0.000  
Q4Dummyt  0.012**  
  0.031  
Q3Dummyt  -0.008  
  0.125  
Q2Dummyt  0.002  
  0.761  
Millst  -0.358***  
  0.000      
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  
    
N  2,046  
No. of Firms  87  
Adjusted R2   0.96   
I report p-values in italics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level. Regression with firm and time fixed effects and AR(1) 
disturbance term. 
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TABLE 1.9.7 
Comparison of Suspect Firm-quarters with the Rest of the Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Employment 
 
(1)   (2)  (3)   (4)   (5)  
 
Sizt-1 0.042*** 
 
0.042*** 
 
0.042*** 
 
0.043*** 
 
0.042***  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BTMt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.307 0.287 0.283 0.305 0.264 
NIt 0.002 -0.009 0.003 0.0000 -0.010  
0.986 0.947 0.979 0.998 0.940 
IBEI/Assets suspectt  -0.055***   -0.056***  
 0.009   0.005 
ΔEarnings/Assets suspectt   0.030***  0.029***  
  0.002  0.002 
Analyst consensus suspectt    0.026** 0.024**  
   0.021 0.030 
Millst 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.146***  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
     
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
     
N 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 
Adjusted R2  0.650 0.651 0.651 0.652 0.654 
I report p-values in italics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. 
Regression with time and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the 
Newey-West procedure. 
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TABLE 1.9.8 
Comparison of Suspect Firm-quarters with the Rest of the Sample, Full Interaction 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Employment 
 
(1) Baseline 
 
(2) Suspect = 
IBEI/Assets suspect 
 (3) Suspect = 
ΔEarnings/Assets suspect 
 
(4) Suspect = Analyst 
consensus suspect 
Abnormal CFOt -0.703*** -0.700*** 
 
-0.669*** -0.602***  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sizet-1 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.045***  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BTMt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.668 0.687 0.447 0.683 
NIt 0.293** 0.271** 0.158 0.1 
 0.011 0.028 0.217 0.333 
Suspectt  -0.016 0.044*** 0.062***  
 0.448 0.000 0.000 
Abnormal CFOt * Suspectt  -0.159 -0.354** -1.130***  
 0.608 0.012 0.000 
Sizet-1 * Suspectt  0.046 0.014 0.021**  
 0.106 0.161 0.026 
BTMt-1 * Suspectt  -0.005* 0.001*** 0.000  
 0.090 0.010 0.908 
NIt * Suspectt  0.75 2.704*** 2.339***  
 0.717 0.000 0.000 
Millst 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.140***  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 1,623 1,623 1,623 1,623 
Adjusted R2  0.527 0.527 0.540 0.543 
I report p-values in italics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively.  
Regression with time and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey-
West procedure. 
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TABLE 1.9.9 
Regression Results: Future Performance 
 
 
(1) CFOt+1 
 
(2) Operating 
Incomet+1 
 
(3) Operating 
Expenset+1 
Intercept 0.064 -0.033 0.146 
 0.350 0.329 0.157 
Assetst -0.012** -0.001 -0.005 
 0.024 0.702 0.407 
MVEt 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000** 
 0.006 0.021 0.036 
Abs(Abn Employment)t -0.052** -0.015 0.169** 
 0.020 0.204 0.042 
Acquirert -0.018** -0.010** -0.041*** 
 0.042 0.014 0.000 
Divestort 0.023* -0.023 0.040 
 0.074 0.406 0.324 
ZScoret 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Returnt 0.019** 0.009** 0.013 
 0.043 0.013 0.128 
ΔCurrentLiabilitiest -0.004 -0.015 0.015 
 0.922 0.324 0.703 
QuickRatiot -0.003 -0.002* -0.007** 
 0.138 0.067 0.038 
Q4Dummyt+1 0.096*** 0.002 0.014** 
 0.000 0.182 0.014 
Q3Dummyt+1 0.052*** 0.002 -0.001 
 0.000 0.117 0.874 
Q2Dummyt+1 0.024*** 0.000 -0.004 
 0.000 0.956 0.437 
Millst+1 -0.030 0.019 -0.051 
 0.138 0.112 0.237 
    
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 1,960 1,931 1,956 
Adjusted R2 0.436 0.420 0.592 
I report p-values in italics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.   
55 
 
TABLE 1.9.10 
Regression Results: Probability of Just Meeting or Beating Earnings 
Benchmarks 
       
  
 
Pr(Small earnings) 
 
Pr(ΔEarnings) 
 
Pr(Analyst 
consensus) 
Intercept -7.828*** -6.177*** -1.457 
 0.000 0.000 0.121 
Discloset 0.133 0.227*** 0.293*** 
 0.548 0.001 0.001 
Assetst 0.732*** 0.162*** -0.054 
 0.000 0.000 0.117 
HabitualBeatert 2.066*** 0.533*** 1.775*** 
 0.004 0.000 0.000 
QuickRatiot 0.031 0.002 -0.034 
 0.193 0.915 0.184 
ΔCurrentLiabilitiest -0.199 -0.171*** 0.067 
 0.316 0.005 0.201 
MVEt -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.009 0.002 
ZScoret -0.103*** 0.061*** 0.047** 
 0.000 0.001 0.027 
Q4Dummyt -0.097 -0.048 -0.025 
 0.684 0.542 0.790 
Q3Dummyt -0.507** 0.290*** 0.001 
 0.045 0.000 0.988 
Q2Dummyt -0.230 0.341*** -0.033 
 0.373 0.000 0.734 
Millst 0.491 0.420*** -0.442** 
 0.355 0.004 0.012 
    
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 20,289 20,289 20,289 
Pseudo R2   0.118 0.044 0.059 
I report p-values in italics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. Robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Chapter 2 
IFRS Adoption and Litigation Risk: Evidence from Directors’ 
and Officers’ Liability Insurance 
 
Brian M. Burnett 
Daphne Hart 
Paige H. Patrick 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As more countries adopt more principles-based accounting standards, such as 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), it becomes increasingly important to 
understand the costs and benefits of such standards. Regulators argue that transitioning to more 
principles-based standards leads to benefits, including improvement in financial reporting quality, 
increased comparability across countries, and improved alignment among shareholders, auditors, 
and reporting firms (e.g., SEC 2003). Empirical research documents such positive outcomes when 
European firms adopt IFRS (e.g., Barth et al. 2008, Daske et al. 2008, Armstrong et al. 2010, 
Brüggemann et al. 2013). However, individual firms incur costs associated with IFRS adoption, 
such as transition costs and increases in audit fees (e.g., Kim et al. 2012, De George et al. 2013). 
                                                          
*We appreciate the comments of Vasiliki Athanasakou, Hong Kim Duong (discussant), Bjorn Jorgensen, 
Wim Van der Stede, and seminar participants at the 2017 IE Doctoral Consortium, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, Tel Aviv University, the 2018 International Accounting Section Midyear 
conference, the 41st EAA Annual Congress and the 2018 AAA Annual Meeting. We thank Alexander 
Barrett and Rani Suleman for excellent research assistance.  
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We extend the discussion of the costs and benefits of principles-based accounting standards by 
investigating whether litigation risk changes upon adoption of more principles-based accounting 
standards. 
To understand the effect of principles-based accounting standards on litigation risk, we 
study changes in two established proxies for litigation risk, Directors' and Officers' (D&O) 
liability insurance and excess cash holdings (Core 1997, Core 2000, Chung and Wynn 2008, Wynn 
2008), around the adoption of IFRS in Canada. D&O liability insurance policies are corporate 
insurance policies that are purchased by firms and cover the firms’ directors and officers.1 Firms 
may also hold cash as a form of self-insurance (Wynn 2008). For firms that carry D&O insurance, 
excess cash available for indemnification may be used as an additional cushion in case of 
litigation, while for firms that do not carry D&O insurance, excess cash may substitute for 
insurance.   
We investigate changes in litigation risk in Canadian firms for several reasons. First, 
Canadian firms face relatively high levels of litigation risk, probably only second to US firms. 
Second, unlike US firms, public Canadian firms are required to disclose whether they purchase 
D&O liability insurance, and these disclosures often include information about the insurance 
premium and coverage limit. Third, Core (1997) finds meaningful variation in the proportion of 
Canadian firms that purchase D&O insurance. In his sample, two-thirds of firms carry D&O 
insurance, whereas more than 90% of US firms carry D&O insurance.  
In addition, Canada offers a natural setting for empirical-archival studies of the effects of 
adopting more principles-based accounting standards. Canada switched its reporting standards 
from Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to IFRS for fiscal years 
starting on or after 1 January 2011. Pre-IFRS Canadian GAAP was close to US GAAP 
(Bandyopadhyay, Hanna and Richardson 1994, Cormier and Magnan 2016), which is considered 
                                                          
1 We discuss the details of D&O liability insurance in greater detail in Section 2.2. 
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a more rules-based standard.2,3 Furthermore, IFRS adoption in Canada was not accompanied by 
other significant changes to the regulatory environment or enforcement intensity that would 
otherwise confound our inferences.    
Ex ante, whether or how Canadian IFRS adoption affects litigation risk is unclear.  On the 
one hand, litigation risk may be higher once Canadian firms adopt IFRS. Lack of specific rules 
means managers will have to rely more on their own judgment, which could result in more legal 
challenges to their decisions (Hail et al. 2010, Donelson et al. 2012). Furthermore, the additional 
discretion and relative lack of guidance may allow managers to engage in more opportunistic 
behavior (e.g., Nelson et al. 2002, Donelson et al. 2016), which would likely result in an increase 
in firms’ litigation risk. 
On the other hand, IFRS adoption may reduce litigation risk relative to pre-IFRS Canadian 
GAAP. As IFRS provides less guidance, it could reduce the occurrence of transaction structuring 
to obtain specific accounting treatment (Nelson et al. 2002, Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005, Hail et 
al. 2010). Moreover, if IFRS adoption improves financial reporting quality or allows for the less 
costly dissemination of private information as some suggest (e.g., SEC 2003, Hail et al. 2010, 
Joos and Leung 2013), the occurrence of lawsuits and their expected costs should decrease 
accordingly. IFRS may permit firms to produce financial statements that are more informative and 
better represent the firm’s financial standing, thus, IFRS adoption may reduce firms’ litigation 
risk. 
                                                          
2 While US GAAP is considered a more rules-based standard, pre-IFRS Canadian GAAP is considered a 
more principles-based standard. However, pre-IFRS Canadian GAAP is relatively more rules-based than 
IFRS, largely due to harmonization efforts with US GAAP. Prior to 2004, a primary objective of the 
Canadian’s Accounting Standards Board’s (AcSB) was to minimize differences from US GAAP 
(Discussion Paper of Accounting Standards in Canada: Future Directions June 24, 2004). Each year the 
AcSB performed a detailed review of differences between Canadian GAAP and US GAAP for a random 
sample of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US that reported reconciliations from Canadian GAAP to US 
GAAP. The AcSB then developed standards that eliminated or minimized these differences. 
3 Cormier and Magnan (2016) note that, while a full-fledged convergence between Canadian GAAP and 
US GAAP took place around the mid-1990s, Canadian accountants and auditors may have applied the 
standards differently than their US counterparts due to the more principles-based approach in Canada.    
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To examine the effect of IFRS adoption on litigation risk, we hand-collected D&O 
insurance data for all firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) with available Compustat 
data. Following Core (1997, 2000), Chung and Wynn (2008) and Wynn (2008), we analyze 
changes in perceived litigation risk using four proxies for litigation risk: D&O coverage limit, 
D&O premiums, the premium-to-coverage ratio, and excess cash holdings.  
In our first set of analyses, we find mixed evidence of the effect of IFRS adoption on 
litigation risk. For non-cross-listed Canadian firms, we show that D&O insurance premiums, the 
premium-to-coverage ratio and excess cash holdings decreased around IFRS adoption, consistent 
with a decrease in litigation risk. However, we find that D&O insurance coverage increased, 
suggesting an increase in litigation risk. Kim (2015) finds that high-tech firms have lower 
coverage limits and posits that the high premiums charged to these firms result in reduced 
coverage limits. Thus, we interpret the combination of increases in coverage limits and decreases 
in premiums, along with reductions in the price per unit of insurance as evidence consistent with 
a decrease in litigation risk. The reduction in excess cash holdings provides additional support to 
our interpretation.  
In our second set of analyses, we separately study Canadian firms that are cross-listed on 
US exchanges. Canadian firms cross-listed in the US were permitted to report under either 
Canadian GAAP or US GAAP prior to the mandated IFRS adoption, but after January 2011, these 
firms were permitted to report under IFRS or US GAAP (Burnett et al. 2015). We focus on 
Canadian firms cross-listed in the US that switched from Canadian GAAP to IFRS and document 
a reduction in D&O insurance premiums, premium-to-coverage ratio and excess cash holdings, 
whereas D&O insurance coverage is unchanged. The results from this analysis are consistent with 
a reduction in litigation risk. 
While cross-listing in the US may lead to higher exposure to litigation risk, litigation and 
enforcement efforts in the US were likely unaffected by IFRS adoption in Canada. As such, our 
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second set of analysis provides additional evidence that our main results are not driven by changes 
in enforcement in Canada that were concurrent with IFRS adoption. 
We also conduct a difference-in-differences analysis comparing changes in litigation risk 
of Canadian firms that are cross-listed in the US to those of New York State incorporated (NY) 
firms. The difference-in-differences analysis allows us to further control for confounding effects. 
We use NY firms as a control group because these firms are required to disclose information about 
their D&O insurance policies and continuously report under US GAAP. NY firms always reported 
under a rules-based system, while some Canadian firms cross-listed in the US adopted a more 
principles-based system after January 2011.We document that the insurance coverage for those 
cross-listed firms that switched to IFRS decreased relative to NY firms that always report under 
US GAAP. The reduction in insurance coverage is consistent with lower litigation risk following 
IFRS adoption.  
Overall, we find evidence that IFRS adoption decreases litigation risk. This is contrary to 
the results in Donelson et al. (2012) who find that principles-based standards result in greater 
litigation risk. Our study differs substantially from theirs: we utilize proxies for expected 
litigation, rather than litigation outcomes. Moreover, Donelson et al. (2012) exploit variation in 
the extent to which US GAAP standards are rules- or principles-based, while we focus on an 
externally mandated change from a more rules-based accounting standard to a more principles-
based standard, rather than variation among standards at a point in time. 
Our findings should be of interest to regulators and investors. We document that 
modifications of accounting regulations alter litigation risk, as measured by the cost of D&O 
insurance and excess cash holdings. We contribute to the understanding of the costs and benefits 
associated with adopting a more rules-based standard, such as IFRS. Our results may also inform 
policy debates in the US on the effects of adopting more principle-based standards.    
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes D&O insurance 
contract and the related literature. Section 2.3 develops the hypotheses and section 2.4 discusses 
61 
 
the research design. Section 2.5 presents the main analysis results. We conduct robustness tests in 
Section 2.6 and conclude in Section 2.7. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.8.1. 
 
2.2 Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) Liability Insurance 
In this section, we review prior literature documenting an association between D&O 
insurance and firm characteristics and corporate governance as well as shareholders’ and 
insurance providers’ risk assessment.  
Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is a contract between a firm and an insurance 
company. Although the firm purchases and owns the insurance policy, the firm’s directors and 
officers are the beneficiaries of the policy. In the event directors or officers are named as 
defendants in a lawsuit related to their duties, the D&O liability insurance provider either 
reimburses the directors and officers directly for all the associated expenses (provided directors 
acted in good faith and met the applicable standard of conduct), or the firm indemnifies the 
directors and officers for their expenses, and then claims the expenses from the insurance provider.  
D&O liability insurance contracts specify the quantity and the price of insurance, as 
agreed by both the insurance provider and the firm. The coverage limit (quantity) is the maximum 
dollar value of the D&O insurance policy. The coverage limit is the maximum amount the 
insurance provider may be liable for and as such, is an assessment of the aggregate potential costs 
of litigation given the insurance premium (price). D&O insurance premium is the total cost of the 
insurance policy, which represents an estimation of the likelihood of litigation and its expected 
costs, with a markup for the insurer. As insurance institutions perform risk sharing and risk 
management functions efficiently (Cummins 1991), insurance contracts, in general, are 
informative about firms' risk exposures.  
Prior literature demonstrates that D&O insurance reflects firm-level litigation risk. Using 
a sample of public Canadian firms, Core (1997) documents that firms with greater litigation risk 
and higher distress probability are more likely to purchase D&O insurance and carry higher 
62 
 
coverage limits. Further, Core (2000) uses D&O liability insurance as a measure of ex-ante 
litigation risk and demonstrates that weaker governance is associated with higher premiums and 
excess CEO compensation. O’Sullivan (2002) finds similar results for public UK firms: 
companies carrying D&O insurance tend to be larger and associated with greater likelihood of 
litigation, greater proportions of non-executive board members, and less managerial ownership.  
D&O insurance reflects the firm’s as well as the insurer’s expected litigation risk. Gillan 
and Panasian (2015) argue that D&O insurance limits and premiums appear informative about the 
firm specific probability of lawsuits and governance quality. Furthermore, Cao and 
Narayanamoorthy (2014) view the insurance premiums charged as indicative for the insurers’ 
assessment of the firm’s litigation risk. For a sample of public US firms, they show that firms with 
prior accounting restatements or lower earnings quality, pay higher premiums. These results are 
consistent with Lin et al. (2013) who detect a positive association between D&O coverage and 
earnings restatements.  
Prior literature also argues that D&O insurance is used to improve corporate governance 
and protect shareholders. Holderness (1990) emphasizes the role of D&O insurance as a 
mechanism to monitor executives. O’Sullivan (1997) argues that, as firm size increases, external 
ownership becomes a costly monitoring scheme. He shows that larger public UK firms are more 
likely to utilize outside directors and D&O insurance to monitor executives.  
In related work, Boyer (2014) provides empirical evidence suggesting that shareholders 
use D&O insurance to protect their own wealth in case of managerial incompetence. The more 
shareholders have at risk, the larger the insurance protection. Moreover, Caskey (2014) illustrates 
analytically that while carrying D&O insurance increases the likelihood of litigation, the insurance 
also partly alleviates investors' incorporation of the potential litigation costs into the stock price. 
Thus, D&O insurance may reduce expected costs and overall, increase firm value.  
To the extent that legal liability insurance alters managers' behavior, D&O insurance and 
litigation risk are interdependent (Pauly 1974, Holmstrom 1979). Wynn (2008) hypothesizes that 
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excess D&O insurance and excess cash available for indemnification are primary determinants of 
firms' disclosure policy. She studies a sample of Canadian firms and document a negative 
association between exposure to litigation risk and legal liability coverage, and the timeliness of 
bad news disclosures and the frequency of bed news forecasts. Moreover, managers with higher 
legal liability coverage tend to disclose bad news more precisely.  
D&O insurance also reflects managers’ private information about expected firm 
performance. Chalmers, Dann and Harford (2002) study D&O insurance around US initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and find that D&O insurance premiums are positively related to IPO size and 
negatively related to leverage, the percentage sold by venture capitalists, and the average operating 
income. Moreover, Chalmers et al. (2002) document a significant negative relation between the 
three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction 
with the IPO, which suggests the coverage limits are set opportunistically prior to IPOs. In 
contrast, Boyer and Stern (2014) study Canadian IPOs and find that insurance providers charge 
higher premium per dollar of coverage to firms with poor stock performance, higher volatility and 
lower Sharpe ratios post-IPO. Boyer and Stern’s (2014) results indicate that in their setting, 
insurers have superior information relative to investors. 
Prior literature proposes that D&O insurance is associated with managerial entrenchment 
and affect risk-taking incentives. Core (1997) argues that entrenched managers demand higher 
levels of D&O insurance. Consistent with this argument, Chung, Hillegeist and Wynn (2015) use 
D&O liability insurance to construct a proxy for managerial opportunism and document a positive 
association between excess D&O insurance coverage and audit fees. Lin et al. (2011) present 
evidence of an association between D&O insurance and real decisions. For a sample of publicly 
traded Canadian firms, they show that managers of firms carrying high D&O insurance coverage 
limits make poor M&A decisions. Particularly, those managers pay higher premiums for their 
acquisitions and their acquisitions exhibit lower synergies. Lin et al. (2011) conclude that acquirer 
firms with high levels of D&O insurance generate lower returns for their stockholders, indicating 
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those firms’ managers are more inclined to risk taking and are less sensitive to shareholder 
discipline. Furthermore, Lin et al. (2013) document a positive relation between D&O insurance 
levels and loan spreads, suggesting that lenders associate higher D&O insurance limits with 
greater risk taking. Similarly, Chen, Li and Zou (2016) show that D&O insurance limits are 
positively associated with the ex-ante cost of capital as implied by stock prices and analyst 
forecasts.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
A more principles-based accounting standard may require the exercise of additional 
managerial discretion and professional judgment relative to a more rules-based accounting 
standard. The effect of increased discretion on litigation risk has been debated. Schipper (2003) 
raises the concern that principles-based standards result in greater expected litigation costs, 
whereas the SEC (2003) predicts lower litigation costs.  
On the one hand, litigation risk may be higher under more principles-based accounting 
standards than under more rules-based accounting standards. Rules provide a “safe harbor”, which 
protects firms from litigation (Schipper 2003, Donelson et al. 2012). Lack of specific rules means 
managers will necessarily rely more on their own judgment, which could result in more legal 
challenges to their decisions (Hail et al. 2010). Moreover, additional discretion and less guidance 
may affect managers’ opportunistic behavior. Nelson et al. (2002) show that imprecise standards 
are associated with more earnings management via discretion in accounting judgments than are 
precise standards. An increase in opportunistic financial reporting would likely result in an 
increase in firms’ litigation risk. While prior research does not find significant changes in earnings 
quality around IFRS adoption in Canada (e.g., Burnett et al. 2015, Liu and Sun 2015), IFRS 
adoption may still alter litigation risk if it facilitates opportunistic behavior. 
On the other hand, adoption of more principles-based accounting standards such as IFRS 
may reduce litigation risk. Donelson et al. (2012) also propose that rules-based systems provide 
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shareholders a “road map” for potential litigation. They argue that violations of clear guidance are 
likely to be intentional, and therefore, litigation outcomes are more likely to favor plaintiffs. As 
IFRS provides less guidance, it could also reduce the occurrence of transaction structuring to 
obtain specific accounting treatment (Nelson et al. 2002, Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005, Hail et al. 
2010). Similarly, Joos and Leung (2013) argue that more principles-based accounting standards 
have fewer bright-line rules and are considered less complex. Thus, principles-based standards 
may allow firms to better balance between complying with accounting standards and producing 
financial reports that reflect firms’ underlying economics.  
 Furthermore, the SEC (2003) suggests that the joint implementation of principles-based 
standards and effective enforcement, better aligns incentives among auditors, reporting firms, and 
investors, which increases reporting quality and decreases litigation costs.  Finally, the additional 
managerial discretion required under IFRS, enables managers to convey private information to 
the markets in a more effective and less costly fashion (Hail et al. 2010). Consistent with these 
predictions, Cormier and Magnan (2016) document an increase in value relevance for Canadian 
firms cross-listed in the US that adopt IFRS. In sum, if IFRS permits firms to produce financial 
statement that are more informative and better represent the firm’s financial standing, it may 
reduce the occurrence and expected costs of lawsuits.  
Scant empirical research investigates the association of litigation risk with rules-based 
versus principles-based accounting standards. Donelson et al. (2012) find evidence suggesting that 
more rules-based accounting standards reduce the threat of litigation. They document that 
restatements involving a violation of rules-based standards are associated with a lower probability 
of litigation. Moreover, they show that when firms are sued with no prior related restatement, 
plaintiffs are more likely to allege a violation of principles-based standards. Donelson et al. (2016) 
investigate why US accounting standards take on more rules-based characteristics. They find that 
both cross-sectional and time-series variation in rules-based characteristics of US GAAP are 
related to changes in litigation risk and to changes in the complexity of the underlying transaction 
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and accounting treatment. The empirical findings in Donelson et al. (2012, 2016) suggest that 
more principle-based standards are associated with higher litigation risk, thus, switching from 
Canadian GAAP to IFRS would be associated with increased litigation risk.  
A related stream of literature investigates audit fees around IFRS adoption. Audit fees 
capture the auditor’s assessment of the firm's litigation risk while D&O insurance captures the 
firm's individual risk. IFRS adoption may alter audit fees due to changes in financial reporting 
incentives affecting earnings quality, or because of changes in litigation risk.4 Kim et al. (2012) 
find that European Union firms’ audit fees increased by 5.4 percent around IFRS adoption in 2005. 
They show that IFRS-related audit fee premiums increase with the audit complexity introduced 
by IFRS adoption but decrease with the improvement in financial reporting quality arising from 
IFRS adoption. De George et al. (2013) find similar results for Australian firms. They document 
an increase in audit fees around IFRS adoption and argue that average audit fees increase in excess 
of 8 percent beyond the normal annual fee growth in the pre-IFRS adoption period.  
Overall, prior literature finds that audit fees increase around IFRS adoption. This increase 
is consistent with higher litigation risk following IFRS adoption. Nevertheless, as auditors are 
likely to increase audit effort to manage the risk of IFRS adoption (De George et al. 2013), audit 
quality may improve, inducing a decrease in litigation risk. Thus, the documented increase in audit 
fees may also be consistent with lower litigation risk following IFRS adoption. 
Collectively, the above arguments and corresponding empirical evidence suggest that the 
association between IFRS adoption and ex-ante perceived litigation risk may be either positive or 
negative. On the one hand, switching to IFRS may increase legal exposure by eliminating the 
shield provided to Canadian firms by the more explicit rules and guidance in Canadian GAAP. 
On the other hand, IFRS adoption may facilitate transferring private information from managers 
                                                          
4 Examining D&O liability insurance around IFRS adoptions extends prior literature and provides another 
perspective on the costs and benefits of IFRS adoption for individual firms. 
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to investor and producing financial statements that better reflect the firm’s underlying economics. 
This leads to our formal hypothesis (stated in the null form): 
H: IFRS adoption does not affect perceived litigation risk. 
 
2.4 Research Design 
2.4.1 The Canadian Setting 
Canada offers a natural setting for empirical-archival studies of the effects of adopting a 
more principle-based accounting standard on litigation risk. First, public Canadian firms are 
required to disclose whether they purchase D&O liability insurance, and these disclosures often 
specify the cost and terms of the insurance contract. We use the information regarding the cost 
and terms of the insurance contracts to measure perceived litigation risk at the firm level.  
Second, Canada switched its reporting standards from Canadian GAAP to IFRS for fiscal 
years starting on or after 1 January 2011. Prior to 2011, most Canadian public firms reported using 
Canadian GAAP. While Canadian GAAP is a principles-based standard, it provides more detailed, 
rules-oriented guidance than does IFRS.5 Thus, the Canadian setting permits examining whether 
more detailed accounting guidance influences either the incidence or the cost of litigation. 
Moreover, IFRS adoption in Canada took place in a period that follows the introduction 
of strengthened corporate governance requirements, such as the National Instrument 52-109 which 
became effective in Canada in 2008 (Lu et al. 2011) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in the 
US, which was effective for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US from 2007. Our sample period 
has consistently high levels of enforcement throughout, and we are unaware of any significant 
changes to enforcement or regulation that coincide with IFRS adoption in Canada.  
 
                                                          
5 Prior to 2004 the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) was actively implementing a strategy of 
harmonizing Canadian GAAP with US GAAP. Each year it reviewed US-cross-listed firms' reconciliations 
between Canadian GAAP and US GAAP and worked on revising standards to minimize these differences.  
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2.4.2 Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US 
Since IFRS adoption in Canada is clustered in time, other events that took place around 
2011 may have altered firms’ litigation risk and any observed association between IFRS adoption 
and litigation risk is due to alternative explanations.6 We address this concern in two ways. First, 
we examine Canadian firms cross-listed in the US that adopted IFRS. These firms operate in the 
US, which was likely unaffected by the accounting standard change in Canada or other regulatory 
and enforcement acts that happened in Canada around 2011. Second, we compare the costs of 
D&O insurance for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US and US firms incorporated in the state 
of New York.  
The US is considered more litigious than Canada. Hence, the sample of Canadian firms 
cross-listed in the US permits examining the effect of adopting IFRS in a more litigious country 
while using D&O insurance information as a proxy for litigation risk and holding fixed the 
disclosure requirements.  
Under the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) adopted in 1991, Canada and 
the US permit Canadian (US) firms to access US (Canadian) capital markets using prospectuses 
prepared in accordance with Canadian (US) disclosure requirements. Hence, Canadian firms can 
access US capital markets with limited oversight from the SEC (Burnett et al. 2017) and without 
additional disclosure requirements.   
Moreover, prior to IFRS adoption in 2011, Canadian firms cross-listed in the US were 
permitted to choose between Canadian GAAP and US GAAP, and, firms reporting under 
Canadian GAAP were exempted from the requirement to reconcile to US GAAP (Burnett et al. 
2017). After Canada adopted IFRS in 2011, Canadian firms cross-listed in the US were permitted 
to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS or US GAAP. As the SEC exempted 
                                                          
6 See for example Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013), which suggests that capital market benefits of IFRS 
adoption are driven by increased enforcement that coincide with IFRS adoption periods. 
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all non-US firms reporting under IFRS from reconciliation to US GAAP, Canadian firms that 
choose to adopt IFRS maintained the exemption from the reconciliation requirement. 
While information about D&O insurance is not generally publicly disclosed by US firms 
(Griffith 2006), Canadian firms cross-listed in the US do provide information7 regarding their 
indemnification policy and D&O insurance as required by the Canada Business Corporations Act.8 
This mandatory disclosure requirement of D&O insurance information allows us to a measure 
perceived litigation risk for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US. 
We also use NY firms as a control group for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US in a 
difference-indifferences research design. New York Business Corporation Law mandates public 
firms incorporated in New York State to disclose their D&O insurance policy information to their 
shareholders.9 Thus, similar to Canadian firms, NY firms are required to disclose whether they 
purchase D&O insurance policy. Furthermore, they are required to specify the insurance costs. 
Unlike the sample of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US, NY firms did not change their 
accounting standard during the sample period - these firms always report under US GAAP.  
2.4.3 Specifications 
Our main variable of interest is 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡, defined as 1 if a firm reports under IFRS at time 
𝑡, and 0 otherwise. We are interested in the effect of IFRS adoption (POST) on litigation risk and 
use three proxies for litigation risk for firms with D&O liability insurance: the insurance coverage 
limit, insurance premiums, and the premium-to-coverage ratio. If IFRS adoption increases 
(decreases) a firm’s litigation risk, the coefficient on POST will be positive (negative). 
First, D&O insurance coverage (COVERAGE), the log of the maximum amount D&O 
insurance provider may be liable for, is used as a proxy for litigation risk where, ceteris paribus, 
                                                          
7 We exclude US firms cross-listed in Canada from our sample, as these firms are not required to disclose 
whether they carry D&O insurance.  
8 Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) - R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 (Section 124). 
9 New York Business Corporation Law, Article 7, Section 726. 
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firms with higher coverage face higher litigation risk. We model D&O insurance coverage as 
follows:10 
(2.1) 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 
=⁡𝛽0 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽6𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +
⁡𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ⁡+⁡𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡−1 +
⁡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸⁡ + ⁡𝜀  
 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2.8.1.  
If adopting IFRS increases (decreases) litigation risk or the expected cost of litigation, 
then directors and officers are likely to demand higher (lower) D&O insurance coverage to 
mitigate their exposure to this risk.  
We follow prior literature in controlling for other determinants of D&O insurance 
coverage. Larger firms (SIZE) are expected to face higher litigation risk because expected 
settlements from small firms are less likely to be sufficient to merit lawsuits (Alexander 1991). 
We expect business risk associated with debt financing, measured by the debt ratio (DEBTRATIO) 
to be positively associated with coverage. Moreover, firms engaging in acquiring (ACQUIRER) 
and divesting (DIVESTOR) activities are expected to carry higher coverage limits (Core 1997).  
Firms in the high technology industry (HIGHTECH) face higher litigation risk (e.g., 
Francis et al. 1994, Johnson et al. 2001, Jones and Weingram 2000). We follow Chung and Wynn 
(2008) and use Kasznik and Lev’s (1995) classification scheme of high technology industries. 
Prior research also documents that stock price volatility (VOLATILITY) is positively associated 
with investor lawsuits (e.g., Alexander 1991, Jones and Weingram 2000). We also control for 
firms that are headquartered in one province in Canada, QUEBEC, as it has civil law legal origin 
                                                          
10 Prior literature on D&O insurance estimates a first-stage Probit model for the decision to purchase D&O 
insurance. These Heckman (1979) models’ estimations are intended to correct for potential sample-selection 
biases in the coefficient estimates of D&O insurance coverage and premiums. Core (1997, 2000) report that 
the first-stage provides no evidence consistent with a selection bias from the decision to purchase D&O 
insurance. Since Core (1997) argues that OLS estimates are more efficient than the Heckman estimates in 
the absence of selection bias, we follow prior literature (see Lin et al. 2011, Lin et al 2013, Chen et al. 2016 
among others) and report only the OLS estimates.  
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while the remaining provinces and territories have common legal origin. Under civil law, firms 
tend to adopt a 'stakeholders' governance model where major interest groups, i.e. labor unions and 
banks, are represented and any information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders is 
resolved through insider communication. Thus, civil litigation is comparatively rare, and the size 
of awards is comparatively small (Ball et al. 2000).  
Lastly, we follow Wynn (2008) and Chung and Wynn (2008) and include a measure of 
excess cash (EXCASH) since firms can increase their cash holdings for indemnification instead of 
increasing D&O coverage. Excess cash for indemnification is a form of self-insurance (Wynn 
2008) and may be used as an additional cushion for incident of litigation if the firm exhausts its 
insurance coverage.  
We include fixed effects for industry (IndustryFE). Furthermore, all independent 
variables used in the analysis are measured as of the beginning of the fiscal year prior to the proxy 
disclosure of the purchase of D&O insurance under the assumption that the insurance was 
purchased at the beginning of the most recent fiscal year (Core 2000).  
Second, D&O insurance premiums (PREMIUM) are used as a proxy for litigation risk 
where, ceteris paribus, firms with higher (lower) premiums are perceived as having higher (lower) 
litigation risk by the insurance underwriter. We model D&O insurance premiums as follows: 
(2.2) 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽6𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽10𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸⁡ + ⁡𝜀 
 
 
Following Core (2000) and Chung and Wynn (2008) we include the log of coverage 
(COVERAGE) in the regression because the premiums depend on how much coverage is 
purchased. 
Core (2000) also considers a second stage regression model of the insurance premiums 
where instead of the log of coverage, he includes the residual from Equation (2.1). Including the 
residual (EXADJCOV) controls for information that is orthogonal to the other regressors. Part of 
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this information arises because coverage is typically purchased in discrete blocks of $5 million 
and therefore the actual coverage limit may not be the firms desired coverage limit. By including 
the residuals from Equation (2.1) we attempt to control for potential omitted correlated variables.  
(2.3) 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 ⁡
+ ⁡𝛽6𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑋𝐴𝐷𝐽𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑡−1 ⁡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + ⁡𝜀 
 
 
Our third proxy for litigation risk, the ratio of D&O insurance premium to D&O insurance 
coverage (PREMIUM/COVERAGE), represents the price of buying a dollar of D&O insurance 
coverage. A higher (lower) ratio indicates a firm faces higher (lower) litigation risk. We model 
the ratio of D&O insurance premium to D&O insurance coverage as follows: 
(2.4) (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀/𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑡
=⁡𝛽0 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 ⁡
+ ⁡𝛽6𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸⁡ + ⁡𝜀 
 
A positive (negative) coefficient on POST indicates that the price of coverage increased 
(decreased), consistent with the notion that insurance underwriters perceive IFRS adoption as 
increasing (decreasing) litigation risk. 
Finally, in addition to the three proxies that are based on D&O insurance contracts, we 
also examine a proxy for litigation risk for firms that do not have D&O insurance, excess cash 
holdings (EXCASH), which is the residual from a regression of cash on cash holdings determinants 
(Wynn 2008). Firms may hold cash for indemnification and as a form of self-insurance, thus, 
excess cash holding is used as a proxy for litigation risk where, ceteris paribus, firms with higher 
excess cash face higher litigation risk. We model excess cash holding as follows: 
(2.5) 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑡 
= 𝛽0 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽6𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1 +
⁡𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽8𝑄𝑈𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸⁡ + ⁡𝜀  
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For the sample of firms that are cross-listed in the US11 we augment Equation (2.1) 
through Equation (2.5) with the inverse Mills ratio (MILLS). The inverse Mills ratio attempts to 
control for the choice of accounting standard that was available in 2011 for Canadian firms cross-
listed in the US, by implementing two-stage Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979). Burnett et al. 
(2015) examines the determinants of US-cross-listed Canadian firms’ choice between IFRS and 
US GAAP. They find that firms are more likely to choose IFRS if IFRS is the standard most 
commonly used by the leading global firms in their industry. In addition, they find that firms more 
likely to choose IFRS are larger, of civil law legal origin, have less US operations, report 
exploration expense, have fewer US shareholders, and report higher stockholders’ equity under 
Canadian GAAP than under US GAAP. Of these, they find that the convergence benefits of 
comparability with industry peers are the most significant determinant in firms’ choice of 
standard. We model the first-stage Heckman (1979) using Burnett et al.’s (2015) model of firms’ 
choice of standard between IFRS and US GAAP.  
For the sample of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US, we also employ a difference-in-
differences research design, where we use a sample of US firms incorporated in the state of New 
York as a control group. NY firms that carry D&O liability insurance are required to disclose the 
premiums they pay. Furthermore, these firms report under US GAAP throughout our sample 
period. Thus, they provide a good control group for studying Canadian firms cross-listed in the 
US, allowing us to control for time trends and potential confounding effects. We use the 
difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of IFRS adoption on D&O premiums. We 
model D&O insurance premiums as follows: 
(2.6) 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 ⁡+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +⁡𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +⁡𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 ⁡
+⁡𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽6𝐴𝐶𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽8𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑡−1
+⁡𝛽9𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽10𝑄𝑈𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽11𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸⁡ + ⁡𝜀 
 
                                                          
11 We focus our analysis on Canadian firms cross-listed in the US that switched from reporting under Canada 
GAAP to reporting under IFRS.   
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Where POST is defined as before for Canadian firms. For NY firms, POST equals 1 if the 
firm would have been required to adopt IFRS based on its fiscal year-end (pseudo-IFRS adoption 
year), and 0 otherwise. IFRS equals 1 if the firm adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise. We include the 
inverse Mills ratio (MILLS) to control for the choice of accounting standard that was available in 
2011 for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US.  
 Our main coefficient of interest is the interaction term, POST*IFRS, which captures the 
effect of reporting under IFRS in the periods after IFRS was mandated in Canada. A positive 
(negative) coefficient on this interaction term indicates that the price of D&O insurance increased 
(decreased) once firms adopted IFRS. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient on the interaction 
term is consistent with IFRS adoption being associated with higher (lower) litigation risk relative 
to firms that were using US GAAP before and after Canadian firms switched to reporting under 
IFRS. 
2.4.4 Sample Selection and Data Description 
The sample consists of Canadian firms in Compustat listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX). These firms are required to disclose if they purchase D&O insurance. Their 
D&O data are publicly available in a proxy circular on SEDAR12 because it is mandatory for firms 
to disclose if they purchase D&O insurance under the Canada Business Corporations Act and the 
TSX requires firms to disclose this as part of their risk management practices. Our sample is a 
constant sample, spanning from 2009 to 2013, as we require firms to have data two years before 
and after IFRS adoption.  
We use non-cross-listed Canadian firms as well as Canadian firms cross-listed in the US. 
The Canadian Accounting standards Board (AcSB) required all publicly accountable enterprises 
to apply IFRS for firm years beginning on or after January 1, 2011. Firms with fiscal year ends 
from December 31 to May 31 adopted IFRS in fiscal year 2011, while firms with fiscal year ends 
                                                          
12 SEDAR is the Canadian electronic filing system which is available at www.sedar.com.  
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from June 1 to December 30 adopted IFRS in fiscal year 2012. For Canadian firms cross-listed in 
the US, the provincial securities regulators, who have authority over the application of accounting 
standards, gave the option to choose IFRS or US GAAP. We focus on firms cross-listed in the US 
that adopt IFRS to examine the effects of moving from a relatively rules-based standard to a more 
principles-based standard, and because the sample of firms that adopt US GAAP with sufficient 
data is small (11 firms).  
Table 2.9.1 Panel A details our sample formation process for Canadian firms that adopted 
IFRS. There were 670 firms listed on TSX with Compustat data for two year before and two years 
after IFRS adoption. One hundred and eight firms are investment companies (mutual funds). We 
exclude 57 firms that initiate or cease D&O insurance during the sample period13 and 49 firms 
that disclose they purchase D&O insurance, but not the policy premiums and coverage.    
Twenty-eight cross-listed firms do not disclose D&O insurance information because they 
do not have Foreign Private Issuer status with the SEC. Therefore, they must file the same forms 
as US domestic issuers using US Form 10-K and are not required to disclose D&O insurance 
information.14 We exclude the four firms in the sample that were not cross-listed in the US that 
obtained special permission to adopt US GAAP. Lastly, we exclude 11 firms cross-listed in the 
US that adopt US GAAP. This results in a sample of 318 firms not cross-listed in the US and 81 
firms cross-listed in the US that adopt IFRS, a total of 399 firms. Since we employ a balanced 
sample requiring two years of data before and after IFRS adoption, this results in 1,596 firm-years.  
                                                          
13 We note that the percentage of firms purchasing D&O insurance is consistent before and after IFRS 
adoption. 56 percent of the firms not cross-listed in the US purchased D&O insurance two years prior to 
IFRS adoption compared to 54.2 percent two years after IFRS adoption (untabulated tests indicate the 
difference is not statistically significant). Similarly, 58.3 percent of firms cross-listed in the US purchased 
D&O insurance two years prior to IFRS adoption compared to 52.7 percent two years after IFRS adoption 
(untabulated tests indicate the difference is not statistically significant; further, this is a difference of only 
six firms in our sample). 
14 The TSX does not require Canadian firms cross-listed in the US reporting as full domestic US filers to 
disclose D&O insurance information. 
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Table 2.9.1 Panel B details our sample partition by whether or not the firms purchase 
D&O insurance policy. Overall, we have a sample of 159 firms not cross-listed in the US and 42 
firms cross-listed in the US that purchase D&O insurance, a total of 201 firms; and a sample of 
159 firms not cross-listed in the US and 39 firms cross-listed in the US that do not purchase D&O 
insurance, a total of 198 firms.  
Table 2.9.2 reports descriptive statistics for firms in the year prior to IFRS adoption. Panel 
A of Table 2.9.2 indicates that the mean (median) D&O insurance coverage for firms not cross-
listed in the US is $36.93 million ($25.00 million).15 As expected, this is lower than the D&O 
coverage reported in Chung and Wynn (2008) since we hand-collected data for all firms on the 
TSX, not just the TSE 300 index (currently the S&P/TSX Composite index) which are the largest 
firms listed on the TSX. The mean (median) D&O insurance premium for firms not cross-listed 
in the US is $0.17 million ($0.11 million). The cost of a dollar of D&O coverage is measured by 
the premium-to-coverage ratio, for which the mean (median) is 0.005 (0.004). That is, on average 
it costs a half cent to purchase a dollar of D&O insurance coverage. 
Panel B of Table 2.9.2 reports descriptive statistics for firms cross-listed in the US. The 
mean (median) D&O coverage is $102.15 million ($68.41 million). While this is higher coverage 
than the firms not listed in the US, US-cross-listed firms are larger than US-non-cross-listed firms 
with mean total assets of $3,498.2 million compared to $361.4 million, respectively. The mean 
(median) D&O premium is $0.97 million ($0.61 million) consistent with cross-listed firms being 
larger and having more coverage. The premium-to-coverage ratio reveals that firms listed in the 
US pay a higher price for coverage consistent with firms facing higher litigation risk in the US 
compared to Canada. Specifically, the mean (median) premium-to-coverage ratio is 0.010 (0.009) 
                                                          
15 All dollar amounts reported are denominated in Canadian dollars. For those companies that report in US 
dollars, amounts have been converted into Canadian dollars using a monthly series of the spot exchange 
rate (obtained from Compustat). Flow amounts such as income (or amounts such as D&O coverage and 
premiums) were converted at the 12-month average rate. Static amounts such as assets were converted at 
the month-end closing exchange rate. 
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for firms listed in the US is nearly double the ratio for firms not listed in the US at 0.005 (0.004) 
(untabulated tests of differences indicate the difference is significant at the 1% level).  
 Panel C and Panel D of Table 2.9.2 report descriptive statistics for non-cross-listed and 
cross-listed firms that did not purchase insurance, respectively. Firms that do not purchase D&O 
insurance appear different from firms that purchase insurance. Non-cross-listed firms (US-cross-
listed firms) that do not purchase D&O insurance are smaller than firms that purchase insurance, 
with average total assets of $202.35 million ($228.15 million). Also, firm that do not purchase 
D&O insurance have lower debt ratios and higher stock volatility compared to non-cross-listed 
and cross-listed firms that purchase D&O insurance. As firms that do not purchase insurance differ 
from firms that purchase insurance, and as excess cash may substitute for D&O insurance for 
firms that do not purchase liability insurance, we focus our analysis of excess cash holdings on 
firms that do not have D&O insurance.      
 
2.5. Empirical Results  
2.5.1 Univariate Results 
 Table 2.9.3 compares firms’ D&O coverage, premiums and premium-to-coverage ratio 
when reporting under Canadian GAAP to when reporting under IFRS. Panel A of Table 2.9.3 
shows that the average coverage for firms not cross-listed in the US statistically significantly 
increases by $2.91 million (8%) after adopting IFRS while the median coverage statistically 
significantly increases $3.28 million (15%). This is consistent with firms increasing coverage in 
response to higher perceived litigation risk under IFRS.  
Nevertheless, the mean (median) premiums statistically significantly decrease by $0.022 
million ($0.002 million) or 12% (2%) after adopting IFRS. Furthermore, the mean (median) 
premium-to-coverage ratio statistically significantly decreases by 0.001 (0.001) or 20% (20%), 
indicating the price of D&O coverage decreases post-IFRS adoption. This reduction is consistent 
with D&O underwriters pricing D&O insurance at a lower cost when firms report using IFRS. In 
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contrast to D&O coverage, the reduction in D&O premiums and premium-to-coverage ratio 
suggests that firms face lower litigation risk after adopting IFRS.  
 The results in Table 2.9.3 Panel B for firms cross-listed in the US, mirror the results from 
Panel A. Specifically, D&O coverage statistically significantly increases by 8% ($8.16 million) 
on average while the median coverage statistically significantly increases by 28% ($19.74 
million). The mean (median) premiums statistically significantly decrease by $0.122 million 
($0.015 million) or 12% (2%) after adopting IFRS. The mean (median) premium-to-coverage ratio 
statistically significantly decreases by 0.002 (0.002) or 18% (20%) indicating the price of D&O 
coverage decreases post-IFRS adoption.  
Table 2.9.4 presents the firms’ excess cash when reporting under Canadian GAAP and 
when reporting under IFRS. Panel A of Table 2.9.4 shows that the average (median) excess cash 
holdings for firms that do not purchase D&O insurance and that are not cross-listed in the US, 
decrease (increase) post-IFRS adoption. Table 2.9.4 Panel B mirrors these results for firm cross-
listed in the US. The differences are not statistically significant for both non-cross-listed firms and 
cross-listed firms.  
Overall, the univariate analysis suggests that both non-cross-listed in the US and cross-
listed in the US firms obtain more coverage but pay lower premiums for that coverage. The 
univariate comparison assumes firms are relatively similar before and after IFRS. However, firm 
characteristics that determine coverage, premiums and cash holdings may have changed during 
the sample period, thus, it is important that we perform multiple regression analyses to examine 
these relationships. 
2.5.2 Regression Analyses of D&O Insurance Policy 
 Table 2.9.5 reports our regression analyses for firms that are not cross-listed in the US. 
Column 1 of Table 2.9.5 shows the regression results for D&O coverage. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.14 (p-value 0.000) indicates that D&O coverage increases 
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by 15.03% post-IFRS adoption.16 This suggests that, on average, firms increase coverage after 
adopting IFRS. As expected, the coefficients on SIZE and DIVESTOR are positive and statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient on VOLATILITY is consistent with stock price volatility 
increasing firms' litigation risk. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on QUEBEC 
is consistent with civil law jurisdictions being less litigious and requiring lower coverage. 
Column 2 and column 3 of Table 2.9.5 show the regression results for D&O premium. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients on POST indicates that D&O premium 
decreases by 8.6-11.3% post-IFRS adoption.17 Consistent with prior literature, SIZE, 
DEBTRATIO, VOLATILITY and coverage limits are positively and statistically significant 
associated with D&O premium. Thus, larger and more leveraged firms pay more for D&O liability 
insurance. Further, firms engaging in divesting activities pay higher premiums (22.1-56.8%) and 
so do firms operating in higher risk industries (37.7-60.0%).  
Column 4 of Table 2.9.5 shows similar results for premium-to-coverage ratio. The 
coefficient on POST is negative (-0.0005) and statistically significant (p-value 0.002), the 
premium-to-coverage ratio for the average firm decreases by 10% post-IFRS adoption.18 This 
implies that, on average, firms pay less per dollar of coverage post-IFRS adoption. 
The multiple regression analysis presented in Table 2.9.5 indicates that while coverage 
limits increase post-IFRS adoption, the total cost of D&O insurance and the price of D&O 
insurance decrease, implying that switching to IFRS generates real benefits for firms. The decline 
in the price of D&O insurance indicates that the insurance providers' assessment of the firm's 
litigation risk decreases (Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2014). Collectively, our analysis suggests 
                                                          
16 In Column 1 Table 2.9.4, the depended variable is the natural logarithm of D&O coverage limit and the 
independent variable POST is a dummy variable. We note that exp(0.14) = 1.1503, thus the percentage 
change in D&O coverage limit post-IFRS adoption is 15.03%.  
17 We note that exp(-0.09) = 0.914 and exp(-0.12) = 0.887. 
18 The average premium-to-coverage ratio pre-IFRS adoption is 0.005 (see Table 2.9.2). The average 
premium-to-coverage ratio decreases by 0.0005 post-IFRS adoption, implying that for the average firms, 
the premium-to-coverage declines by 10%. 
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that to some extent, litigation risk diminishes around IFRS-adoption for Canadian firms not cross-
listed in the US.  
 Table 2.9.6 reports our regression analyses for firms that are cross-listed in the US. In 
column 1 of Table 2.9.6, we examine D&O coverage limit and do not find that coverage limits 
change around IFRS adoption. Thus, we cannot reject the null that IFRS adoption does not affect 
litigation risk as captured by the D&O liability insurance coverage limits. As expected, the 
coefficients on SIZE, HIGHTECH and VOLATILITY are positive and statistically significant. The 
significant coefficient on QUEBEC indicates that firms headquartered in Quebec have 
substantially lower coverage limits relative to firms headquartered in the rest of Canada.   
Column 2 and column 3 of Table 2.9.6 suggest that D&O premium decreases for firms 
cross-listed in the US post-IFRS adoption, which is consistent with our analysis for firms not 
cross-listed in the US. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on POST indicate that 
D&O premium decreases by 11.3-17.3% post-IFRS adoption.  
Based on column 3 of Table 2.9.5, we note that, for firms cross-listed in the US, divesting 
activities (DIVESTOR) and more volatile stock returns (VOLATILITY) are associated with higher 
D&O premiums. This result is consistent with prior literature (Core 1997). The negative and 
statistically coefficient on QUEBEC indicates firms headquartered in Quebec pay lower premiums 
consistent with lower litigation risk. 
Column 4 of Table 2.9.6 shows the regression results for premium-to-coverage ratio. The 
coefficient on POST is negative (-0.0025) and statistically significant (p-value 0.009), implying 
that on average, firms pay 25%19 less per dollar of coverage post-IFRS adoption. The positive and 
significant coefficient on HIGHTECH is in line with the expectation of a higher cost of D&O 
coverage for firms in the higher risk industries. 
                                                          
19 The average premium-to-coverage ratio pre-IFRS adoption is 0.010 (see Table 2.9.2). The average 
premium-to-coverage ratio decreases by 0.0025 post-IFRS adoption, implying that for the average firms, 
the premium-to-coverage declines by approximately 25%. 
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Collectively, we interpret the multivariate regression analysis presented in Table 2.9.6 as 
being consistent with a decrease in litigation risk after US-cross-listed firms adopt IFRS. D&O 
underwriters had been pricing D&O insurance for foreign private issuers reporting under IFRS in 
US markets for at least four years when cross-listed Canadian firms began reporting under IFRS. 
As such, the underwriters would be relatively well informed about the litigation risks associated 
with reporting under IFRS and it appears that they assess that risk lower than when Canadian firms 
reported under Canadian GAAP. This result should be of interest to US regulators in assessing 
potential litigation costs if the US were to ever adopt IFRS. 
2.5.3 Regression Analyses of Excess Cash 
As D&O insurance may be substitute using cash available for indemnification, we 
examine excess cash holdings by firms that do not own D&O insurance policy. Table 2.9.7 reports 
our regression analyses for firms that are not cross-listed in the US. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on POST of -0.06 (p-value 0.001) indicates that excess cash decreases post-
IFRS adoption. As expected, the coefficient on SIZE is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting bigger firms hold more cash available for indemnification. The coefficient on 
DEBTRATIO is significant but negative. This may suggest that financial constraints reduce firms’ 
excess cash holdings.  
Table 2.9.8 reports our regression analyses for firms that do not own D&O insurance 
policy and that are cross-listed in the US. The coefficient on POST is negative (-0.10) and 
statistically significant (p-value 0.043), consistent with firms holding less excess cash post-IFRS 
adoption. Similar to our results for non-cross-listed firms, the coefficient on SIZE is positive and 
statistically significant and the coefficient on DEBTRATIO is negative and statistically significant. 
Table 2.9.8 also indicates that firms involving in acquisitions (AQUIRER) have more excess cash 
while firms headquartered in Quebec (QUEBEC) appear to hold less excess cash.  
Overall, our multivariate analysis indicates that firms without a D&O insurance policy 
hold less excess cash available for indemnification post-IFRS adoption. We document a reduction 
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in excess cash for firms not cross-listed in the US as well as for firms cross-listed in the US. These 
results lend additional support to the conjecture that IFRS adoption is associated with a reduction 
in litigation risk.   
 
2.6 Robustness Tests 
 To control for time trends and potential confounding effects, we employ a difference-in-
differences research design using firms incorporated in NY as a control sample. These firms were 
likely not affected by the adoption of IFRS in Canada.  
US firms incorporated in the state of New York are required to disclose whether they 
purchase directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and the premiums they pay if they have 
insurance. Note that if these firms have insurance, they are not required to disclose their insurance 
coverage limits.  
We hand-collect the premium data for US firms in Compustat that are incorporated in 
NY. We collect the data for two years before and after the year NY incorporated firms would have 
been required to adopt IFRS had they been in Canada based on their fiscal year-end. Twenty-nine 
NY firms disclose premium data for two years before and after the pseudo-IFRS adoption date 
and have all the necessary data for our analysis. We note that our sample size is comparable to 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2009) who document an increase in D&O insurance premiums for NY 
firms following Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  
 Table 2.9.9 reports descriptive statistics for NY firms in the year prior to their pseudo-
IFRS adoption date, which is the date they would have switched to reporting under IFRS if they 
had to follow the Canadian regulation and adopt IFRS in 2011. Their mean (median) D&O 
premium is $2.30 million ($0.87 million). When scaled by total assets, the average D&O premium 
for NY firms of 0.0007 is similar to Canadian firms cross-listed in the US at 0.0008. The mean 
(median) total assets of NY firms is $2,591.5 million ($2,807.4 million) and is similar to Canadian 
firms cross-listed in the US at $3,498.2 million ($2,921.9 million).  
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 Table 2.9.10 provides the difference-in-differences regression analysis comparing the 
premiums of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US to US NY firms. The negative (-0.13) and 
statistically significant (p-value 0.087) coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS indicates 
that the premiums for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US decrease more than for NY firms after 
adopting IFRS. Consistent with our cross-sectional analysis, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on SIZE, VOLATILITY, and HIGHTECH, indicate that larger, more 
volatile firms pay higher premiums, and so do firm operating in higher risk industries.  
Our analysis indicates that the perceived litigation risk decreased following IFRS 
adoption in Canada. The difference-in-differences analysis results are consistent with IFRS 
adoption causing the decline in D&O insurance premiums for Canadian firms cross-listed in the 
US, and not just a general trend in the D&O market in the US. Canadian firms cross-listed in the 
US benefit from a decline of 12.2% in their D&O insurance premiums, equivalent to an average 
saving of $0.118M, once they switched to reporting under IFRS.  
This result informs US regulators, investors, lawyers, and managers as they continue to 
evaluate and monitor the consequences of IFRS adoption if the US ultimately adopts IFRS or 
more principles-based standards. Canadian firms cross-listed in the US are arguably the most 
similar firms to US firms of any non-US firms. Our evidence is consistent with IFRS decreasing 
litigation risk for firms previously reporting using Canadian GAAP, arguably the most similar 
accounting standard to US GAAP. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we study the effect of adoption of more principle-based standards on 
litigation risk. Specifically, we investigate changes in perceived litigation risk around the adoption 
of IFRS in Canada. To proxy for litigation risk, we focus our analysis on changes in D&O liability 
insurance coverage, premiums, and the ratio of premiums-to-coverage. We also examine excess 
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cash holdings available for indemnification by firms that do not own D&O liability insurance 
policy.  
The IFRS framework places greater reliance on managerial discretion in the preparation 
of financial reports and allows managers more flexibility when choosing accounting policies. De 
George et al. (2016) state that IFRS can raise concerns about independent verifiability of reported 
figures and increase potential for manipulation of financial accounting. The increased managerial 
discretion after IFRS adoption has implications for the litigation exposure of firms, especially 
during the initial periods when uncertainty about the new accounting regime is relatively high (De 
George et al. 2016). The change in the legal environment induced by the accounting standard 
change may therefore modify the coverage and premiums of D&O insurance and the amount of 
cash firms choose to hold. 
Furthermore, we expect IFRS adoption to affect D&O insurance since D&O insurance is 
associated with earnings quality as well as with audit fees, both of which were affected by IFRS 
adoption (Chung et al. 2015). Prior literature documents change in audit fees around IFRS 
adoption (ICAEW 2007, De George et al. 2013, Kim et al. 2012) possibly due to changes in 
financial reporting incentives that affect earnings quality, or due to changes in litigation risk. 
While converting to IFRS is also likely to affect financial reporting, accounting standards are only 
one of the determinants of overall accounting quality (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). 
Overall, we document an additional consequence of IFRS adoption, namely the cost of 
D&O insurance. We find consistent evidence that perceived litigation risk decreased for Canadian 
firms following IFRS adoption for both firms that are not cross-listed in the US, and those that 
are. Our analyses suggest that switching to more principles-based standards is associated with a 
reduction in the litigation risk of firms and their directors and officers. Our findings should be of 
interest to shareholders and regulators as they suggest that modification of accounting regulations 
has real effects on litigation risk and litigation costs. 
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One caveat to our analysis is that we cannot rule out the alternative explanation that factors 
other than IFRS adoption caused the change in litigation risk. However, our sample period has 
consistently high levels of enforcement throughout, and we are unaware of any significant changes 
to the regulatory, economic, or governance environments that coincide with IFRS adoption in 
Canada. We further address this concern in two ways. First, by focusing on Canadian firms cross-
listed in the US and examining an environment that is likely unaffected by the standard change or 
other regulatory and enforcement acts that happened in Canada around 2011. Second, by 
employing a difference-in-differences research design where we compare D&O insurance 
premiums of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US with a sample of NY incorporated firms that 
are also required to disclose information regarding their D&O insurance. 
With increasingly dispersed ownership around the world and the rising prominence of 
equity ownership, litigation may become a more widespread mechanism for resolving disputes. 
One possible avenue for future research on D&O insurance could be to investigate the cross-
country determinants of D&O insurance and the cross-country D&O disclosure requirements. A 
natural extension of our paper would be to examine whether the determinants of D&O insurance 
differ between countries with more rules-based standards and more principle-based standards. 
Moreover, future research may wish to examine the litigation risk of foreign firms cross-listed in 
the US, focusing on the ex-post litigation risk reflected in D&O insurance contracts.   
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2.8 Appendix 
APPENDIX 2.8.1 
Variable Descriptions 
COVERAGEt  Log of maximum amount the D&O insurance provider may be 
liable for at year t 
POSTt A year dummy set equal to 1 for fiscal years after IFRS adoption 
in Canada, and 0 otherwise. For NY firms, the variable is set equal 
to 1 for fiscal years after pseudo-IFRS adoption date (i.e. the date 
after which the US firm should have adopted IFRS given its fiscal 
year end if it had been a Canadian firm).  
SIZEt-1 Log of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year t 
DEBTRATIOt-1 Debt over the sum of debt and market value of equity at the 
beginning of the fiscal year t 
ACQUIRERt-1 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if in the prior year the book 
value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year increases by more 
than 25% from the beginning of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
DIVESTORt-1 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if in the prior year the book 
value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year decreases by more 
than 25% from the beginning of the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
HIGHTECHt-1 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a member of 
Pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833–2836), R&D Services (8731–
8734), Programming (7371–7379), Computers (3570–3577), or 
Electronics (3600–3674) industries, and 0 otherwise 
VOLATILITYt-1 The standard deviation of daily stock returns during the previous 
year 
QUEBECt-1 An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in 
Quebec at the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise 
EXCASHt-1 The residual from the regression of cash on determinants of cash 
holdings at the beginning of the year, which include the log of 
total assets, market-to-book value ratio, cash flows (defined as 
earnings before depreciation and amortization, less interest, taxes, 
and common dividends), debt, net working capital (excluding 
cash), and membership in high-tech industry 
PREMIUMt Log of total cost of D&O insurance policy at year t 
(PREMIUM/COVERAGE)t Ratio of total cost of D&O insurance policy to aggregate dollar 
value of D&O insurance policy at year t 
MILLS Inverse Mills ratio from a selection model of firms’ choice of 
standard between IFRS and US GAAP. We model the first-stage 
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Heckman (1979) using Burnett et al.’s (2015), where the choice is 
a function of the distance between stockholders’ equity under 
Canadian GAAP than under US GAAP, if a firm reports R&D 
expense, if a firm reports exploration expense, if IFRS is the most 
commonly used standard by leading global firms in their industry, 
firms have more operations located in IFRS countries than 
operations in the US, the level of US ownership, leverage, size, 
return on assets, and legal origin 
IFRS An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm chooses IFRS as 
its new reporting standard, and 0 otherwise (i.e. this variable is 
set equal to 1 for Canadian firms that adopt IFRS, prior to IFRS 
adoption date).  
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2.9 Tables 
TABLE 2.9.1 
Sample Formation 
       
Panel A: Canadian Firms that Adopted to IFRS     
  
Not Cross-
listed in US  
Cross-
listed in 
U.S.  Total 
Canadian firms on TSX with COMPUSTAT data 
two years before and after IFRS adoption  
531  139  670 
Less Investment Companies  (108) 
 0  (108) 
Firms that initiate or cease D&O insurance  (52) 
 (5)  (57) 
Firms with D&O insurance that do not disclose terms 
of coverage 
(49)  (14)  (63) 
Cross-listed firms that do not have Foreign Private 
Issuer status  
0  (28)  (28) 
Firms that obtain special approval to adopt US GAAP (4) 
 0  (4) 
Firms that adopt US GAAP  0 
 (11)  (11) 
No. of firms  318  81  399 
No. of firm-years  1,272  324  1,596 
       
Panel B: Sample Partitioned by D&O Insurance Purchase   
  
Not Cross-
listed in US  
Cross-
listed in 
U.S.  Total 
Firms that purchase D&O insurance  159   42   201  
Firms that do not purchase D&O insurance  159   39   198  
Total firms   318   81   399  
       
Panel A reports the sample selection of Canadian firms in COMPUSTAT that were listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange with financial data and with D&O insurance for the two years before 
and after IFRS adoption. Panel B partitions the sample by whether or not the firms purchase D&O 
insurance. 
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TABLE 2.9.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
        
Panel A: Firms Not Cross-listed in the US That Purchase D&O Insurance 
  N   Mean Median Std. Dev. 
D&O Coverage (m$)  159   
36.93 25.00 40.94 
D&O Coverage/TA  159   
0.17 0.06 0.33 
D&O Premium (m$)  159   
0.17 0.11 0.22 
D&O Premium/TA  159   
0.0009 0.0002 0.0024 
Premium/Coverage  159   
0.005 0.004 0.002 
SIZE  159   
5.89 5.77 2.04 
DEBTRATIO  159   
0.21 0.16 0.22 
ACQUIRER  159   
0.15 0.00 0.36 
DIVESTOR  159   
0.05 0.00 0.22 
HIGHTECH  159   
0.15 0.00 0.36 
VOLATILITY  159   
0.03 0.02 0.02 
QUEBEC  159   
0.21 0.00 0.41 
EXCASH  159   
0.04 0.01 0.29 
     
   
Panel B: Firms Cross-listed in the US That Adopt IFRS and Purchase D&O Insurance 
  N   Mean Median Std. Dev. 
D&O Coverage (m$)  42   
102.15 68.41 104.81 
D&O Coverage/TA  42   
0.09 0.02 0.31 
D&O Premium (m$)  42   
0.97 0.61 0.95 
D&O Premium/TA  42   
0.0008 0.0002 0.0023 
Premium/Coverage  42   
0.010 0.009 0.006 
SIZE  42   
8.16 7.98 3.05 
DEBTRATIO  42   
0.18 0.11 0.22 
ACQUIRER  42   
0.21 0.00 0.42 
DIVESTOR  42   
0.02 0.00 0.15 
HIGHTECH  42   
0.07 0.00 0.26 
VOLATILITY  42   
0.03 0.02 0.02 
QUEBEC  42   
0.12 0.00 0.33 
EXCASH  42   
-0.01 0.00 0.26 
MILLS  42   
0.28 0.29 0.12 
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TABLE 2.9.2 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: Firms not Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
  N   Mean Median Std. Dev. 
SIZE  159   
5.31 5.16 1.76 
DEBTRATIO  159   
0.16 0.09 0.21 
ACQUIRER  159   
0.17 0.00 0.38 
DIVESTOR  159   
0.06 0.00 0.24 
HIGHTECH  159   
0.04 0.00 0.19 
VOLATILITY  159   
0.05 0.04 0.04 
QUEBEC  159   
0.06 0.00 0.24 
EXCASH  159   
0.01 -0.07 0.32 
     
   
Panel D: Firms Cross-listed in the US That Adopt IFRS and Do Not Purchase D&O 
Insurance 
  N   Mean Median Std. Dev. 
SIZE  39   
5.43 4.66 2.27 
DEBTRATIO  39   
0.07 0.02 0.10 
ACQUIRER  39   
0.31 0.00 0.47 
DIVESTOR  39   
0.05 0.00 0.22 
HIGHTECH  39   
0.08 0.00 0.27 
VOLATILITY  39   
0.06 0.05 0.03 
QUEBEC  39   
0.05 0.00 0.22 
EXCASH  39   
-0.07 -0.12 0.36 
MILLS  39   
0.29 0.29 0.14 
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TABLE 2.9.3 
Univariate Tests of Changes in D&O Coverage and Premiums After IFRS Adoption 
          
Panel A: Firms Not Cross-listed in the US       
  Pre-IFRS (N=318)  Post-IFRS (N=318)  Difference 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
D&O Coverage (m$)  36.97 21.72  39.88 25.00  2.91**   3.28*** 
D&O Premium (m$)  0.180 0.102  0.158 0.100  -0.022*** -0.002*** 
Premium/Coverage  0.005 0.005  0.004 0.004  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
          
Panel B: Firms Cross-listed in the US        
  Pre-IFRS (N=84)  Post-IFRS (N=84)  Difference 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
D&O Coverage (m$)  102.42 69.79  110.58 89.54  8.16**     19.74**   
D&O Premium (m$)  0.982 0.666  0.860 0.651  -0.122*     -0.015**   
Premium/Coverage  0.011 0.010  0.008 0.008  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
          
The table presents univariate tests of differences for both non-cross-listed and cross-listed Canadian firms that adopt IFRS. If 
indicated, we use the natural logarithm of the raw values. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, 
**, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and , 0.01 levels, respectively, based on t-test for the difference in means 
and a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in medians. 
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TABLE 2.9.4 
Univariate Tests of Changes in Excess Cash After IFRS Adoption for Firms That Do Not Purchase D&O 
Insurance 
          
Panel A: Firms Not Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance    
  
Pre-IFRS 
(N=318)  
Post-IFRS 
(N=318)  Difference 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
EXCASH  -0.02 -0.08  -0.04 -0.07  -0.02 0.01 
          
Panel B: Firms Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance    
  
Pre-IFRS 
(N=82)  
Post-IFRS 
(N=82)  Difference 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
EXCASH  -0.10 -0.15  -0.17 -0.14  -0.07 0.01 
          
The table presents univariate tests of differences for both non-cross-listed and cross-listed Canadian firms that adopt IFRS and never 
purchased D&O insurance. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, *** denote statistical signiﬁcance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01 levels, respectively, based on t-test for the difference in means and a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test for the difference in medians. 
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TABLE 2.9.5 
Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on D&O Coverage and Premiums 
for Canadian Firms Not Cross-listed in the US 
           
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign  Coverage  Premium  
Premiu
m  
Premium / 
Coverage 
Intercept    0.76***  -6.06***  -5.59***  0.0014*** 
    0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
POST  +/-  0.14***  -0.09***  -0.12***  
-
0.0005*** 
    0.000        0.002        0.004        0.002       
SIZE  +  0.41***  0.16***  0.49***  0.0003*** 
    0.000        0.000        0.000        0.004       
DEBTRATIO  +  -0.18        0.47***  0.27*      0.0018**   
    0.444        0.010        0.094        0.028       
ACQUIRER  +/-  -0.11        -0.04        -0.11**        -0.0002       
    0.132        0.358        0.023        0.489       
DIVESTOR  +/-  0.29***        0.20*      0.45***  0.0008       
    0.006        0.052        0.000        0.171       
HIGHTECH  +  2.68        0.32**  0.47***  0.0010**   
    0.111        0.014        0.000        0.037       
VOLATILITY  +  2.68*      5.82***  8.10***  0.0247*** 
    0.095        0.000        0.000        0.002       
QUEBEC  -  -0.17**    0.03        -0.09        0.0002       
    0.035        0.353        0.104        0.258       
EXCASH  -  0.27             
    0.180             
COVERAGE       0.76***     
      0.000           
EXADJCOV        0.76***   
        0.000         
           
Industry 
Fixed Effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
No. of 
Observations    636  636  636  636 
No. of Firms    159  159  159  159 
Adjusted R2       66.3%   82.7%   82.6%   6.1% 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, *** denote 
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test if a predicted sign, 
and two-tailed test if no predicted sign), respectively, based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 2.9.6  
Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on D&O Coverage and 
Premiums for Canadian Firms Cross-listed in the US 
           
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign  Coverage  Premium  Premium  
Premium / 
Coverage 
Intercept    1.35***  -4.93***  -3.62***  0.0074*** 
    0.001        0.000        0.000        0.000       
POST  +/-  0.07        -0.19***  -0.12**      
-
0.0025*** 
    0.274        0.001        0.031        0.009       
SIZE  +  0.38***  -0.05        0.40***  -0.0001       
    0.000        0.360        0.000        0.397       
DEBTRATIO  +  0.32        -0.20        0.10        0.0019       
    0.240        0.257      0.365        0.193       
ACQUIRER  +/-  -0.06        0.06        0.03        0.0004       
    0.629        0.506        0.689        0.651       
DIVESTOR  +/-  0.20        0.37        0.52*      0.0088       
    0.562        0.213        0.090        0.171       
HIGHTECH  +  0.43*      0.18         0.59*      0.0032*     
    0.066        0.284        0.051        0.095       
VOLATILITY  +  2.31**    1.40        3.62**   0.01       
    0.037        0.213        0.034        0.297       
QUEBEC  -  -0.66***  0.08        -0.66***  -0.0004       
    0.000        0.311        0.000        0.386       
MILLS  +/-  -0.25        0.29        -0.04        0.0072       
    0.637        0.636        0.953        0.339       
EXCASH  +  0.58*           
    0.067             
COVERAGE      1.13***     
      0.000           
EXADJCOV        1.14***   
        0.000         
           
Industry 
Fixed Effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
No. of 
Observations    168  168  168  168 
No. of Firms    42  42  42  42 
Adjusted R2       85.1%   91.5%   90.7%   23.3% 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, *** denote 
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test if a predicted 
sign, and two-tailed test if no predicted sign), respectively, based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 2.9.7 
Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Excess Cash for Canadian Firms 
Not Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
      
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign   EXCASH  
Intercept    -0.32***  
    0.000        
POST  +/-  -0.06***  
    0.001        
SIZE  +  0.06***  
    0.000        
DEBTRATIO  +  -0.26***        
    0.000        
ACQUIRER  +/-  0.03        
    0.140        
DIVESTOR  +/-  0.10        
    0.121        
HIGHTECH  +  0.01        
    0.458        
VOLATILITY  +  -0.37       
    0.200        
QUEBEC  -  -0.05        
    0.147        
      
Industry Fixed Effects    Yes  
      
No. of Observations    636  
No. of Firms    159  
Adjusted R2       15.4%   
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, *** denote 
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test if a predicted sign, 
and two-tailed test if no predicted sign), respectively, based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 2.9.8 
Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Excess Cash for Canadian 
Firms Cross-listed in the US That Do Not Purchase D&O Insurance 
      
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign   EXCASH  
Intercept    -0.28        
    0.246        
POST  +/-  -0.10**    
    0.043        
SIZE  +  0.04*      
    0.061        
DEBTRATIO  +  -0.72***        
    0.002        
ACQUIRER  +/-  0.16**    
    0.021        
DIVESTOR  +/-  0.13        
    0.327        
HIGHTECH  +  0.22        
    0.155        
VOLATILITY  +  -0.20       
    0.464        
QUEBEC  -  -0.25**    
    0.030        
MILLS  +/-  -0.09        
    0.620        
      
Industry Fixed Effects    Yes  
      
No. of Observations    156  
No. of Firms    39  
Adjusted R2       9.1%   
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, *** denote 
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test if a predicted 
sign, and two-tailed test if no predicted sign), respectively, based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 2.9.9 
Descriptive Statistics for New York State Incorporated Firms 
       
  N  Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
D&O Premium (m$)  29  
2.30 0.87 3.09 
D&O Premium/TA  29  
0.0007 0.0004 0.0008 
SIZE  29  
7.86 7.94 2.66 
DEBTRATIO  29  
0.24 0.21 0.19 
ACQUIRER  29  
0.07 0.00 0.26 
DIVESTOR  29  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
HIGHTECH  29  
0.10 0.00 0.31 
VOLATILITY  29  
0.02 0.02 0.01 
    
   
The table presents descriptive statistics for US firms that are incorporated in New York 
State and that disclose D&O premiums for two years before and after the year they would 
have had to adopt IFRS had they been in Canada. Data is presented for the year prior to 
pseudo IFRS-adoption year.  
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TABLE 2.9.10 
Regression of the Effect of IFRS Adoption on Premiums for Canadian 
Firms Cross-listed in the US Compared to Firms Incorporated in New 
York State 
     
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign  Premium 
Intercept    -4.22*** 
    0.000       
IFRS  ?  -0.53       
    0.132       
POST  +/-  -0.01       
    0.840       
IFRS*POST  +/-  -0.13*     
    0.087       
SIZE  +  0.49*** 
    0.000       
DEBTRATIO  +  0.04       
    0.472       
ACQUIRER  +/-  0.12 
    0.301       
DIVESTOR  +/-  0.67       
    0.200       
HIGHTECH  +  0.42*     
    0.085       
VOLATILITY  +  2.88*     
    0.081       
QUEBEC  -  -0.32*     
    0.082       
MILLS  +/-  0.39       
    0.718       
     
Industry Fixed Effects    Yes 
     
No. of Observations    284 
No. of Canadian Firms    42 
No. of New York Firms    29 
Adjusted R2       78.2% 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, *** denote 
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test if a predicted 
sign, and two-tailed test if no predicted sign), respectively, based on robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Chapter 3 
Accounting-Based Valuation for Multiple Firms: The Case 
of Cross Holdings 
 
Daphne Hart 
Bjorn N. Jorgensen 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter develops an accounting-based valuation model for firms with cross 
holdings. We extend Feltham and Ohlson (1995) (FO henceforth) to study an economy with 
multiple firms connected through mutual inter-company equity investments, called cross 
holdings.1  
We also model linear information dynamics in a setting with multiple firms and inter-
firm information transfers, for firms with and without equity investments. Overall, we find 
that market values appear distorted for firms with mutual equity investments and that the 
degree of ownership determines the magnitude of this perceived distortion. These findings 
should be of interest to investors and regulators. 
Cross holdings are believed to be common in Germany, Japan (keiretsu) and South 
Korea (chaebol), however, the phenomenon is not limited to those countries. Becht and Roëll 
(1999) document high concentration of voting power in continental Europe. Holderness 
                                                          
 We thank Vasiliki Athanasakou, Stefano Cascino, Denis Gromb, Stephen Penman, Zane Swanson 
(discussant), Wim Van der Stede, Martin Wallmeier (discussant) and participants at the 2017 AAA 
annual meeting, the 10th Accounting Research Workshop in Basel and the 2nd HEC PhD Finance 
Workshop. 
1 We use the terms cross holdings and equity investments interchangeably throughout the chapter.  
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(2009) shows that public US firms have a large percentage of concentrated equity ownership, 
11 percent of US firms have block holders that are public and private non-financial 
corporations. These block holders have 39 percent of the voting stock on average. 
The incentives for corporate equity ownership and the effects of block holdings on 
target firms (investees) are well documented (see Allen and Phillips 2000, Ouimet 2012, Liao 
2014, among others). However, less is known about the long-term effects of corporate equity 
ownership on the valuation of the investing firms (investors). One exception is Fedenia, 
Hodder and Triantis (1994) who study the consequences of cross holdings in a capital market 
setting. Based on an asset pricing model, they show that stock returns and risk premia are 
distorted when firms hold corporate equity.2 While Fedenia et al. (1994) model the behavior 
of stock returns, they do not derive stock market values and returns from accounting 
fundaments. 
In this paper, we rely on the accounting-based valuation framework and complements 
the asset pricing analysis in Fedenia et al. (1994). Accounting-based valuation studies the 
relation between accounting information and firm valuation. The advantage of using the 
accounting-based valuation framework for our setting, is that we can undo distortions 
generated by the accounting treatment.3 
Prior accounting-based valuation research focuses on a single firm setting with 
operating and financing activities. In an influential paper, Ohlson (1995) studies a single firm 
with operating activities and demonstrates how clean surplus allows valuation based on 
abnormal earnings and book value of equity. FO (1995) consider a single firm with both 
operating activities and financing activities. They assume that each year, the firm places cash 
in either an operating asset (“operating activities”) or a risk-free bond without future abnormal 
                                                          
2 Specifically, Fedenia et al. (1994) demonstrate how cross holdings lead to a non-stationary covariance 
matrix of observed stock returns, thus, increasing estimates of priced risk. 
3 As further discussed below, the distortion is due to the accounting treatment. Alternative valuation 
models, such as discounted future cash flows, may not capture the “double counting” introduced by 
accounting. 
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earnings (“financing activates”).4 FO (1995) derive valuation based on abnormal operating 
earnings, operating assets and financial assets. Extending these papers, we consider a setting 
with multiple firms with operating activities, financing actives, as well as investments in 
corporate equity. In our setting, each firm places cash in an operating asset, a risk-free bond, 
or a risky equity security issued by another firm.  
We model the investments in corporate equity based on the accounting guidance on 
equity investments. US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) classify equity ownership into two 
categories: Financial instruments5 and investment in common stock6 (Investment in 
associates). We focus on equity investments classified as financial instruments that are 
accounted for using the fair value method.7  
Under the fair value method, the investment is an asset on the investing firm’s balance 
sheet. When the investee’s price appreciates (depreciates) the investor’s assets increase against 
unrealized holding gains (losses) in the equity account.8 When the investee pays dividends, 
the investor records an increase in cash and earnings. Any accounting profit or loss generated 
by the investee is unrecorded by the investing firm. We note that investments accounted for 
                                                          
4 We follow FO’s (1995) conventions in the accounting-based valuation literature. First, we define 
financing activities as investments in a riskless bond. Furthermore, we consider all equity firm. 
5 Under US GAAP, the main guidance on Financial Instruments is given in ASC 320 Investments - 
Debt and Equity Securities. Under IFRS the main guidance is described in IAS 32, Financial 
Instruments: Presentation; IFRS 7, Financial Instruments: Disclosures; and IFRS 9, Financial 
Instruments. 
6 Guidance on Investment in Common Stock under US GAAP is presented in ASC 323 Investments-
Equity Method and Joint Ventures, and under IFRS in IAS 28, Investment in Associates. IAS 28 
generally requires investors to use the equity method for their investments in associates in consolidated 
financial statements, however, if separate financial statements are presented (i.e., by a parent or 
investor), subsidiaries and associates can be accounted for at either cost method or fair value method. 
(Ernst and Young, 2012) 
7 In Appendix 3.5.3, we consider unconsolidated equity positions accounted for using the equity method 
and find qualitatively similar results as those reported in the body of the chapter relying on the fair 
value method. Further, in appendix 3.5.4, we illustrate the implications of the accounting methods for 
market-to-book ratios and return on equity. 
8 Equity securities within the scope of ASC 320 are classified as trading or available-for-sale. For 
investments classified as trading, all gains and losses are reported in current earnings. For investments 
classified as available-for-sale, realized gains and losses are recorded in current earnings while 
unrealized gains and losses are recorded in other comprehensive income. Other-than-temporary 
impairments of available-for-sale securities are recorded in current earnings (Ernst and Young, 2015). 
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using the fair value method do not require consolidation, since the investor and the investee 
are separate entities for financial reporting purposes.9  
While (i) managers’ choice between the equity method and the fair value method10 
and (ii) managers’ motivation for engaging in equity transaction are outside the scope of the 
accounting-based valuation literature, we note that purchasing equity stakes in a related or 
rival firm have economic rationales, such as strategic reasons, operational reasons, and for 
investment diversification.11 Furthermore, corporate equity ownership has implications for 
firms’ corporate governance and product market decisions.12 In this paper, we take the 
ownership structure as given and do not analyze the managers’ motivations for purchasing 
equity. We assume any synergies or goodwill created upon the equity investment are reflected 
in the initial transaction prices. This paper merely considers the consequences of 
(unconsolidated) equity holdings on accounting-based valuation. Finally, we abstract from 
risk adjustments of variables as analyzed in Feltham and Ohlson (1999), among others. 
We assume clean surplus and derive an augmented valuation model based on FO 
(1995) when firms have mutual equity ownership. While prior finance research documents 
that cross-firm ownerships distort market values due to “double counting”, we show that 
                                                          
9 For example, from 2009 to 2015 Ryanair held a 29.8% interest in Aer Lingus Group plc, which during 
2007 to 2009 was recorded at a total cost of €407.2 million. This investment was an asset carried at fair 
value. Ryanair reports its investment in Aer Lingus as available-for-sale financial assets, because “…the 
company does not have the power to exercise any influence over the entity.” (Ryanair Annual Report 
2013, note 4). 
10 The choice of the appropriate accounting treatment, equity method or fair value method, may depend 
on the ability of the holding firm to exercise control over the investee. One example of this discretion 
is Freedom Foods Group (FFG), which was the largest single shareholder of a2 Milk Company (a2MC) 
with 17.8% equity interest. In 2014, FFG accounted for its investment in a2MC using the equity method. 
In 2015, following a failed takeover attempt and the resignation of FFG’s CEO from the board of a2MC, 
FFG reclassified its investment as available-for-sale and recognized a fair value gain of A$53.1 million. 
Another example is Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. (WBG) which owned 5.2% of AmerisourceBergen 
(AB) in 2015 and designated one member of AB’s board of directors. In 2013 the two companies 
announced various agreements and arrangements, including a ten-year pharmaceutical distribution 
agreement. Further, WGB had the right to purchase a minority equity position in AB (which it exercised 
in 2016) and gain associated representation on AB’s board of directors in certain circumstances. In 
2015, WGB accounted for its equity investment as available-for-sale (see Walgreens Boots Alliance, 
Inc. Annual Report 2015, note 7). 
11 See Hansen and Lott (1995) and Clayton and Jorgensen (2005). 
12 See Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Aghion and Tirole (1997), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), and 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), among others. 
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financial statements are similarly distorted. Consider the case of two-sided cross holdings, 
when one firm records the value of its investment in another firm, this value includes the other 
firm’s investment in its own equity securities. Thus, the aggregate market values of all shares 
outstanding exceeding the aggregate intrinsic value of all firms and the aggregate value of all 
future dividends. 
We note that these value distortions may arise for firms with direct, as well as indirect 
cross holdings. A firm can own shares in another firm indirectly, through equity ownership of 
an intermediate firm. To illustrate this point, consider a three firm network where firm H has 
one-sided equity ownership in firm F, firm F has one-sided equity ownership in firm G, and 
firm G has one-sided equity ownership in Firm H. Although none of these three firms have 
direct two-sided equity ownership, the circular ownership structure causes each firm’s 
valuation to depend on the performance of the two other firms. 
We also illustrate the effects of corporate equity ownership on market-to-book (MB) 
and price-to-earnings (PE) ratios. When we allow for equity investments, we find that MB 
ratios are distorted away from unity. These findings provide a theoretical perspective on Fama 
and French (1992, 1993, 2015), who suggest that MB ratios capture firms’ underlying risk. 
We show that corporate equity investments alter earnings and book values, thus articulating 
an analytical explanation for the observed empirical relation between MB ratios and stock 
returns. Moreover, prior empirical literature discusses the effects of equity market 
concentration and cross holdings on market prices and informativeness of accounting 
information (French and Poterba 1991, Alford et al. 1993). We demonstrate how 
unconsolidated equity positions alter the relation between earnings and prices. 
Lastly, we discuss linear information dynamics in a setting with multiple firms. We 
propose linear information models that permit formal analyses of inter-firm information 
transfers. Prior empirical literature examines intra-industry information transfers (Baginski 
1987, Foster 1981, Han, Wild and Ramesh 1989, Han and Wild 1990), and market and 
analysts’ reaction to peer firms’ disclosures (Freeman and Tse 1992, Ramnath 2002, Shroff, 
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Verdi and Yost 2017). Our model offers theoretical foundations to these studies, as we provide 
a theoretical benchmark for assessing inter-firm information transfers. 
We derive a closed form solution for a linear information model where a firm directly 
incorporates information about another firm. Moreover, we derive a closed form solution for 
firms with cross holdings, that is, a model where firms indirectly incorporate information 
about their investees. We show that in the presence of cross-firm equity ownership, the implied 
stock prices incorporate information about investees even in the absence of inter-firm 
information transfers.  
Our contribution is twofold. First, we present an accounting-based valuation and a 
linear information model to value multiple firms jointly. Second, we demonstrate that 
corporate equity investments may distort accounting-based valuation. We focus on the periods 
following the initial equity investment decision and analytically demonstrate how equity 
ownership of other firms may subsequently alter firms’ valuation. Thus, we provide a 
benchmark for these firms’ value net of benefits or synergies that were unpriced at the date of 
the initial equity investment.13  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model and formalizes the 
valuation of firms with corporate equity investments. We also discuss the implications of cross 
holdings for empirical research and for financial ratios. Section 3.3 presents a linear 
information framework for multiple firms and discusses the effects of inter-firm information 
transfers and cross holdings on firms’ valuation. We conclude and discuss future research in 
Section 3.4. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.5.1. Appendices 3.5.2-3.5.4 expand an 
example due to Lundholm (1995) to illustrate corporate equity ownership and the implication 
of the accounting treatments for financial ratios. Appendices 3.5.5-3.5.6 discuss valuation 
using the general linear information model and provide guidance for empirical applications. 
                                                          
13 We assume that the firm acquires its corporate equity positions at fair value. The share price at the 
time of the acquisition incorporates all expected future abnormal earnings.  
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3.2 A Valuation Model with Corporate Equity Ownership 
Ohlson (1995) presents a valuation model for companies that engage exclusively in 
operating activities. Conceptually, these companies can increase their production capacity or 
improve production processes by purchasing additional productive assets. Thus, future 
abnormal earnings are correlated with current abnormal earnings and, future return on assets 
(ROA) are similar to past ROA. FO (1995) suggest an investment channel through which 
companies invest in risk-free (government) bonds. By construction, this investment channel 
does not generate future abnormal earnings.  
Extending Ohlson (1995) and FO (1995), we introduce the possibility that companies 
purchase equity in other firms. Each firm may invest in a productive asset, a risk-free bond, 
or a risky equity security issued by another firm. The returns from these equity investments 
depend on the nature of the investment and the performance of the investee firms over time. 
The investments we consider are one-sided or two-sided cross holdings that are either direct 
or indirect.  
Ohlson (1995) and FO (1995) show that accounting-based valuation equals book 
value and expected discounted future abnormal earnings. Since we consider the value of a firm 
that owns shares in another firm, we take into consideration both the investor’s and its 
investees’ book values and future abnormal earnings.14 
3.2.1 Formal Model of Cross Holdings 
We model an economy with two firms denoted by⁡𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘,15 operating for 
multiple periods 𝑡 = 0,1,2,…. Both firms are traded in a competitive stock market, where the 
                                                          
14 Appendix 3.5.2 illustrate the central features of firms’ equity investments. As a benchmark, we first 
present a single firm setting without equity investments from Lundholm (1995). Next, we present two 
firms where only one of the firms has equity investment, an ownership stake in the other firm. Lastly, 
we present the case of two-sided cross holdings, where both firms have equity investments, ownership 
stakes in each other. Appendix 3.5.2 demonstrates how equity ownership affects book values and 
earnings. 
15 The model can be extended and solved for 𝑛 > 2 firms, that is, 𝑖 = 1,2, . . , 𝑛. 
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ex-dividend market price of firm 𝑖 at date 𝑡 (end of the period) is given by⁡𝑝𝑡
𝑖, and 𝑝𝑡 = |
𝑝𝑡
𝑗
𝑝𝑡
𝑘
| 
denotes the 2-dimensional price vector. Each firm engages in operating, financing and 
investing activates. We follow FO (1995) and assume firms disclose accounting information 
about their operational and financial activities. Moreover, we assume firms disclose 
accounting information concerning their corporate equity investments.  
We focus on firms’ valuation in the periods following an investment decision. For 
ease of exposition, we treat the ownership structure as exogenously given and constant over 
time.16 Firm 𝑗’s percentage ownership in firm 𝑘 is represented by 𝜙𝑗,𝑘, and 𝜙𝑗 = |𝜙𝑗,𝑗 𝜙𝑗,𝑘| 
denotes the vector of firm 𝑗’s ownership structure.17 We normalize 𝜙𝑗,𝑗 = 0⁡to eliminate self-
ownership and⁡0 ≤ 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 < 1 to prohibit short selling and leveraged positions.  
We augment FO’s (1995) specification to account for corporate equity investments: 
the firm’s book value includes the market value of the firm’s equity investments and the firm’s 
earnings include the cash flow generated by these investments. Thus, the following conditions 
hold ∀𝑖, ∀𝑡: 
(3.1)⁡𝐵𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗𝑝𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑝𝑡
𝑘 
(3.2) ⁡𝑥𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑖𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑗 +𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝑡
𝑘 
Equation (3.1) denotes firm 𝑗’s total book value at date 𝑡. Firm⁡𝑗’s book value of equity 
(𝐵𝑡
𝑗
) is the sum of the firm’s total financial assets net of financial obligations⁡(𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗
), its total 
operating assets net of operating liabilities⁡(𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗
), and the current market value of firm⁡𝑗’s 
equity investment in firm 𝑘,⁡(𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑝𝑡
𝑘). Equation (3.2) describes the firm’s earnings for the 
period (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡). Firm 𝑗’s earnings (𝑥𝑡
𝑗
) comprise of interest revenue from financing activities 
                                                          
16 This constraint does not have any implications for the investee’s liquidity. In particular, we impose 
no constraints on the liquidity of the investee’s stocks. 
17 Without loss of generality, we use firm 𝑗 as a representative firm. 
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net of interest expenses (𝑖𝑡
𝑗
), operating earnings (𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑗
), and its claim to the dividends paid by 
firm⁡𝑘 at the end of the period⁡(𝑑𝑡
𝑘). 
In addition to Equations (3.1) and (3.2) we assume the present value relation, where 
firm’s market value,⁡Vt
j
, equals the present value of expected dividends (PVED) at time 𝑡: 
(3.3) V𝑡
𝑗 = ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑑𝜏
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
Accounting Relations 
We now present three accounting relations: Clean Surplus Relation, Financial Assets 
Relation and Operating Assets Relation. We use these accounting relations to derive firms’ 
valuation. 
(i) Clean Surplus Relation (CSR) 
As in Ohlson (1995), we assume the Clean Surplus Relation (CSR) holds: 
(CSR)  𝐵𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐵𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑑𝑡
𝑗
 
CSR merely states that the book value at time 𝑡 equals the book value at time (𝑡 − 1), 
plus the earnings generated over the period⁡(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡), minus dividends paid by the firm to its 
shareholders (𝑑𝑡
𝑗
). Thus, book value increases with earnings and decreases with dividends 
paid. 
Using the present value relation (PVED) we can value the firm based on CSR. We 
start by defining abnormal earnings for the firm as: 𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 ≜ 𝑥𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑟 ∗ 𝐵𝑡−1
𝑗
. The risk-free rate is 
denoted by 𝑟, which, for simplicity, we assume is constant over time. CSR can be written as: 
𝐵𝑡
𝑗 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 − 𝑑𝑡
𝑗
. Rearranging, we get: 
(3.4) 𝑑𝑡
𝑗 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1
𝑗 − 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗
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Substituting 𝑑𝑡
𝑗
 in (PVED) and with appropriate transversality conditions, we get that 
the firm’s value is given by: 
(3.5) 𝑉𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1  ,⁡∀𝑖, ∀𝑡 
Equation (3.5) states that firm 𝑗's value at date 𝑡 equals the sum of firm 𝑗's book value 
and discounted future abnormal earnings. We use Equation (3.5) to simultaneously solve for 
both firms’ market values. Since the firms are permitted to hold equity stock in each other, we 
solve a system of equations to extract each firm’s individual value. To do so, we first define 
the following variables: 𝑉𝑡 = |
𝑉𝑡
𝑗
𝑉𝑡
𝑘
| is the [2 × 1]-vector of the firms' market values at time 𝑡 
and 𝐵𝑡 = |
𝐵𝑡
𝑗
𝐵𝑡
𝑘
| is the [2 × 1]-vector of the firms' book values at time 𝑡. 𝐹𝐴𝑡 = |
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑘
| and 
𝑂𝐴𝑡 = |
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘
| are the [2 × 1]-vectors of the firms' stock of financial assets and stock of 
operating assets at time 𝑡, respectively. 𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎 = |
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑘
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
| is the [2 × 1]-vector of 
the firms' discounted abnormal earnings from 𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞. Lastly, 𝜙⁡denotes the [2 × 2] matrix 
of equity ownership percentage (i.e. ownership structure):⁡𝜙 = |𝜙𝑗, 𝜙𝑘| = |
0 𝜙𝑗,𝑘
𝜙𝑘,𝑗 0
|. 
Given Equation (3.5), the firms’ market values can be expressed as:⁡𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎 . 
Substituting from Equation (3.1) we get:  𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡 +𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙𝑝𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎 . Assuming efficient 
capital markets, where market prices fully reflect the firms’ values, implies: 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡, hence:  
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜙𝑉𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
[𝐼 − 𝜙]𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡 +𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
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where 𝐼 is the [2 × 2] identity matrix 𝐼 = |
1 0
0 1
| . Thus, the firms’ values are: 18 
 (3.6)⁡𝑉𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡| + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
(ii) Financial Asset Relation (FAR) 
In FO (1995) each firm has a stock of financial assets generated through the 
accumulation of cash from operating actives and earnings re-invested in risk-free bonds. We 
extend FO (1995) and model an economy where each firm can hold shares of other firms in 
addition to investing in risk-free bonds. Corporate equity investments differ from financing 
activities as the former permits firms to invest their earnings in a risky asset, while the later 
allows firms to reinvest their earnings in a risk-free asset. The firm’s income from its equity 
investments are the dividends paid by the investees and the market returns on the corporate 
equity. Moreover, income generated by equity investments are cash based (dividends received 
from investees) as well as non-cash based, in the form of unrealized capital gains (losses). We 
define the following cash-based items to account for all cash-based income:     
(3.7) 𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗
 
(3.8) 𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐿𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 (1 + 𝑟) + (𝑐𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑑𝑡
𝑗
) + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝑡
𝑘 
Equation (3.7) defines the firm's income from financing activities, where 𝐿𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗
 
represents the liquid assets invested in the risk-free bonds at the beginning of period t. This 
income is a cash flow, as in each period the firm reinvests its total liquid assets, 𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝑗
, in a bond 
that pays risk-free interest,⁡𝑟. Equation (3.8) denotes the evolution of total liquid assets over 
                                                          
18 We assume the firms’ equity investments are independent. 𝐼 and 𝜙 are square matrices and |𝐼 − 𝜙| 
is a full rank matrix, hence, its inverse matrix |𝐼 − 𝜙|−1 exists such that: |𝐼 − 𝜙|−1|𝐼 − 𝜙| = 𝐼. Note 
that for the case of two firms {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡|𝐼 − 𝜙| = ⁡ |
1 −𝜙𝑗,𝑘
−𝜙𝑘,𝑗 1
| and |𝐼 − 𝜙|−1 =
⁡|
1
1−𝜙𝑗,𝑘𝜙𝑘,𝑗
𝜙𝑗,𝑘
1−𝜙𝑗,𝑘𝜙𝑘,𝑗
𝜙𝑘,𝑗
1−𝜙𝑗,𝑘𝜙𝑘,𝑗
1
1−𝜙𝑗,𝑘𝜙𝑘,𝑗
|. 
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time. Total liquid assets increase with cash flow realized from operating activities net of 
investment in those activities, 𝑐𝑡
𝑗
, and with dividends paid from the investee, 𝑑𝑡
𝑘. The liquid 
assets decrease with the dividend paid to shareholders, 𝑑𝑡
𝑗
. 
In our model, the financial assets account accumulates income generated by both 
financing activities and equity investments. Interest is earned on the liquid assets during the 
period (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡) and dividends are declared and paid at the end of the period. In addition, as 
in FO (1995), the financial assets account includes the cash generated by operating actives. 
Hence, financial assets increase with cash from operating activities, returns on liquid asset 
(equivalent to a savings account) and the capital gains on investment assets (investee’s 
equity).19 The following equation denotes the Financial Asset Relation (FAR):  
(FAR)  ⁡𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑟 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 − (𝑑𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑐𝑡
𝑗
) + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ (𝑝𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑑𝑡
𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡−1
𝑘 ) 
We note that equity investments alter FAR relative to FO (1995). When equity 
investments are introduced, financial assets accumulate cash dividends paid by the investee as 
well as the unrealized capital gains (losses) over time.20 
 We can now express the firm's valuation using FAR. We start by observing that Equation 
(3.8) can be simplified using backward induction. Assuming that the initial stock of financial 
assets equals the initial stock of liquid assets,⁡⁡𝐿𝐴0
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴0
𝑗
, we can rewrite Equation (3.8) as:  
(3.9)  𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴0
𝑗(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)𝑡−𝜏(𝑐𝜏
𝑗 − 𝑑𝜏
𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝜏
𝑘)𝑡𝜏=1 . 
Substituting 𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝑗⁡in FAR and re-arranging, we get: 
𝑑𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 − 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑟𝐹𝐴0
𝑗(1 + 𝑟)𝑡−1 + 𝑟∑ (1 + 𝑟)𝑡−1−𝜏(𝑐𝜏
𝑗 − 𝑑𝜏
𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝜏
𝑘)𝑡−1𝜏=1 + 𝑐𝑡
𝑗 +
𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ (𝑝𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑑𝑡
𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡−1
𝑘 )  
                                                          
19 Partitioning the financial assets into liquid assets and equity ownership is required for tractability of 
the financing activities’ earnings and the unrealized changes in the investees’ value. 
20 Both US GAAP and IFRS generally permit recognition of capital gains in the income statement. 
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The current dividend,⁡𝑑𝑡
𝑗
, depends on the values of past dividends,⁡𝑑𝜏
𝑗
. 21 This is a 
dynamic process, we use backwards induction to get:  
(3.10) 𝑑𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 (1 + 𝑟) − 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑐𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑟𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∑ (𝑝𝜏
𝑘 − 𝑝𝜏−1
𝑘 )𝑡−1𝜏=1 + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∗ (𝑝𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑑𝑡
𝑘 −
𝑝𝑡−1
𝑘 ) 
Using (PVED) and the transversality condition, the firm’s valuation can be represented as: 
(3.11) 𝑉𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑐𝜏
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 + 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑑𝜏
𝑘
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 ,⁡⁡∀𝑖, ∀𝑡 
The firm’s value equals the sum of its financial assets, discounted future abnormal 
cash flows from operating activities and discounted future dividends paid by its investee. 
We can use Equation (3.11) to define the valuation of all firms. First, we define 𝐶𝑡+1 =
|
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑐𝜏
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑐𝜏
𝑘
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
| as the [2 × 1]-vector of the firms' discounted cash flows from operating 
activities from time 𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞, and 𝐷𝑡+1 = |
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑑𝜏
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑑𝜏
𝑘
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
| as the [2 × 1]-vector of the 
firms' discounted dividends paid by all firms from 𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞. We extrapolate Equation (3.11) 
for all firms: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝜙𝐷𝑡+1 
Using the (PVED) identify (𝑉𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡+1) and rearranging, we get: 
(3.12) 𝑉𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝐹𝐴𝑡 + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝐶𝑡+1 
(iii) Operating Asset Relation (OAR)  
Following FO (1995), we define the Operating Asset Relation (OAR) as:  
                                                          
21 The current dividend is a function of prior dividends paid. Current dividends depend on the stock of 
liquid assets, which decreases with prior dividends paid. 
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(OAR)  𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑐𝑡
𝑗
 
 OAR characterizes the evolution of firm 𝑗’s operating assets. Each period the firm 
chooses whether to reinvest or realize its operating earnings. Reinvesting the earnings 
increases the operating assets, which potentially increases future operating earnings. Realizing 
the earnings increases the liquid assets, which increases future interest revenues. 
We value the firm based on OAR. We start by defining abnormal operating earnings 
for firm 𝑗 at time 𝑡 as: 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 ≜ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑟𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗
. Hence OAR can be written as: 
⁡𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 − 𝑐𝑡
𝑗
. 
Rearranging, we get: 
(3.13) 𝑐𝑡
𝑗 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗 − 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗
 
Using Equation (3.13) we calculate the firm’s present value of cash flows: 
 (3.14) ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑐𝜏
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 = 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 ,⁡∀𝑖, ∀𝑡 
And add 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗
 to both sides of Equation (3.14) and get:  
(3.15) ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑐𝜏
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 + 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 ,∀𝑖, ∀𝑡 
Next, we can augment Equation (3.15) for all firms as:  
𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐹𝐴𝑡 = 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
Where 𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎 = |
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,1
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,2
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1
| is the [2 × 1]-vector of the firms’ discounted abnormal 
operating earnings from 𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞. 
Lastly, from FAR we know that:⁡[𝐼 − 𝜙]𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡+1, hence, we get: 
(3.16) 𝑉𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 +𝑂𝐴𝑡| + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
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Proposition I: 
Given Equations (3.1)-(3.3) and (3.7)-(3.8), assuming efficient capital markets and assuming 
the three accounting relations, firms’ market prices are given by the following equivalent 
expressions: 
(a)⁡𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡| + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
(b)𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝐹𝐴𝑡 + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝐶𝑡+1 
(c)𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡| + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
 
First, the above proposition extends Proposition 1 in FO (1995, page 698), which is 
the special case of our setting without corporate equity ownerships, i.e., 𝜙 = 0. The two 
propositions coincide since when |𝐼 − 𝜙|−1 = 𝐼, the other firm’s accounting information is 
not needed for valuation. 
Second, Proposition I naturally extends to cases with 𝑛 > 2 firms. As long as capital 
markets are efficient, the market value is consistent with all three accounting relations, similar 
to FO (1995). The same price prevails regardless of the underlying accounting relations, as 
the firm’s book values and abnormal earnings capture the firms’ underlying economics.  
3.2.2 Implication for Empirical Research: The Case of Cross Holdings 
Proposition I permits studying the effects of corporate equity investments on prices. 
In this section, we demonstrate the empirical application of Proposition I and show that not 
accounting for cross holdings may lead to biased estimation due to omission of correlated 
variables.  
We start by using Proposition I to price two firms with similar operating activities but 
different equity investment stakes. 22 Both firms, H and F, are traded in a competitive stock 
                                                          
22 We consider two firms to be similar if their operating actives are the same, but their equity 
investments differ. Assume two firms that operate in the same industry and have access to identical 
production technology. Assume one firm, Firm H, holds all its operating assets directly and a second 
firm, Firm F, that holds some of its operating asset indirectly, by owing equity in firm H. These two 
firms are similar as their underlying economics are the same. 
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market. Firm H does not have corporate equity investments, while Firm F owns 𝜑 ∈ (0,1) of 
Firm H. The ownership structure is denoted by 𝜙 = |𝜙𝐻 , 𝜙𝐹| = |
0 0
𝜑 0
|.  
Under CSR the firms’ prices are given be:23 
𝑝𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻 +∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝐻
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
𝑝𝑡
𝐹 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐹 + 𝜑𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝜑𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝐹+𝜑𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝐻
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
Note that Firm H is unaffected by the corporate equity investments of Firm F. Firm 
H's price is identical to the valuation presented in Ohlson (1995), as 𝐵𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻. 
Nonetheless, Firm F’s valuation is altered by its equity ownership, its stock of financial asset 
incorporates capital gains (losses) on its investee, Firm H. Specifically, from Equation (3.10), 
we get: 
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
𝐻 (1 + 𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑑𝑡
𝐻  
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐹 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡−1
𝐹 (1 + 𝑟) + 𝑐𝑡
𝐹 − 𝑑𝑡
𝐹 − 𝑟𝜑 ∗ ∑ (𝑝𝜏
𝐻 − 𝑝𝜏−1
𝐻 )𝑡−1𝜏=1 + 𝜑 ∗ (𝑝𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑑𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑝𝑡−1
𝐻 )  
Using backwards induction, we can express the stock of financial assets as follows:  
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴0
𝐻(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + ∑ (𝑐𝜏
𝐻 − 𝑑𝜏
𝐻)(1 + 𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝑡𝜏=1   
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐹 = 𝐹𝐴0
𝐹(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + ∑ (𝑐𝜏
𝐹 − 𝑑𝜏
𝐹 + 𝜑 ∗ 𝑑𝜏
𝐻)(1 + 𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝑡𝜏=1 + 𝜑∑ (𝑝𝜏
𝐻 − 𝑝𝜏−1
𝐻 )𝑡𝜏=1   
Thus, the firms’ prices are given by: 
𝑝𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐹𝐴0
𝐻(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + ∑ (𝑐𝜏
𝐻 − 𝑑𝜏
𝐻)(1 + 𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝑡𝜏=1 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝐻
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
𝑝𝑡
𝐹 = (𝐹𝐴0
𝐹 + 𝜑𝐹𝐴0
𝐻)(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 +∑ (𝑐𝜏
𝐹 − 𝑑𝜏
𝐹 +𝜑𝑐𝜏
𝐻)(1 + 𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝑡𝜏=1 +𝜑∑ (𝑝𝜏
𝐻 − 𝑝𝜏−1
𝐻 )𝑡𝜏=1 +
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐹 + 𝜑𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝐹+𝜑𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝐻
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
                                                          
23 Where⁡|𝐼 − 𝜙|−1 = |
1 0
𝜑 1
|. 
115 
 
Firm F’s financial assets include capital gains (losses) on its investee, while its price 
also includes a fraction of the investee’s financial assets, operating assets and operating cash 
flows. This implies that even under fair-value accounting, the value of a firm with equity 
investments may differ from a similar firm that does not have equity investments. Corporate 
equity investments permit firms to incorporate unrealized profits and changes in market 
expectations into their current assets. As such, these investments are also expected to affect 
the volatility of firms’ prices. Furthermore, the evolution of the financial assets of a firm with 
equity investments differs from that of a firm without equity investments. Since financial 
assets differ, cash flows are also likely to differ and thus, induce different prices in practice.  
Proposition II: 
The following holds for an economy with two similar firms: 
(a) Consider two firms denoted by⁡𝑗 and 𝑘. Without loss of generality, we set 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 > 0 
and⁡𝜙𝑘,𝑗 = 0. Thus, firm 𝑗 owns a fraction of firm 𝑘 as one-sided cross holding. The firms' 
prices are given by 𝑝𝑡
𝑗
 and 𝑝𝑡
𝑘. 
(b) Consider two firms denoted by⁡𝑗̂ and ?̂?. Both firms do not have corporate equity 
investments, thus, 𝜙?̂?,?̂? = 𝜙?̂?,?̂? = 0. The firms' prices are given by: 𝑝𝑡
?̂?⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑝𝑡
?̂? . 
Given (a) and (b), 𝑝𝑡
𝑗 ≠ 𝑝𝑡
?̂?
 
Proposition II states that equity investments alter a firm's value. The value of a given 
firm without investments activities is different from the value of an identical firm that owns 
part of its operating assets and operating activities through an equity investment, i.e. equity 
ownership of an identical firm. Since market prices incorporate expectations about future 
performance, equity ownership permits the integration of these expectations into the current 
value of a holding firm.  
Consider next the case of two-sided cross holdings, where two identical firms, Firm F 
and Firm G, both have equity investments. Firm F owns 𝜑 ∈ (0,1) of Firm G, and Firm G 
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owns 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) of Firm F: 𝜙 = |𝜙𝐺 , 𝜙𝐹| = |
0 𝛾
𝜑 0
|. Under CSR the Firms' prices are given 
by:24 
𝑝𝑡
𝐹 =
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐹+𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐹+𝜑𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐺+𝜑𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐺
1−𝛾𝜑
+
1
1−𝛾𝜑
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝛼,𝐹+𝜑𝑥𝜏
𝛼,𝐺
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
𝑝𝑡
𝐺 =
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐺+𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐺+𝛾𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐹+𝛾𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐹
1−𝛾𝜑
+
1
1−𝛾𝜑
∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝛼,𝐺+𝛾𝑥𝜏
𝛼,𝐹
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1   
The valuations of both firms are distorted relative to the valuations given by Ohlson 
(1995) and FO (1995). Two-sided cross holdings mechanically alter the valuation of the firms 
by 
1
1−𝜑𝛾
,⁡ a value amplifier that depends on the ownership structure. The two-sided cross 
holdings create a dependency between the firms, as the value of Firm G depends on the 
percentage ownership of Firm F and vice-versa. 
Note that Firm F did not change its operating activities, financing activities or 
investments relative to the case of one-sided cross holding. The two-sided cross holdings 
imply a circular holding structures, leading to a greater dependency between the firms. The 
value of Firm F became more sensitive to the firm and its investee’s (Firm G) initial book 
values and to the expected flows of abnormal earnings. 
Corollary I: Given an economy with two similar firms, the following holds: 
 (a) Consider two firms denoted by 𝑗 and 𝑘. Without loss of generality we set  𝜙𝑗,𝑘 > 0 and 
𝜙𝑘,𝑗 = 0. Thus, firm 𝑗 owns a fraction of firm 𝑘 as one-sided cross holding. The firms' prices 
are given by 𝑝𝑡
𝑗 ⁡and 𝑝𝑡
𝑘. 
(b) Consider two firms denoted by 𝑗̂ and ?̂?. We set 𝜙?̂?,?̂? > 0 and 𝜙?̂?,?̂? > 0, thus, the firms’ own 
equity in each other as two-sided cross holdings. The firms' prices are given by:⁡𝑝𝑡
?̂? , ⁡𝑝𝑡
?̂?. 
Given (a) and (b),⁡𝑝𝑡
?̂? =
1
1−𝜙?̂?,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,?̂?
𝑝𝑡
𝑗
. 
                                                          
24 Where |𝐼 − 𝜙|−1 =⁡ |
1
1−𝛾𝜑
𝛾
1−𝛾𝜑
𝜑
1−𝛾𝜑
1
1−𝛾𝜑
|. 
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Corollary I states that the firm's value depends on the equity investments of its 
investee. The price of a given firm that has equity investment as two-sided cross holding 
appear distorted relative to the price of an identical firm that has the same equity investment 
as one-sided cross holdings. Thus, the corporate equity investments of the investee may alter 
the price of a given firm, as two-sided ownership structure induces double counting into both 
firms' valuations. Moreover, the price adjustment depends on the percentage ownership of 
both the investing firm and its investee.  
Figure 3.6.1 provides an illustration of Corollary I, demonstrating the potential effect 
of cross holdings on the firm’s value. Consider two firms with operating assets worth 100. 
Assume that these firms exchange shares, thus creating a circular ownership structure. Figure 
3.6.1 shows how each firm’s value increases with the percentage of (symmetric) ownership. 
That is, the more shares the two firms swap, the higher are their individual values, while their 
underlying economics (operating assets) does not change.  
Corollary II: 
Given an economy with three similar firms, the following holds: 
(a) Consider three firms denoted by 𝑗,⁡𝑘 and ℎ, where⁡𝜙𝑗,ℎ = 0, 𝜙𝑗,𝑘 > 0⁡;⁡⁡𝜙𝑘,ℎ > 0, 𝜙𝑘,𝑗 =
0 and 𝜙ℎ,𝑘 = 𝜙ℎ,𝑗 = 0. Thus, firm 𝑗 owns a fraction of firm 𝑘 as one-sided cross holding, firm 
𝑘 owns a fraction of firm ℎ as one-sided cross holding, and firm ℎ does not have any cross 
holdings. The firms' prices are given by: 𝑝𝑡
𝑗 , 𝑝𝑡
𝑘 , 𝑝𝑡
ℎ. 
(b) Consider three firms denoted by ⁡𝑗̂, ?̂? and ℎ̂. Set 𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂ = 0,⁡𝜙?̂?,?̂? > 0⁡and 𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂ > 0,𝜙?̂?,?̂? =
0. Thus, firm 𝑗̂ owns a fraction of firm ?̂? and firm ?̂? owns a fraction of firm ℎ̂. Firm ℎ̂ is an 
intermediate firm as 𝜙ℎ̂,?̂? > 0, 𝜙ℎ̂,?̂? = 0.⁡The ownership structure of firm ℎ̂ creates a circular 
ownership between firm 𝑗̂ and firm ?̂?. Thus, the ownership structure is such that firms 𝑗̂ and ?̂? 
have indirect two-sided cross holdings. The firms' prices are given by: 𝑝𝑡
?̂?, 𝑝𝑡
?̂? , 𝑝𝑡
ℎ̂ 
Given (a) and (b): 
𝑝𝑡
?̂? =
1
1−𝜙ℎ̂,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂
𝑝𝑡
𝑗
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𝑝𝑡
?̂? =
1
1−𝜙ℎ̂,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂
𝑝𝑡
𝑘 +
𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂∗𝜙ℎ̂,?̂?
1−𝜙ℎ̂,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂
∗ (𝐹𝐴𝑡
?̂? +𝑂𝐴𝑡
?̂? + ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑥𝜏
𝑎,?̂?
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 )  
 
We know from Corollary I that two-sided cross holdings alter the firms' prices. 
Corollary II states that prices also change when the two-sided cross holdings are indirect. 
Indirect cross holdings arise when firms own shares in each other through an intermediate firm 
(see Figure 3.6.2). The circular ownership structure modifies the valuations of all firms, 
causing each firm’s price to depend on the performance and investing activities of the two 
other firms. Their market values may be inflated or deflated depending on initial book values 
and expected abnormal earnings flows. 
Corollary II shows that upon the creation of a circular ownership structure (moving 
from (a) to (b)), the firms’ prices change depending on their location relative to the 
intermediate firm. Put differently, the price of the firm that is furthest from the intermediate 
firm in terms of the ownership chain,25 firm 𝑗, is multiplied by the value amplifier, 
1
1−𝜙ℎ̂,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,?̂?∗𝜙?̂?,ℎ̂
.26 The value of the firm that is closest to the intermediate firm in terms of the 
ownership chain, firm 𝑘, which initially owns a fraction of the intermediate firm as one-sided 
cross holding, is multiplied by the same value amplifier. However, once the intermediate firm 
purchases shares in firm 𝑗, firm 𝑘 has indirect ownership in firm 𝑗, thus its “revised” market 
value also incorporates a fraction of firm 𝑗’s assets and future abnormal earnings.  
Overall, cross holding is expected to increase the inter-dependencies of firms and may 
alter their price volatility. Cross holdings may influence price volatility for two reasons. First, 
market prices are incorporated into current values, thus, the price of a firm with equity 
investments contains market expectations about the future stock market performance of its 
investees. Second, direct or indirect two-sided cross holdings induce a mechanical 
amplification of the firms’ price. This implies that the price of a firm with two-sided cross 
                                                          
25 The ownership is through the equity investment in firm 𝑘. 
26 Note that the value amplifier is bigger than 1. 
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holding is likely more sensitive to changes in the firm’s own performance as well as its 
investees’ performances.  
Given that prices are affected by the ownership structure, we next discuss a possible 
empirical application of Proposition I and Corollaries I and II. An empirical estimation of the 
price functions would take the following form:27 
(3.17) 𝑝𝑡
𝐻 = 𝛼1
𝐻 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼2
𝐻 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼5
𝐻 ∗ 𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎,𝐻
 
(3.18) 𝑝𝑡
𝐹 = 𝛼1
𝐹 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛼2
𝐹 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐹 + 𝛼3
𝐹 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼4
𝐹 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼5
𝐹 ∗ 𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎,𝐹 + 𝛼6
𝐹 ∗ 𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎,𝐻
 
(3.19) 𝑝𝑡
𝐺 = 𝛼1
𝐺 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐺 + 𝛼2
𝐺 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐺 + 𝛼3
𝐺 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝐾 + 𝛼4
𝐺 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐾 + 𝛼5
𝐺 ∗ 𝑥𝜏
𝛼,𝐺 + 𝛼6
𝐺 ∗ 𝑥𝜏
𝛼,𝐾
 
Where 𝑝𝑡
𝐻, 𝑝𝑡
𝐹 and 𝑝𝑡
𝐺 represent the price of a firm with no corporate equity investment 
(Firm H), a firm with one-sided cross holding (Firm F owns shares in Firm H) and a firm with 
two-sided cross holdings (Firm G owns shares in Firm K and vice versa), respectively. Current 
prices and current book values are observable, while future expected abnormal earnings could 
be estimated or inferred from analysts’ forecasts (see Penman and Sougiannis 1998, Francis, 
Olsson, and Oswald 2000).  
Regression specification that fails to account for firms’ equity ownership may yield 
biased coefficient estimates. A common practice in empirical-archival accounting research 
involves specifications similar to Equation (3.17). A regression based on Equation (3.17) has 
omitted correlated variables when used to study a firm with corporate equity investments, such 
as Firm F or Firm G. The correct specification should include the book values and the 
abnormal earnings of the firm’s investees. Moreover, when firms are connected through a 
network of inter-company ownerships, the coefficients are scaled by the ownership structure. 
Thus, we expect different coefficients on the book values and abnormal earnings of firms with 
                                                          
27 The empirical estimation assumes linear information dynamics (LID). We further discuss LID in 
section 3.3 and in Appendices 3.5.5 and 3.5.6.. 
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two-sided cross holdings, with one-sided cross holding, and without corporate equity 
ownership. 
3.2.3 Price and Book Values: The Effect of Cross Holdings on Financial Ratios 
Prior literature establishes that in the absence of future abnormal earnings, book 
values equal market values (FO (1995)). Penman (1992) shows that MB ratios can be 
expressed as: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
= 1 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸, where 𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑥𝑡
𝐵𝑡
 denotes return on equity, and the 𝛽 
coefficient captures the relation between the MB ratio and ROE. Penman (1992) explains that 
excess earnings are isomorphic to book rate of return. This implies that the values of the 𝛽-
coefficient should appropriately impound earnings (growth) beyond the level implied by book 
values, into market prices. 
In Appendix 3.5.4 we illustrate the effects of cross holdings on MB and ROE ratios. 
First, we show that MB ratios are distorted away from unity when firms have corporate equity 
investments. Assuming firms purchase productive assets with positive expected cash flows, 
the MB ratio appear biased downwards for firms that use the fair value method. This distortion 
arises since book value incorporates expected capital gains (losses). 
Second, we demonstrate that the way earnings from equity investments are reflected 
in MB and ROE ratios changes with the accounting treatment (fair value method or equity 
method). Thus, for the predicated relationship between MB ratios and ROE to hold, 𝛽 must 
vary with the firm’s corporate equity ownership and accounting treatment. Intuitively, since 
the book value is modified when a firm has equity investments and since the modification 
depends on the accounting treatment, so is the implied 𝛽.  
Our findings provide an additional theoretical perspective on Fama and French (1992, 
1993, 2015), who view MB ratios as risk factors, capturing firms’ underlying risk. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (1995) demonstrate that common factors in stock returns 
mirror common factors in earnings. Our analysis shows that corporate equity investments alter 
earnings and book values, thus articulating an analytical explanation for the observed 
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empirical relation between MB ratios and stock returns. Moreover, as MB ratios are affected 
by cross holdings, we offer an alternative reason for the observed MB ratios variation across 
firms that is, in our setting, independent from risk. 
Prior empirical literature explores the effects of equity market concentration and cross 
holdings on market prices and informativeness of accounting information. French and Poterba 
(1991) investigate the discrepancy of price-earnings ratios between Japan and the US. They 
argue that some international differences may be attributable to the more prominent inter-
corporate equity holdings in Japan relative to the US, causing double counting of equity. 
Harris, Lang and Mőller (1994) compare Germany and the US and find that the association 
between price and earnings in Germany is comparable to the US, but that German accounting 
data exhibit increasing explanatory power in the level of consolidation. Their findings are 
consistent with Alford et al. (1993) documenting that for non-US firms, unconsolidated 
earnings are less value relevant than consolidated earnings. 
Our accounting-based valuation for firms with corporate equity investments provides 
explanations consistent with the above empirical findings. We model the double counting that 
may arise due to cross holdings and provide theoretical foundations to the observed increase 
in earnings informativeness with the degree of consolidation. Overall, our analysis 
demonstrates how unconsolidated equity positions may alter the relation between earnings and 
prices. 
 
3.3 Uncertainty and Linear Information Dynamics  
 The pricing models in Ohlson (1995) and FO (1995) focus on expected abnormal 
earnings. Bernard (1995) notes that these models shift attention from analyzing price behavior 
to forecasting abnormal earnings behavior, and that this approach of estimating fundamental 
value using prices’ information independency is in line with fundamental analysis. Ohlson 
(1995) assume that current accounting variables are sufficient statistics of future accounting 
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information and use linear information dynamics to derive a relation between the firm’s 
current accounting numbers and its equity market value.  
We extend FO (1995) by considering linear information dynamics (LID) for multiple 
firms and showing that each firm’s value can be derived when its augmented LID incorporates 
information about peer firms. We focus on operating activities and assume that abnormal 
operating earnings and book values form part of the sufficient statistics representing relevant 
information (FO 1995). Our model differs from prior literature in two ways. First, we present 
a LID that incorporates accounting information for multiple firms and allow for inter-firm 
information transfers. Second, in our setting, we account for cross holdings such that book 
values include equity investments.  
Proposition I demonstrates a relation between the firm's valuation and future 
accounting figures. As future accounting variables are uncertain, we describe the evolution of 
these uncertain variables over time using LID assumptions. We assume that accounting 
variables follow a dynamic process based on prior accounting variables. For tractability, the 
model follows a linear Markovian structure, as in FO (1995). 
We begin by presenting an inter-firm information dynamic model for multiple firms 
and showing that a unique closed-form solution exists. We next focus on a simplified 
information model, suppressing inter-firm information transfers and demonstrating that a 
closed-form solution exists where the presence of two-sided cross holdings biases the 
valuation compared to the benchmarks of one-sided cross holding and no equity ownership.  
3.3.1 Inter-Firm Information Transfers: Multiple Firms  
 Single-firm accounting-based valuation models commonly assume that the firm’s 
current accounting information form a sufficient statistic of relevant information. 
Nevertheless, in a multiple firm setting, information from peer firms may form part of the 
value relevant information set. Hence, we suggest the following linear information dynamics 
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for 𝑖 = {1,2,3…𝑛} firms, ∀𝑡. Without loss of generality, we set firm 𝑗 to be a representative 
firm.  
(3.20a) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 +𝜔14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀1̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.20b) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀2̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.20c) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽1
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝜀3̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.20d) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽2
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡 + 𝜀4̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
The information system described by the four equations in (3.20) denotes the 
evolution of four random variables over time. This specification differs from prior literature 
as we assume firm 𝑗’s future abnormal operating earnings, operating assets and other 
information depends on its own current information as well as on all other firms’ current 
information. 
Equation (3.20a) states that firm 𝑗's abnormal operating earnings at time 𝑡 + 1 depends 
on its abnormal operating earnings and operating assets at time 𝑡. The abnormal operating 
earnings at time 𝑡 + 1  also depend on the abnormal operating earnings and operating assets 
of the other firms, as well as on other information, where 𝑂𝑋𝑡 = ||
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,1
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,2
⋮
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑛
|| denotes the [𝑛 × 1]-
vector of all firms’ abnormal operating earnings; 𝑂𝐴𝑡 = ||
𝑂𝐴𝑡
1
⁡𝑂𝐴𝑡
2
⋮
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑛
|| is the [𝑛 × 1]-vector of all 
firms’ operating assets and 𝜈1,𝑡 = ||
𝜈1,𝑡
1
𝜈1,𝑡
2
⋮
𝑣1,𝑡
𝑛
|| is the [𝑛 × 1]-vectors of all firms’ other information. 
Similarly, Equation (3.20b) defines the relation between firm⁡𝑗's operating assets at time 𝑡 + 1 
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and its operating assets at time 𝑡, all other firms' operating assets at time 𝑡 and on other 
information, where 𝜈2,𝑡 = ||
𝜈2,𝑡
1
⁡𝜈2,𝑡
2
⋮
𝑣2,𝑡
𝑛
|| is the second [𝑛 × 1]-vector of all firms’ other information.  
Our linear information model includes two random processes denoted by Equations 
(3.20c)-(3.20d). These random processes represent other information, thus permitting the 
abnormal operating earnings and stock of operating asset to incorporate additional sources of 
information about all firms (e.g. industry specific information, market-wide information). 
Finally, the information system includes random terms:⁡{𝜀1̃,𝑡+1
𝑗 , 𝜀2̃,𝑡+1
𝑗 , 𝜀3̃,𝑡+1
𝑗 , 𝜀4̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
}. These 
terms represent idiosyncratic shocks and are independent and identically distributed, with 
mean zero. 
We note that 𝜔11
𝑗,⁡𝜔12
𝑗, 𝜔22
𝑗 are scalars capturing firm 𝑗's responsiveness to its own 
current abnormal operating earnings and operating assets. Moreover, since we allow firm 𝑗 to 
incorporate information about its 𝑛 − 1 counterpart firms’ operating process and other 
information, 𝜔13
𝑗, 𝜔14
𝑗, 𝜔24
𝑗, 𝛽1
𝑗
 and 𝛽2
𝑗
 are [1 × 𝑛] vectors capturing the responsiveness 
of the firm 𝑗 to these sources of information.28  
Overall, the above information system permits the earnings and the operating assets 
of firm j to be influenced by other firms’ operating activities and information. The linear 
information model described by Equations (3.20) is consistent with the notion that firms 
operating in the same industry or economy are often influenced by each other. We note that 
even in the absence of cross holdings, each firm’s linear information model may incorporate 
information from other related firms, whether these are competing firms, firms operating 
within the same industry or the same country. A firm’s informational environment includes 
                                                          
28 The 𝑗-th element in 𝜔13
𝑗, 𝜔14
𝑗 and 𝜔24
𝑗 is zero, as firm 𝑗 already accounts for its own current 
abnormal operating earnings and operating assets information through coefficients 𝜔11
𝑗,⁡𝜔12
𝑗, and 
𝜔22
𝑗. 
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outside information sources in addition to its own operations. Hence, investors may assign 
weights on other firms’ operations even in the absence of corporate equity ownership. 
3.3.2 Linear Information Dynamics and Firm Valuation: The Case of Two Firms  
For ease of exposition, we consider only two firms, 𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. We further 
assume that the firms do not have cross holdings. The following information system denote 
the linear information dynamics for firm⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, ∀𝑡: 
(3.21a) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀1̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.21b) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀2̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.21c) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽11
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽12
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀3̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.21d) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽21
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽22
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀4̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
Next, we consider the firm’s goodwill, that is the difference between the market price 
of the firm’s equity and the firm’s book value: ⁡𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑗 − 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 , ∀𝑗. Given Equation (3.16) and 
Proposition I, it follows that  𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]∞𝜏=𝑡+1 .  
We assume that abnormal operating assets and operating assets’ book value form part 
of the sufficient statistic representing investor information. We conjecture and find that firm 
𝑗's goodwill has the following structure:29 
𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼6
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼7
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 +
𝛾8
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘   
Where: 
𝛼1
𝑗 =
𝜔11
𝑗(𝑅 − 𝜔11
𝑘) + 𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘
𝛿1
𝑗
 
                                                          
29 See solution and a generalization to 𝑛 firms in Appendix 3.5.5. 
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𝛼2
𝑗 =
1
𝛿1
𝑗
𝜔13
𝑗𝑅
(𝑅 − 𝜔11𝑘)
 
𝛼3
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
(𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑘)𝜔12
𝑗 + 𝜔14
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘
𝛿2
𝑗
+ 𝛼2
𝑗 (𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑘)𝜔14
𝑘 +𝜔12
𝑘𝜔24
𝑘
𝛿2
𝑗
) 
𝛼4
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
(𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑗)𝜔14
𝑗 + 𝜔12
𝑗𝜔24
𝑗
𝛿2
𝑗
+ 𝛼2
𝑗 (𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑗)𝜔12
𝑘 +𝜔14
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗
𝛿2
𝑗
 
𝛼5
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑘
𝛿3
𝑗
+ 𝛼2
𝑗 𝛽12
𝑘
𝛿3
𝑗
 
𝛼6
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝛽12
𝑗
𝛿3
𝑗
+ 𝛼2
𝑗 𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑗
𝛿3
𝑗
 
𝛼7
𝑗 = 𝛼3
𝑗 𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑘
𝛿4
𝑗
+ 𝛼4
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑘
𝛿4
𝑗
 
𝛼8
𝑗 = 𝛼3
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑗
𝛿4
𝑗
+ 𝛼4
𝑗 𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑗
𝛿4
𝑗
 
And: 
𝑅 = 1 + 𝑟 
𝛿1
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝜔11
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝜔11
𝑘) − 𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘 
𝛿2
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑘)(𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑗) − 𝜔24
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗 
𝛿3
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑘) − 𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘 
𝛿4
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑘) − 𝛽22
𝑘𝛽22
𝑗 
 
Hence, the valuation function can be expressed as: 
𝑝𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼6
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼7
𝑗 ∗
𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼8
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘 ,⁡∀𝑖, ∀𝑡.  
Note that solving for the pricing model coefficients is equivalent to solving: 𝐸𝑡[𝑦(?̃?𝑡+1)] =
𝐴𝑦(𝑥𝑡) 
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where  
𝑦(?̃?𝑡+1) =
|
|
|
𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗
𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑘
𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗
𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑘
𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗
𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑘
𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗
𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑘
|
|
|
; ⁡𝑦(𝑥𝑡) =
|
|
|
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎𝑘
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝐾
𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗
𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘
𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗
𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘
|
|
|
; 
𝐴 =
|
|
|
𝜔11
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑗 𝜔13
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑗 1 0 0 0
𝜔13
𝑘 𝜔14
𝑘 𝜔11
𝑘 𝜔12
𝑘 0 1 0 0
0 𝜔22
𝑗 0 𝜔24
𝑗 0 0 1 0
0 𝜔24
𝑘 0 𝜔22
𝑘 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 𝛽11
𝑗 𝛽12
𝑗 0 0
0 0 0 0 𝛽12
𝑘 𝛽11
𝑘 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 𝛽21
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑗
0 0 0 0 0 0 𝛽22
𝑘 𝛽21
𝑘
|
|
|
;  
A unique solution exists if: det|𝐴| ≠ 0. Thus, we require:30  
𝜔11
𝑗
𝜔13𝑗
≠
𝜔13
𝑘
𝜔11𝑘
 ; 
𝜔22
𝑗
𝜔24𝑗
≠
𝜔24
𝑘
𝜔22𝑘
 ; 
𝛽11
𝑗
𝛽12
𝑗 ≠
𝛽12
𝑘
𝛽11
𝑘 ;
𝛽21
𝑗
𝛽22
𝑗 ≠
𝛽22
𝑘
𝛽21
𝑘 
The unique solution is defined using the ratio of each firm’s responsiveness to its own 
information and to the other firm’s information (i.e. 
𝜔11
𝑗
𝜔13𝑗
). A unique solution exists when the 
firm’s responsiveness ratio differs from the invers responsiveness ratio of the other firm, that 
is, when the firms react to information differently. If the firms process and respond to 
information in the same way, with the same relative magnitude, then the information 
components, the information sources become indistinguishable.  
                                                          
30 To also ensure decreasing persistent effect of abnormal earnings, sufficient conditions would 
constrain the evolution of abnormal earnings over time such that as 𝑡 → ∞, the coefficient on abnormal 
earnings approaches zero: −1 < {𝜔11, 𝜔13} < 1. Note that both the weights assigned to the firm’s own 
abnormal earnings and other firms’ abnormal earnings are constrained. The firm’s abnormal earnings 
process is influenced by the other firms, which in turn, are also influenced by the firm’s abnormal 
earnings, hence, to limit the circular effect, both 𝜔11 and 𝜔13 need to be constrained. 
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We note that for a finite time period 𝜏 > 0 and if and only if 𝐴 [nxn] has n independent 
eigenvectors, the following holds:𝐸𝑡[𝑦(?̃?𝑡+𝜏)] = 𝐴
𝜏𝑦(𝑥𝑡) = ⁡𝑉𝜆
𝜏𝑉−1 
where 𝜆 is the matrix of eigenvalues and 𝑉 is the eigenvectors matrix.   
3.3.3 Linear Information Dynamics and Firm Valuation: Cross Holdings  
We consider an economy with only two firms, 𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, and for ease of 
exposition, we suppress the inter-firm information transfer. We first consider a simplified case 
where the firms do not have corporate equity ownership:  
 (3.22a) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀1̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.22b) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀2̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.22c) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽11
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀3̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.22d) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽21
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀4̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
Equations (3.22a)-(3.22d) are identical to FO (1995, page 702), and as in FO (1995), 
we assume that abnormal operating assets and operating assets’ book value form part of the 
sufficient statistic representing investor information. Thus, we conjecture and find that Firm 
𝑗's goodwill has the following structure:31 𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼5
𝑗𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼7
𝑗𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗
 
where 𝛼1 =
𝜔11
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)
; 𝛼2 =
𝑅∗𝜔12
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)
; 𝛼3 =
𝑅
(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)
; and 
𝛼4 =
𝑅∗𝜔12
(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)
  
Hence, the valuation function can be expressed per individual firm as: 
𝑝𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼5
𝑗𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼7
𝑗𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗
,⁡∀𝑖 ∈, ∀𝑡.  
This result is identical to FO (1995), where 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗
. 
                                                          
31 See solution in Appendix 3.5.5. 
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We next outline the extension of FO (1995) to a setting with multiple firms with cross 
holdings. For simplicity, we assume all firms, 𝑖 = {1, 2, 3……𝑛}, are symmetric with the same 
linear information dynamics, such that we can conjecture and verify prices with the same 
response coefficients, (𝛼1, 𝛼2, ⁡𝛼3, 𝛼4) for all firms. As a benchmark, we present the pricing 
model for multiple firms in the absence of cross holdings: 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝛼4 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡 
 We next allow for cross holdings such that: 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜙𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑡 and the 
pricing model needs to be adjusted. Thus follows Proposition III.  
Proposition III 
For an economy with multiple firms that have financing activities, operating activities and 
corporate equity investments, the firms ’pricing function is denoted by: 
𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + (1 + 𝛼2) ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝛼4 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡| 
 Proposition III presents the firms' market values as a function of current accounting 
information and current other information. Proposition III demonstrates that cross holdings 
may distort values and that the value distortion occurs when pricing is based on OAR and 
linear information dynamics. Although we make similar assumption to FO (1995) regarding 
the linear information model, our result differs as our pricing model is multiplied by the 
amplification factor, the [𝑛 × 𝑛] matrix |𝐼 − 𝜙|−1, which modifies the pricing coefficients. 
Furthermore, the equity ownership itself introduces inter-firm information transfers, as firms’ 
prices incorporate information about their investees. 
We note that our pricing model can be extended to express market returns. Return 
specification has been prevalent in accounting research (see Easton and Harris 1991, Clubb 
1996, among others) and our proposed pricing model permits exploring cross-sectional 
variation in firms’ stock returns. In particular, one empirical implication of Proposition III is 
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that the estimated coefficients of a pricing model based on standard linear information 
dynamics are altered by cross holdings, even when fair value accounting is used. 
In Appendix 3.5.6 we further discuss the empirical application of accounting-based 
valuation in the presence of inter-firm information transfers. We also propose a new approach 
to cross-sectional studies in settings where firms file their financial statements at different time 
periods or at different frequencies. Our approach provides a roadmap to valuing firms that face 
different disclosure requirements. For example, we consider the valuation of public European 
firms that are not required to file their financial statements as often as public US firms; or 
private European firms that are not required to file financial statements as often as public 
firms. Our analysis suggests that different disclosure policies may alter the pricing 
coefficients, implying that empirical research should consider the role of information 
disclosure dynamics in firms’ valuation by external financial statements users.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
Extending the accounting-based valuation model to allow for corporate equity 
ownership, we find that the ownership structure distort accounting-based valuation 
coefficients. The presence of cross holdings alters the accounting-based valuation of firms, 
which modifies the predicted relation between intrinsic values and firm fundamentals. This 
distortion arises for both direct and indirect cross holdings.  
Moreover, we demonstrate how cross holdings serve as an indirect channel for 
incorporating information about investees in a linear dynamic information model. We also 
study inter-firm information transfers for multiple firms and given different reporting 
schedules. 
Overall, we provide an analytical framework to examine different forms of 
interactions among firms, such as minority interest stakes and information transfers. We 
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present an additional motivation for firms to own corporate equity and have more complex 
ownership structures.  
A critical assumption in our model is that firms clearly disclose information about 
their investments in other firms’ equity. Nevertheless, firms may not fully disclose the details 
of their corporate equity ownership, such that direct and indirect equity investments may be 
unknown to outsiders. In the US, all investing firms are required to disclose equity ownership 
that exceeds the 5 percent threshold of the investee’s equity on Form 13D to the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Thus, some corporate equity ownerships are not publicly 
disclosed, especially when an investment is accounted for using the fair value method. 
Nevertheless, given our findings, knowing the details of each of these equity investments can 
be crucial for correctly assessing firm values. In summary, our model presumes that investors 
have accounting information concerning all firms’ equity investments, but we acknowledge 
that this assumption requires that investors can observe and process ownership information 
for multiple firms.  
Future analytical research could use our approach to formally develop models of the 
returns-earnings relation in the presence of intra-industry information transfers (IIIT). 
Specifically, one could envision that other non-accounting information sources, at the two 
extremes, are either firm-specific or common within an industry. In the latter case, common 
non-accounting information sources might serve a role conceptually somewhat similar to cross 
holdings. Empirical-archival research into IIIT might benefit from a more rigorous analytical 
foundation to articulate when other information is predicted to be substitutes or complements 
to accounting information. 
The presence of corporate equity ownership has other implications that future 
empirical-archival accounting research might address. First, corporate equity ownership may 
affect the perception of dividends payments. When a firm reports dividends per share or 
dividend payout ratios (dividends in percentage of earnings), some of these dividends flow 
back to the firm through its investees. Second, corporate equity ownership may affect 
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perceived liquidity as common liquidity ratios in prior literature do not correct for cross 
holdings. Third, while accounting-based valuation models consider an all equity firm, most 
firms do have debt. A leveraged investee firm can be at risk of liquidation. In the presence of 
corporate equity ownership, however, the investing firm faces incentives to prop up a 
financially distressed investee that is close to liquidation. This, in turn, might affect optimal 
corporate governance and executive compensation. Finally, equity investments may raise 
corporate governance challenges associated with rent extraction through tunneling. In 
conclusion, we note that the strength of the accounting-based valuation model is its generality, 
while at the same time this means that these models do not directly incorporate any of the 
above-mentioned avenues for future research. 
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3.5 Appendices 
APPENDIX 3.5.1 
Variable Definitions 
𝑛 Number of firms in the economy 
𝑖 Firm indicator 
𝑡 Time indicator 
𝑟 Risk-free interest rate 
𝑝𝑡
𝑗
 
𝑝𝑡 
Ex-dividend market price of firm 𝑗 at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1] vector of the 𝑛 firms’ prices at date 𝑡 
𝜙𝑗,𝑘 
𝜙𝑗 
𝜙 
Firm 𝑗’s percentage ownership in firm 𝑘 
[𝑛 × 1] ownership structure vector of firm 𝑗  
[𝑛 × 𝑛] matrix of equity ownership percentage (i.e. the ownership structure) 
𝐵𝑡
𝑗
 
𝐵𝑡 
Firm⁡𝑗’s book value of equity at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1] vector of the 𝑛 firms' book values at date 𝑡 
𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑗
 
𝐹𝐴𝑡 
Firm⁡𝑗’s total financial assets net of financial obligations at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vectors of the 𝑛 firms' stock of financial assets at date 𝑡 
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗
 
𝑂𝐴𝑡 
Firm⁡𝑗’s total operating assets net of operating liabilities at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vectors of the 𝑛 firms' stock of operating assets at date 𝑡 
𝑥𝑡
𝑗
 
𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗
 
𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
Firm 𝑗’s earnings at date 𝑡 
Firm 𝑗’s abnormal earnings at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vector of the 𝑛 firms' discounted abnormal earnings from 𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞ 
𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 
Firm 𝑗’s interest revenue from financing activities net of interest expenses at 
date 𝑡 
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑗
 
𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗
 
𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
Firm 𝑗’s operating earnings at date 𝑡 
Firm 𝑗’s abnormal operating earnings at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vector of the 𝑛 firms' discounted abnormal operating earnings from 
𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞ 
𝑑𝑡
𝑗
 
𝐷𝑡+1 
Dividends paid by firm⁡𝑗 at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vector of the 𝑛 firms' discounted dividends paid by all firms from 𝑡 +
1 to⁡∞ 
Vt
j
 
𝑉𝑡 
Firm 𝑗’s market value at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vector of the firms' market values at date 𝑡 
𝐼 [𝑛 × 𝑛] identity matrix 
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𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝑗
 Firm 𝑗’s liquid assets invested in risk-free bonds at date 𝑡 
𝑐𝑡
𝑗
 
 
𝐶𝑡+1 
Firm 𝑗’s cash flow realized from operating activities net of investment in those 
activities at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vector of the 𝑛 firms' discounted cash flows from operating activities 
from 𝑡 + 1 to⁡∞ 
⁡𝑔𝑡
𝑗
 
𝑔𝑡 
Firm 𝑗’s goodwill at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vector of the 𝑛 firms’ goodwill at time 𝑡 
𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗
, 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗
 
𝜈1,𝑡, 𝜈2,𝑡 
Firm 𝑗’s other information at date 𝑡 
[𝑛 × 1]-vectors of the 𝑛 firms’ other information at date 𝑡 
𝜀?̃?+1
𝑗
 
Idiosyncratic shocks to Firm 𝑗’s information model. These random shocks are 
independent and identically distributed, with mean zero. 
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APPENDIX 3.5.2 
Illustration of Two Firms with Cross Holdings Using the Fair Value Method 
Under the fair value method, the initial investment is an asset on the investing firm’s 
balance sheet. When the investee’s price appreciates (depreciates) the firm's assets account 
increases against an unrealized holding gain (loss) in the equity account. When the investee 
pays dividends, the investing firm records an increase in cash and revenues. Any profit or loss 
generated by the investee is unrecorded by the investing firm.  
In this appendix, we rely heavily on Lundholm’s (1995) example of the FO (1995) 
model to demonstrate how corporate equity investments may alter book values and earnings 
when the investment is accountant for using the fair value method. Lundholm (1995) illustrates 
a firm’s payouts from productive assets and financial assets. As in Lundholm (1995), we first 
consider a single firm, firm H, operating over 3 periods.  
Firm H begins at time 𝑡 = 0⁡with a capital contribution of 100. The firm immediately 
uses its entire capital to purchase productive assets that earn risk-free interest (𝑟), on the assets 
and an uncertain amount at 𝑡 = 2, (𝑧⁡̃). The firm liquidates some of its assets at the interim 
date, 𝑡 = 1, to pay an interim dividend (𝑑). In addition, the firm pays a liquidating dividend 
at 𝑡 = 2.32 These amounts are summarized in Panel A of Table 3.7.1, which presents book 
values⁡(𝐵𝑡
𝐻), earnings⁡(𝑥𝑡
𝐻) and dividends⁡(𝑑𝑡
𝐻) for each date (𝑡 = 0, 1⁡,2) for firm H. This 
Panel is identical to a single firm case in Lundholm (1995, page 754). 
Illustration: Two firms with cross holdings 
Building on Lundholm’s (1995) single firm example, we now consider an economy 
with two firms, firm H and firm F. Both firms have three sources of income from productive 
assets, financial assets, and investment assets.  
                                                          
32 It is common to report dividends net of capital contribution and to represent prices immediately 
following any dividend payments at each date. 
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We assume the firms’ equity trade in an efficient capital market. Both firms begin at 
𝑡 = 0 with a 100 capital contribution. As in the previous example, firm H uses its entire capital 
of 100 to purchase a productive asset that yields risk-free interest (𝑟) on their book value, as 
well as an uncertain amount at time 𝑡 = 2 (?̃?). Firm F allocates its capital between purchasing 
a similar productive asset and purchasing 20% of Firm H, whose initial market price is given 
by 𝑝𝐻 = 100. Hence, firm F invests 80 into a productive asset and 20 into firm H’s equity. 
We assume that the initial purchase of Firm H’s equity affects neither firm’s equity values.33 
Both firms liquidate some of their assets at 𝑡 = 1 to pay an interim dividend (𝑑), as well as a 
liquidating dividend at 𝑡 = 2. Any dividends received earn risk-free interest of (𝑟).  
Firm H’s book values, earnings and dividends remain as previously presented in Table 
3.7.1 Panel A. We assume that firm F has no influence over firm H’s operations or activities. 
Hence, firm F accounts for its equity holdings using the fair value method, where firm F’s 
assets are comprised of its productive asset, the market price of firm H’s equity and the 
dividends paid by firm H. Firm F's earnings incorporate the dividends paid out by Firm H as 
well as changes in Firm H’s market price. Table 3.7.1 Panel B presents the book values, 
earnings, and dividends for Firm F. 
The market prices can be derived by discounting future dividends. In Table 3.7.1 Panel 
C we present the book values, earnings, and dividends for firm F, given firm H’s market prices 
(see market prices below). It appears that firm F’s book values and liquidating dividends are 
higher (lower) than firm H’s, when the expectations and the realizations of ?̃? are positive 
(negative). Nevertheless, the level of income generated by the productive asset might depend 
on the initial investment level such that ⁡𝑧𝐻 > 𝑧𝐹. Moreover, reported earnings differ between 
the companies since firm F’s earnings incorporate expected future capital gains. Particularly, 
𝑥1
𝐹 > 𝑥1
𝐻 when expectations about ?̃? increases over time. The patterns illustrated in Table 3.7.1 
                                                          
33 Note that firm H does not issue new equity. Moreover, Firm H is unaffected by the identity of its 
equity holders. Similarly, firm F dose not issue new equity in order to finance the purchase of firm H’s 
equity. 
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are consistent with the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance of dividend policy. As discussed in 
Lundholm (1995), a dollar increase in the current dividend policy decreases the current price 
by exactly one dollar, i.e., (
𝜕𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑑𝑡
= −1), and the future expected earnings decrease by an 
amount equal to the interest that would have been earned on that dollar, i.e., (
𝜕𝐸𝑡[𝑋𝑡+1]
𝜕𝑑𝑡
= −𝑟). 
See also Clubb (2013) for further discussion on dividend displacement.  
Next, we consider the case of two-sided cross holdings. Consider two identical firms 
denoted by F and G. Both firms begin at 𝑡 = 0⁡with a capital contribution of 100 and use 80% 
of their initial capital to purchase productive assets. As before, these productive assets earn 
risk-free interest (𝑟) on their book value and an uncertain amount at 𝑡 = 2 (?̃?). With the 
remaining capital, each firm purchases 20% of the other firm, where the initial price is⁡𝑝 =
100. Both firms use the fair value method to account for their equity investments. Both firms 
liquidate some of their assets at 𝑡 = 1 to pay an interim dividend (𝑑) and pay a liquidating 
dividend at 𝑡 = 2. These amounts are summarized in Table 3.7.1 Panel D for firm G 
(representative firm). 
The liquidating dividend paid by firm G at 𝑡 = 2, encompasses the return on the 
productive assets owned by firm G as well as the capital gains made on its equity investment 
in the other firm (firm F). In this case, capital gains are the sum of 20.83% of firm f’s income 
from productive assets (𝑧𝐹)  and an additional 4.16% of firm G’s income from its own 
productive assets (𝑧𝐺). Essentially, it appears as if firm G invests more than 80% of its initial 
capital in productive assets, since it holds an equity investment which includes an indirect 
ownership stake in its own productive assets. Ceteris paribus, when the realization of ?̃? is 
positive (negative), the liquidating dividend of a firm with two-sided cross holdings is higher 
(lower) than the liquidating dividend of a firm with one-sided cross holding, solely due to the 
accounting treatment of the circular ownership structure. 
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Market Prices 
To calculate the market prices at the end of each period, we apply discounted dividend 
valuation. These prices only differ at the intermediate date t=1. 
Firm H – No equity ownership 
𝑝0
𝐻 = 100 + 𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐻
(1+𝑟)2
] = 100
𝑝1
𝐻 = (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻 + 𝐸1[
𝑧𝐻
1+𝑟
]
𝑝2
𝐻 = 0
  
Firm F – One-sided equity ownership 
𝑝0
𝐹 = 100 + 𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐹+20%∗𝑧𝐻
(1+𝑟)2
] = 100
𝑝1
𝐹 = (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹 + 𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐹+20%∗𝑧𝐻
1+𝑟
]
𝑝2
𝐹 = 0
  
Firm G – Two-sided equity ownership 
𝑝0
𝐺 = 100 + 𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐺+20%∗𝑧𝐹
(1−20%)∗(1+20%)∗(1+𝑟)2
] = 100
𝑝1
𝐺 = (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺 + 𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐺+20%∗𝑧𝐹
(1−20%)∗(1+20%)∗(1+𝑟)
]
𝑝2
𝐺 = 0
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APPENDIX 3.5.3 
Illustration of Two Firms with Cross Holdings Using the Equity Method 
Under the equity method the initial investment is an asset on the investing firm’s 
balance sheet. When the investee’s market price appreciates (depreciates), the firm’s assets 
account is unaffected. When the investee pays dividends, the investing firm records an 
increase in cash against a reduction in the value of the investment. Any profit (loss) generated 
by the investee is recorded as an increase (decrease) in the firm's assets account and revenues 
from investment. 
The distinction between the fair value method and the equity method is as follows. If 
the investing firm has substantial control over the investee, meaning, it influences the 
operational and financial decisions of the investee, the equity method is the applicable 
treatment. Nevertheless, if the investing firm states that it lacks significant influence over an 
investee, then the fair value method can be used. 
We build on Lundholm (1995) to illustrate the book values, earnings and dividends of 
firms that account for their corporate equity investments using the equity method. Similar to 
Appendix 3.5.2, we consider an economy with two firms, firm H and firm F. We assume that 
both firms are traded in an efficient capital market, and that each firm can engage in operating 
activities, financing activities and corporate equity ownership.  
The firms begin at 𝑡 = 0 with a 100 capital contribution. Firm H uses its entire capital 
of 100 to purchase productive assets that pay the risk-free interest rate (𝑟) on their book value 
and an uncertain amount at time 𝑡 = 2 (?̃?). Firm F allocates its capital between purchasing a 
similar productive asset and purchasing 20% of firm H whose initial market price is given by 
𝑝𝐻 = 100. Hence, firm F invests 80 into a productive asset, and 20 into firm H’s equity. As 
in Appendix 3.5.2, we assume that the initial purchase of firm H’s equity does not affect firm 
H’s nor firm F’s value. Both firms liquidate some of their assets at 𝑡 = 1⁡to pay a n interim 
dividend (𝑑)⁡and pay a liquidating dividend at 𝑡 = 2.  
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Assume firm F has control over firm H such that firm F accounts for its equity 
holdings using the equity method. Firm F’s assets are comprised of its productive assets and 
the historical cost of firm H’s equity. Note that the dividends paid by firm H do not affect firm 
F’s assets. The firms’ book values, earnings and dividends, are summarized in Table 3.7.2 
below. 
Panel A of Table 3.7.2 repeats Lundholm’s (1995, page 547) example to facilitate 
comparison with firm H, the benchmark case of no equity investments. Panel B of Table 3.7.2 
presents the book values, earnings and dividends of firm F. Firm F's earnings incorporate the 
dividends paid by firm H and a portion of firm H’s earnings. However, under the equity 
method, the net effect of receiving dividends from an investee on earnings is zero (recall that 
for public limited liability firms, dividends are paid out of retained earnings account). The 
book values, earnings and dividends of the firms are similar at 𝑡 = 0, 1. Nonetheless, we note 
that the firms may pay different dividends, which in turn may affect their earnings in the 
subsequent period. At 𝑡 = 2, firm F’s liquidating earnings and dividends differ from those of 
firm H, as it includes 20% of firm H’s income from the productive asset. 
Next, we consider the case of two-sided cross holdings between two identical firms, 
firm F and firm G. Both firms begin at 𝑡 = 0 with a 100 capital contribution and use 80% of 
their initial capital to purchase productive assets that earn a risk-free interest (𝑟) on their book 
value and an uncertain amount⁡at 𝑡 = 2 (?̃?). With the remaining capital, each firm purchases 
20% of the other firm, where⁡𝑝 = 100. Both firms declare to have influence over the activities 
of their investee, thus they use the equity method to account for their investments. Both firms 
liquidate some of their assets at 𝑡 = 1⁡to pay a dividend (𝑑) and pay a liquidating dividend at 
𝑡 = 2. These amounts are summarized in Panel C of Table 3.7.2 for the representative firm 
(firm G). 
The liquidating dividend paid by firm G encompasses the return on the productive 
assets owned by firm G, as well as the earnings generated by the equity investment in firm F. 
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These earnings are the sum of 20.83% of the investee’s income from productive assets (𝑧𝐹) 
and an additional 4.16% of firm G’s income from productive assets (𝑧𝐺). Essentially, it 
appears as if firm G invests more than 80% of its initial capital in productive assets since it 
invests in a financial asset which includes ownership stake in its own productive assets. Ceteris 
paribus, firm G’s liquidating dividend is higher (lower) than Firm F’s liquidating dividend 
when the realization of ?̃? is positive (negative), solely due to the accounting treatment of the 
two-sided cross holdings. 
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APPENDIX 3.5.4 
Market-to-Book and Return-on-Equity Ratios 
Penman (1992) showed that market-to-book ratios (MB) can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
=
1 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸, where 𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑥𝑡
𝐵𝑡
 denotes the return on equity, and the coefficient 𝛽 denotes the 
relation between the MB ratio and the ROE.  
Using Lundholm’s (1995) example of the FO (1995) model,34 we illustrate the MB 
and ROE ratios for firms with different equity investments: firm H (no investments), firm F 
(one-sided cross holding) and firm G (two-sided cross holdings) over two periods: 𝑡 = 0, 1. 
Note that MB ratios for the terminal date 𝑡 = 2, is undefined (both numerator and denominator 
are zero).  
To compare the fair value method and the equity method, we assume that the interim 
dividends are the same across accounting treatments. This assumption allows studying how 
book values and earnings differ between the two accounting methods for any dividend policy, 
𝑑1.  
Table 3.7.3 present the MB ratios for the three firms and across the two accounting 
methods. Table 3.7.3 demonstrates how the accounting treatment may alter the MB ratios. We 
note that the ownership structure does not affect MB ratios in the special case where firms 
purchase productive assets that are expected to generate zero future cash flows, i.e., (𝐸[?̃?] =
0). We focus our discussion on firms with operating assets that generate non-zero expected 
cash flows.  
Comparing the MB ratios for the different accounting methods, we observe that the 
MB ratios of a firm with corporate equity investments (firm F or firm G) accounted for using 
                                                          
34 A summary of the effect of using the fair value method on book values, earnings, and dividends, is 
given in Table 3.7.1 in Appendix 3.5.2. In Appendix 3.5.3 we return to Lundholm’s (1995) example of 
the FO (1995) model to illustrate the effect of using the equity method on book values, earnings, and 
dividends. A summary of the example is given in Table 3.7.2 in Appendix 3.5.3. 
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the fair value method, has a higher (lower) denominator, as its book values incorporate 
expected capital gains (losses). Nevertheless, a firm that applies the equity method may have 
higher (lower) numerators as prices incorporate the expected income (loss) of its investees’ 
operating assets. Hence, the numerator may be higher for firms that use the equity method 
relative to firms that use the fair value method. Assuming that on average firms purchase 
productive assets that are expected to generate positive cash flows (𝐸[?̃?] > 0), it appears that 
MB ratios of firms that use the fair value method are biased downwards, while the BM ratios 
of firms that use the equity method are biased upwards. 
Table 3.7.4 illustrates how the accounting treatment may alter the firm’s ROE. In the 
first period, when all firms earn only the risk-free rate on their operating assets, the expected 
ROE is equal across firms and accounting treatments. In the second period, the expected ROE 
incorporates returns on operating assets as well as expected income from corporate equity 
ownership. Thus, the expected ROE of firms with equity investments (firm F or firm G) 
changes with the accounting method. Moreover, we observe that if 𝐸[?̃?] is the same for all 
firm and is proportional to the initial level of investment in operating assets, the ROE under 
the equity method is unaffected by equity investments and is constant across firms. 
Nonetheless, the ROE of a firm with corporate equity investments accounted for using 
the fair value method, has a higher (lower) denominator, as its book values incorporate 
expected capital gains (losses). Assuming that on average firms purchase productive assets 
that are expected to generate positive cash flows (𝐸[?̃?] > 0), it appears that the ROE of firms 
that use the fair value method are biased downwards, while the ROE of firms that use the 
equity method are unaffected by the corporate equity ownership.  
Penman (1992) explains that excess earnings are isomorphic to book rate of return. 
This implies that the values of 𝛽-coefficients should appropriately impound earnings (growth) 
beyond the level implied by the book values, into the market price. However, Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 show that the manner by which earnings from equity investments are captured by the MB 
ratio and ROE, varies with the accounting method. Thus, for the relationship between MB 
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ratios and ROE to hold, 𝛽 must change with the firm’s corporate equity investments and 
accounting treatments.  
We note that for the equity method, the implied 𝛽 should be constant across ownership 
structures. Under the equity method, the book value is unaffected by the equity investments 
and profit (loss) from investees are recorded only when realized at 𝑡 = 2. Thus, ROE and the 
implied 𝛽 are the same for firms with and without corporate equity investments. However, 
under the fair value method, book value increases (decreases) with the expected profit (loss) 
of the investees' operating activities. Thus, as the expected profit (loss) from the operating 
activities of the investees' increases, the implied 𝛽 decreases (increases). Thus, although the 
underlying economic activity is unchanged by the equity investments, the MB ratios, ROEs 
and implied 𝛽s are altered by the presence of corporate equity investments. As such, the 
relation between MB ratios and ROE may not be isomorphic. 
Theorem A-I: 
Under the equity method, when considering the relation between MB ratios and ROE, the 
implied coefficient on ROE, 𝛽, is constant across ownership structures. 
Theorem A-II: 
Under the fair value method, when considering the relation between MB ratios and ROE, the 
implied coefficient on ROE, 𝛽, is distorted for firms that own corporate equity. Given⁡𝐸[?̃?] >
0, for firms that own corporate equity, 𝛽 is lower than for firms that do not have corporate 
equity.  
Theorem A-III: 
Given⁡𝐸[?̃?] > 0, for firms that own corporate equity, the implied 𝛽 is higher for firms that use 
the equity method than for firms that use the fair value method: 𝛽𝐸𝑀 > 𝛽𝐹𝑉𝑀. 
  
145 
 
APPENDIX 3.5.5 
Linear Information Dynamics 
From Proposition I we know: 
𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡| + |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑎  
Following FO (1995) we develop a model in which future abnormal operating earnings 
depends on current accounting and non-accounting information. We begin by defining 
goodwill as: 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡, where 𝑔𝑡 = ||
𝑔𝑡
1
⁡𝑔𝑡
2
⋮
𝑔𝑡
𝑛
|| is the [𝑛 × 1]-vector of all firms’ goodwill at 
time 𝑡. 
Hence, for any firm 𝑖 = {1,2,3…𝑛}, goodwill can be expressed as: 
𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = ∑ 𝐸𝑡 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
]
𝑇→∞
𝜏=𝑡+1
 
𝑔𝑡+1
𝑗 = ∑ 𝐸𝑡+1 [
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏−𝑡−1
]
𝑇→∞
𝜏=𝑡+2
 
Note that under the fair value method goodwill is unaffected by the initial equity investment.  
Next, we multiply goodwill by 𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟): 𝑅 ∗ 𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = (1 + 𝑟)∑
𝑜𝑥𝜏
𝑎,𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
𝑇→∞
𝜏=𝑡+1 , and rearrange: 
 (3.23) 𝑅 ∗ 𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑜𝑥𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 ] + 𝐸𝑡[𝑔𝑡+1
𝑗
] 
To keep the model tractable, the model follows a linear Markovian structure. We start with 
FO (1995) and assume the following linear information model (identical to Equations (3.22)) 
∀𝑖, ∀𝑡: 
(3.22a) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀1̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.22b) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀2̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
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(3.22c) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽11
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀3̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.22d) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽21
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀4̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
We conjecture a linear price model: 𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼7
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗
 
Substituting into Equation (3.23): 
𝑅𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝑅𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑅𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑅𝛼7
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗)𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +
(𝜔12
𝑗 + 𝛼1
𝑗𝜔12
𝑗 + 𝛼3
𝑗𝜔22
𝑗) ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗 + 𝛼5
𝑗𝛽11
𝑗) ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + (𝛼3
𝑗 + 𝛼7
𝑗𝛽21
𝑗) ∗
𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗
  
Isolating the coefficient and rearranging, we get: 
𝛼1
𝑗 =
𝜔11
𝑗
(𝑅 − 𝜔11𝑗)
 
𝛼3
𝑗 =
𝑅𝜔12
𝑗
(𝑅 − 𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝜔22𝑗)
 
𝛼5
𝑗 =
𝑅
(𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝜔11𝑗)
 
𝛼7
𝑗 =
𝑅𝜔12
𝑗
(𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝜔22𝑗)
 
Next, given Proposition I, we can write the conjectured price for all firms as: 
𝑝𝑡 = [𝐼 − 𝜙]
−1{𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑡} + [𝐼 − 𝜙]
−1𝑔𝑡 
Rearranging we get:  
𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + |𝐼 + 𝛼3| ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼5 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝛼7 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡|  
Where 𝜈1,𝑡 and 𝜈2,𝑡 are the  
 If we assume constant pricing coefficients across firms, that is 𝛼1
𝑗, 𝛼3
𝑗, 𝛼5
𝑗, 𝛼7
𝑗 
are the same for all firms, then 𝛼1 = 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝐼, 𝛼3 = 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝐼, 𝛼5 = 𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝐼 and 𝛼7 = 𝛼7
𝑗 ∗ 𝐼, 
where 𝛼1
𝑗, 𝛼3
𝑗, 𝛼5
𝑗, 𝛼7
𝑗 are scalars. Nonetheless, given the linear information model 
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specified in Equations (3.22), the pricing coefficients could vary among firms which implies 
𝛼1, 𝛼3, 𝛼5 and 𝛼7 are [𝑛 × 𝑛] diagonal matrices, where each diagonal denotes the individual 
firms’ pricing coefficients.  
 Solving for the assumed information dynamic presented in Equations (3.22), we get a 
closed form solution, identical to FO (1995). For unique solution to exists, the following 
condition should hold: 𝜔11
𝑖𝜔13
𝑖 ≠ 0, ∀𝑖. We remind the reader that for convergence of the 
linear information system, the following condition should hold: 
(i) −1 < 𝛽11
𝑖 < 1, −1 < 𝛽21
𝑖 < 1,⁡ ∀𝑖 
(ii) 0 ≤ 𝜔11
𝑖 < 1, ∀𝑖 
Furthermore, the following conditions are necessary to restrict long-run growth or decay of 
the operating assets (condition (iii)) and to rule out aggressive accounting (condition (iv)):  
(iii) 1 ≤ 𝜔22
𝑖 < 𝑅, ∀𝑖 
(iv) 0 ≤ 𝜔12
𝑖, ∀𝑖 
These assumptions and the solution characteristics are discussed in FO (1995), pages 703–704 
and pages 722–723. 
General Linear Information Dynamic 
Consider now the more general linear information dynamics allowing for inter-firm 
information transfers (identical to Equations (3.20)), ∀𝑖, ∀𝑡: 
(3.20a) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 +𝜔14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀1̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.20b) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀2̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.20c) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽1
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝜀3̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.20d) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽2
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡 + 𝜀4̃,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
where 𝜔11
𝑗,⁡𝜔12
𝑗, 𝜔22
𝑗 are scalars capturing firm 𝑗's responsiveness to its own 
current abnormal operating earnings and operating assets. We allow firm 𝑗 to incorporate 
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information about the operating process of other firms, as well as its counterpart firms' other 
information. Thus, 𝜔13
𝑗, 𝜔14
𝑗, 𝜔24
𝑗, 𝛽1
𝑗
 and 𝛽2
𝑗
 are the [1 × 𝑛] vectors capturing 
theresponsiveness of the firm to these sources of information. Note that for 𝜔13
𝑗, 𝜔14
𝑗, 𝜔24
𝑗, 
the 𝑗-th element in each vector is zero, as the firm already accounts for its own current 
abnormal operating earnings and operating assets information by assigning the weights 
𝜔11
𝑗,⁡𝜔12
𝑗, 𝜔22
𝑗. 
Next, consider the general linear information dynamics for the entire economy: 
𝑂?̃?𝑡+1 = Ω11 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Ω12 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Ω13 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Ω14 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑡+1 
𝑂?̃?𝑡+1 = Ω22 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Ω24 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝜈2,𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑡+1 
𝜈1,𝑡+1 = Β1 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝜀3,𝑡+1 
𝜈2,𝑡+1 = Β2 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡 + 𝜀4,𝑡+1 
 Where Ω11 = |𝜔11
1⁡𝜔11
2…𝜔11
𝑛| is a⁡[𝑛 × 𝑛]-diagonal matrix of the firms’ response 
coefficient to their current abnormal earnings in the abnormal earnings process. Similarly, 
Ω12 = |𝜔12
1⁡𝜔12
2…𝜔12
𝑛| and Ω22 = |𝜔22
1⁡𝜔22
2…𝜔22
𝑛| are the diagonal matrices of the 
firms’ response coefficient to their current operating assets in the abnormal operating earnings 
process and the operating assets process, respectively.  
 In this general case we assume the firm’s linear information dynamics regarding its 
operating activities incorporates information about other firms’ operating abnormal earnings 
and operating assets. Accordingly, we define Ω13 = |𝜔13
1⁡𝜔13
2…𝜔13
𝑛| as the [𝑛 × 𝑛] matrix 
of response coefficients of each firm to its counterpart firms’ current abnormal operating 
earnings. Note that for each firm, the response coefficient for its own current abnormal 
operating earnings is given by Ω11, hence, the elements on the diagonal of Ω13 equal zero. We 
also define Ω14 = |𝜔14
1⁡𝜔14
2…𝜔14
𝑛| and Ω24 = |𝜔24
1⁡𝜔24
2…𝜔24
𝑛| as the matrices of the 
firms’ response coefficients to other firms’ current operating assets in the abnormal operating 
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earnings process and in the operating assets process, respectively. The elements on the 
diagonal of Ω14 and Ω24 equal zero, 
 We also assume the firms’ other information incorporates the remaining n − 1  firms’ 
other information. Hence, we define Β1 = |𝛽1
1⁡⁡𝛽1
2…𝛽1
𝑛| and Β2 = |𝛽2
1⁡⁡𝛽2
2…𝛽1
𝑛| as the 
[𝑛 × 𝑛] matrices of response coefficients of each firm to its own and  to all  firms’ other 
information. Lastly, 𝜀𝑙,𝑡+1, 𝑙 = 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes the [𝑛 × 1] vector of idiosyncratic shocks 
at time 𝑡 + 1, i.i.d with mean zero. 
We conjecture the following linear price model: 
𝑔𝑡 = Α1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Α2 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Α3 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Α4 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Α5 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + Α6 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡 
 Where Α1 = |𝛼1
1⁡𝛼1
2 ⁡…𝛼1
𝑛| and Α3 = |𝛼3
1⁡𝛼3
2 ⁡… 𝛼3
𝑛| are [𝑛 × 𝑛] diagonal 
matrices of the firms’ pricing coefficient for their own current abnormal earnings and current 
operating assets, respectively. Α2 = |𝛼2
1⁡𝛼2
2 ⁡…𝛼2
𝑛| and Α4 = |𝛼4
1⁡𝛼4
2 ⁡…𝛼4
𝑛|, are [𝑛 × 𝑛] 
matrices of the pricing coefficients for all firms’ current abnormal operating earnings and 
current assets, respectively. Note that each firm’s pricing coefficients for its own current 
abnormal operating earnings operating assets are given by Α1 and Α3, hence, the elements on 
the diagonals of both Α2 and Α4 matrices equal zero. Finally, Α5 = |𝛼5
1⁡𝛼5
2 ⁡…𝛼5
𝑛| and Α6 =
|𝛼6
1⁡𝛼6
2 ⁡…𝛼6
𝑛| denotes the [𝑛 × 𝑛] matrices of the pricing coefficients assigned to other 
information. 
Substituting into Equation (3.23): 
𝑅 ∗ Α1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝑅 ∗ Α2 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝑅 ∗ Α3 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅 ∗ Α4 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝑅 ∗ Α5 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + 𝑅 ∗ Α6 ∗
𝜈2,𝑡 = |𝐼 + Α1|Ω11 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + ||𝐼 + Α1|Ω12 + Α3 ∗ Ω22| ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + ||𝐼 + Α1|Ω13 + Α2 ∗ Ω11 +
Α2Ω13| ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + ||𝐼 + Α1|Ω14 + Α3 ∗ Ω24 + Α2Ω12 + Α2Ω14 + Α4 ∗ Ω22 + Α4 ∗ Ω24| ∗
𝑂𝐴𝑡 + |𝐼 + Α1 + Α2 + Α5Β1|𝜈1,𝑡 + |Α3 + Α4 + Α6Β2|𝜈2,𝑡  
Isolating the coefficient and rearranging, we get: 
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Α1 = |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω11|
−1Ω11 
Α2 = |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω11 − Ω13|
−1||𝐼 + |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω11|
−1Ω11| ∗ Ω13| 
Α3 = |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω22|
−1||𝐼 + |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω11|
−1Ω11| ∗ Ω12| 
Α4 = |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω22 −Ω24|
−1||𝐼 + Α1| ∗ Ω14 + Α2 ∗ |Ω12 + Ω14| + Α3 ∗ Ω24| 
Α5 = |𝑅 − Β1|
−1|𝐼 + Α1 + Α2| 
Α6 = |𝑅 − Β2|
−1|Α3 + Α4| 
Assuming firms’ corporate equity investments are independent, the following 
matrices are invertible: |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω11|, |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω22|, |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω11 − Ω13|, |𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 − Ω22 −
Ω24|, |𝑅 − Β1| and |𝑅 − Β2|.  
Solving for the pricing model coefficients is equivalent to solving: 𝐸𝑡[𝑦(?̃?𝑡+1)] = 𝐴𝑦(𝑥𝑡). 
where: 𝑦(?̃?𝑡+1) = |
𝑂𝑋𝑡+1
𝑂𝐴𝑡+1
𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝜈2,𝑡+1
|; ⁡𝑦(𝑥𝑡) = |
𝑂𝑋𝑡
𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝜈1,𝑡
𝜈2,𝑡
|; 𝐴 = |
Ω 𝐼
0 Β
| 
We note that some restrictions should be placed on the information generating 
processes in order to derive a unique solution. Specifically, we require det|𝐴| ≠ 0, where 𝐴 
is the [4𝑛 × 4𝑛] “response coefficients” matrix for all firms. This implies the following 
conditions for the response coefficients of abnormal operating earnings and operating assets, 
|Ω|, and response coefficients of other information,⁡|Β|: det|Ω| ≠ 0 and det|Β| ≠ 0.  
Using Proposition I and the conjectured pricing model, we get: 
(3.24)⁡𝑝𝑡 = |𝐼 − 𝜙|
−1|𝐹𝐴𝑡 + Α1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Α2 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + |𝐼 + Α3 ∗ 𝐼| ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Α4 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Α5 ∗
𝜈1,𝑡 + Α6 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡| 
Note that without cross holdings, that is 𝜙 = 0, the pricing model of firms with inter-
industry information transfers is: 
(3.25)⁡𝑝𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + Α1 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Α2 ∗ 𝑂𝑋𝑡 + Α3 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Α4 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡 + Α5 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡 + Α6 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡  
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Overall, we see that when allowing for cross holdings, the amplification factor appears 
in a pricing model that is based on standard linear information dynamics as well as in a more 
general linear information dynamics that includes inter-firm information transfers. 
Furthermore, from Equation (3.25) we observe that even in the absence of equity investments, 
the response coefficients demonstrate inter-firms dependencies, as a firm’s earnings and 
operating assets evolve along with other firms’ earnings and operating assets. 
We leave a discussion of the asymptotic properties of the general information 
dynamics for future research, as the convergence of the system depends on the interactions 
between the weights assigned to each firm’s own accounting variable and the weights assigned 
to its counterpart firms’ accounting variables. To further investigate this, one would like to 
consider, among other issues, strategic behavior by firms, response to complementary or 
substitute products and industry-wide information.  
General Linear Information Dynamic: The Case of Two Firms 
We consider a simplified two firm economy, 𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, and present the 
firms’ valuation.  
The linear information system for the two firms is given by: 
(3.26a) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑗 = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀1,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.26b) 𝑜?̃?𝑡+1
𝑎,𝑘 = 𝜔11
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔12
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 +𝜔13
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔14
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀1,𝑡+1
𝑘  
(3.26c) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 +𝜔24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀2,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.26d) 𝑂?̃?𝑡+1
𝑘 = 𝜔22
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 +𝜔24
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀2,𝑡+1
𝑘  
(3.26e) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽11
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽12
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀3,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(26f) 𝜈1,𝑡+1
𝑘 = 𝛽11
𝑘 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽12
𝑘 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀3,𝑡+1
𝑘  
(3.26g) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝛽21
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽22
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀4,𝑡+1
𝑗
 
(3.26h) 𝜈2,𝑡+1
𝑘 = 𝛽21
𝑘 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽22
𝑘 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀4,𝑡+1
𝑘  
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We conjecture a linear price model: 𝑔𝑡
𝑗 = 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 +
𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼6
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼7
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼8
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘   
Substituting into Equation (3.23) and rearranging we get: 
𝑅𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝑅𝛼2
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝑅𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑅𝛼4
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑅𝛼5
𝑗,∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑅𝛼6
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑅𝛼7
𝑗 ∗
𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑅𝛾8 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘 = ((1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)𝜔11
𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘) ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + (𝜔12
𝑗(1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
) + 𝛼2
𝑗𝜔14
𝑘 +
𝛼3
𝑗𝜔22
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘) ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + (𝜔13
𝑗(1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
) + 𝛼2
𝑗𝜔11
𝑘) ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 + (𝜔14
𝑗(1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
) +
𝛼2
𝑗𝜔12
𝑘 + 𝛼3
𝑗𝜔24
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗𝜔22
𝑘) ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + ((1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
) + 𝛼5
𝑗, 𝛽11
𝑗 + 𝛼6
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘)𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + (𝛼2
𝑗 +
𝛼5
𝑗, 𝛽12
𝑗 + 𝛼6
𝑗𝛽11
𝑘)𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + (𝛼3
𝑗 + 𝛼7
𝑗𝛽21
𝑗 + 𝛼8
𝑗𝛽22
𝑘)𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + (𝛼4
𝑗 + 𝛼7
𝑗𝛽22
𝑗 + 𝛼8
𝑗𝛽21
𝑘)𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘)  
Solving for 𝛼1
𝑗
, 𝛼2
𝑗
, 𝛼3
𝑗
, 𝛼4
𝑗
,⁡𝛼5
𝑗
, 𝛼6
𝑗
, 𝛼7
𝑗
, 𝛼8
𝑗
 :  
𝛼1
𝑗 =
𝜔11
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔11
𝑘)+𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘
(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔11𝑘)−𝜔13𝑗𝜔13𝑘
  
𝛼2
𝑗 =
𝑅𝜔13
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔11𝑘)−𝜔13𝑗𝜔13𝑘
  
𝛼3
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝜔12
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘)+𝜔14
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑘𝜔24𝑗
+ 𝛼2
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑘(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘)+𝜔12
𝑘𝜔24
𝑘
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑘𝜔24𝑗
)  
𝛼4
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝜔14
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑗)+𝜔12
𝑗𝜔24
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑘𝜔24𝑗
+ 𝛼2
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑘(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑗)+𝜔14
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑘𝜔24𝑗
  
𝛼5
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑘)
(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑘)−𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘 + 𝛼2
𝑗 𝛽12
𝑘
(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑘)−𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘  
𝛼6
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝛽12
𝑗
(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑘)−𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘 + 𝛼2
𝑗 𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗
(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽11
𝑘)−𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘  
𝛼7
𝑗 = 𝛼3
𝑗 (𝑅−𝛽21
𝑘)
(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑘)−𝛽22
𝑘𝛽22
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑘
(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑘)−𝛽22
𝑘𝛽22
𝑗  
𝛼8
𝑗 = 𝛼3
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑗
(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑘)−𝛽22
𝑘𝛽22
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 (𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗)
(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅−𝛽21
𝑘)−𝛽22
𝑘𝛽22
𝑗  
We can present the solution as: 
𝛼1
𝑗 =
𝜔11
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔11
𝑘)+𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘
𝛿1
𝑗   
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𝛼2
𝑗 =
𝑅𝜔13
𝑗
𝛿1
𝑗   
𝛼3
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘)𝜔12
𝑗+𝜔14
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘
𝛿2
𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 (𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘)𝜔14
𝑘+𝜔12
𝑘𝜔24
𝑘
𝛿2
𝑗   
𝛼4
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑗)𝜔14
𝑗+𝜔12
𝑗𝜔24
𝑗
𝛿2
𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 (𝑅−𝜔22
𝑗)𝜔12
𝑘+𝜔14
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗
𝛿2
𝑗   
𝛼5
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝑅−𝛽11
𝑘
𝛿3
𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 𝛽12
𝑘
𝛿3
𝑗   
𝛼6
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼1
𝑗
)
𝛽12
𝑗
𝛿3
𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 𝑅−𝛽11
𝑗
𝛿3
𝑗   
𝛼7
𝑗 = 𝛼3
𝑗 𝑅−𝛽21
𝑘
𝛿4
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑘
𝛿4
𝑗   
𝛼8
𝑗 = 𝛼3
𝑗 𝛽22
𝑗
𝛿4
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 𝑅−𝛽21
𝑗
𝛿4
𝑗   
Where: 
𝛿1
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝜔11
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝜔11
𝑘) − 𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘  
𝛿2
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑘)(𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑗) − 𝜔24
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗  
𝛿3
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝛽11
𝑘) − 𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘
  
𝛿4
𝑗 = (𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑗)(𝑅 − 𝛽21
𝑘) − 𝛽22
𝑘𝛽22
𝑗
  
Note that the pricing coefficients can all be expressed as a linear combination of 𝛼1
𝑗
 and 𝛼2
𝑗 . 
For a closed form solution to exist, we require: 𝛿1
𝑗, 𝛿2
𝑗, 𝛿3
𝑗, 𝛿4
𝑗 ≠ 0.  
A unique solution exists if and only if: det|𝐴| ≠ 0. Thus, we also require: 
𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘 ≠ 𝜔11
𝑗𝜔11
𝑘 
𝜔22
𝑗𝜔22
𝑘 ≠ 𝜔24
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘 
𝛽12
𝑗𝛽12
𝑘 ≠ 𝛽11
𝑗𝛽11
𝑘
 
𝛽22
𝑗𝛽22
𝑘 ≠ 𝛽21
𝑗𝛽21
𝑘
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The valuation function can be expressed as: 
𝑝𝑡
𝑗 = 𝐵𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼1
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼2
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑡
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼3
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼4
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼5
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼6
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈1,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛼7
𝑗 ∗
𝜈2,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼8
𝑗 ∗ 𝜈2,𝑡
𝑘   
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APPENDIX 3.5.6 
Linear Information Dynamics – Empirical Application 
In Appendix 3.5.5 we consider the baseline case where firms file their financial 
statements at the same time. However, reporting periods and reporting frequencies differ 
across firms. This may pose some challenges for empirical research studying inter-firms or 
intra-industry information transfers. In this appendix we provide guidance regarding the 
empirical application of two cases: (i) Firms with different reporting frequencies (ii) Firms 
with misaligned reporting periods. 
First, consider a public European firm that file its financial statements semi-annually 
and a private European firm that files its financial statements annually; or consider Singapore, 
where lager public firms (above S$75 million in market capitalization) are required to report 
quarterly, while smaller public firms are required to report semi-annually (see Kajuter, 
Klassmann, and Nienhaus 2018). These are two examples where firms may operate in the 
same country or even in the same industry, nevertheless, have different reporting frequencies. 
We note that the variation in reporting frequency may be voluntary or mandatory following a 
policy change (Butler, Kraft, and Weiss 2007, Fu, Kraft, and Zhang 2012, Kraft, Vashishtha, 
and Venkatachalam 2018). 
Moreover, firms operating in different countries may also have different reporting 
frequencies. A public US firm is required to file its financial statements quarterly, while a 
public UK firm is required to report semi-annually. The US firm discloses information to 
external users more frequently than the UK firm. Hence, external users may update their 
information set based on the US firm’s disclosures more often. This implies that the valuation 
function may be altered compared to the benchmark case of two firms that report at the same 
time and every period. 
Second, firms file their financial statements at the different times. For example, 
consider two UK firms that report semi-annually, where one firm files its financial statements 
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at the end of March and September, while the other firm files its financial statements at the 
end of June and December. In this setting, external users may update their information set in 
a staggered manner, based on one firm disclosure at a time. Furthermore, Kamp (2002) 
documents that firms’ typical fiscal year-ends vary across countries. For example, the most 
common fiscal year end is end of March in Japan, end of June in Australia, and end of 
December in US. Thus, the information flow between firms and across countries is misaligned 
such that the valuation function may be altered relative to the benchmark case where all firms 
report at the same time period. Our approach differs from Ohlson (1979) as we consider the 
reliability of the disclosed information and its relevance to both reporting and non-reporting 
firms. 
We demonstrate the solution for these two cases of misaligned information flows 
using a simplified two-firm economy. First, we illustrate the empirical specification of the 
benchmark case. Second, we discuss the solution for two firms with different reporting 
frequencies. Lastly, we demonstrate the valuation of two firms with the same reporting 
frequency but misaligned reporting periods. A crucial, simplifying assumption in our analysis 
is that the true information generating process is independent of the reporting frequency and 
disclosure timing.35 Thus, we assume that the firms’ linear information dynamics remain 
constant over time and across reporting schedules. 
Two Firms with the Same Reporting Frequency and the Same Reporting Period 
Consider an economy with two firms, 𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. We set 𝑢 = 2𝑡 and assume 
that the underlying information process is quarterly, as in Equations (3.26), and that both firms 
file their financial statements in every period 𝑢. For external users, the information set in each 
period is complete as they observe the financial statements of both firms and may update the 
information set every quarter based on all disclosed information. Equations (3.27) denotes the 
                                                          
35 We acknowledge that Oyer (1998) considers a contracting setting where this assumption does not 
hold. 
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firms’ information system based on the information observed by external users. For simplicity 
we also assume there is no other information. 
(3.27a) 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗
] = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 +𝜔13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑘  
(3.27b) 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 ] = 𝜔11
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔12
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑘 +𝜔13
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔14
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
We conjecture a linear price model for both firms: 
(3.28a) 𝑔𝑢
𝑗 = 𝛼11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 + 𝛼14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑘  
(3.28b) 𝑔𝑢
𝑘 = 𝛼11
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼12
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼13
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑘 + 𝛼14
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
Solving for firm 𝑗 (representative firm) we get: 
𝛼11
𝑗 =
𝜔11
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔11
𝑘)+𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘
(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔11𝑘)−𝜔13𝑗𝜔13𝑘
  
𝛼12
𝑗 =
𝑅𝜔13
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔11𝑗)(𝑅−𝜔11𝑘)−𝜔13𝑗𝜔13𝑘
  
𝛼13
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼11
𝑗
)
𝜔12
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘)+𝜔14
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑗𝜔24𝑘
+ 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑘(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘)+𝜔24
𝑘𝜔12
𝑘
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑗𝜔24𝑘
  
𝛼14
𝑗 = (1 + 𝛼11
𝑗
)
𝜔14
𝑗(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑗)+𝜔24
𝑗𝜔12
𝑗
(𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑗𝜔24𝑘
+ 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑘(𝑅−𝜔22
𝑗)+𝜔14
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗
((𝑅−𝜔22𝑘)(𝑅−𝜔22𝑗)−𝜔24𝑗𝜔24𝑘
  
The pricing coefficient are consistent with Appendix 3.5.5. 
1. Two Firms with Different Reporting Frequency 
Consider an economy with two firms, 𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, where firm 𝑗 discloses 
information every period (that is at time 𝑢,⁡𝑢 + 1, 𝑢 + 2, 𝑢 + 3, and so on) and firm 𝑘 
discloses information every other period (that is at time 𝑢 + 1, 𝑢 + 3, 𝑢 + 5, and so on). Thus, 
the firms provide new information to the market at different frequencies. 
For external users, the information set in odd periods is complete, as they may use the 
disclosed financial information of both firms to update their information set. Nevertheless, in 
even periods external users’ information set is incomplete, they may update the information 
set based only on firm 𝑗’s disclosed information. Thus, in each even period the information 
set can only be updated using one firm’s disclosure.  
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We assume that external users may update the information set based on observed 
information as well as on estimations of firm 𝑘′𝑠 financial information. Put differently, for the 
firm that discloses less frequently, external users will generate a predication of the firm’s 
financial information using the partial information set.  
The following denotes the firms’ information system based on the information 
disclosed to external users. Equations (3.29) denotes the expected information set for even 
periods where the information set is partial: 
(3.29a) 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗
] = 𝜔11̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 +𝜔13̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘  
(3.29b) 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 ] = 𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘 +𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
(3.29c) 𝐸𝑢[𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑗
] = 𝜔22̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 +𝜔24̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘  
(3.29d) 𝐸𝑢[𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑘 ] = 𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘 +𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
Equations (3.30) denotes the expected information set for odd periods where the information 
set is complete:  
(3.30a) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗
] = 𝜔11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔21
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑗 +𝜔13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘  
(3.30b) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘] = 𝜔11
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝜔12
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘 +𝜔13
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔14
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑗
 
(3.30c) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
] = 𝜔22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑗 + 𝜔24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘  
(3.30d) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘] = 𝜔22
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘 + 𝜔24
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑗
 
We note that the underlying data generating process may differ from the estimated 
data and use a different notation for the estimated information generating processes.36 
Accordingly,  {𝜔11̂, 𝜔12̂, 𝜔13̂, 𝜔14̂} represent the response coefficients for periods where the 
                                                          
36 In this analysis, we make two assumptions. First, we take as given that the market can use the currently 
disclosed accounting information from one firm to form an updated expectation about the other firm’s 
non-disclosed current accounting information. The assumption of linear information model makes this 
estimate calculatable. Second, we presume that pricing function continues to be linear and rely on the 
(i) most current (observed) accounting information from the disclosing firms as well as (ii) the updated 
expectation about the accounting information of the non-disclosing firm. This second assumption is a 
reasonable heuristic that allows us to establish that the resulting pricing coefficients differ relative to 
the benchmark case where information is disclosed by both firms in all periods, and that the pricing 
coefficients vary with the information set.  
159 
 
information set includes estimation of the other firms’ financial information, while 
{𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} are the response coefficients for periods where the information set 
includes estimation of the firm 𝑘’s own financial information (investors‘ expectations about 
the undisclosed information). In this case, the only estimated information relates to firm 𝑘 in 
even periods. Hence, we use {𝜔11̂, 𝜔12̂, 𝜔13̂, 𝜔14̂} in Equations (3.29a) and (3.29c), and 
{𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} in Equations (3.29b) and (3.29d).  
Given that the information set differs between odd and even periods, we conjecture a linear 
price model for even (𝑔𝑢) and odd (𝑔𝑢+1) periods both firms: 
(3.31a) 𝑔𝑢
𝑗 = 𝛼11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 + 𝛼14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘  
(3.31b) 𝑔𝑢+1
𝑗 = 𝛼21
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼23
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑗 + 𝛼24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑘  
(3.31c) 𝑔𝑢
𝑘 = 𝛼11
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼12
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼13
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘 + 𝛼14
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
(3.31d) 𝑔𝑢+1
𝑘 = 𝛼21
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼22
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼23
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑘 + 𝛼24
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑗
 
The partial information sets imply that pricing coefficient should be solved as a system 
for periods with partial and full information sets. That is, solving a simultaneous system of the 
linear pricing model for even (𝑔𝑢) and odd (𝑔𝑢+1) periods. We solve the pricing coefficients 
by substituting Equations (3.30)-(3.32) into Equation (3.23), using firm 𝑗 as a representative 
firm: {
𝑅 ∗ 𝑔𝑢
𝑗 = 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗 ] + 𝐸𝑢[𝑔𝑢+1
𝑗
]
𝑅 ∗ 𝑔𝑢+1
𝑗 = 𝐸𝑢+1[𝑜𝑥𝑢+2
𝑎,𝑗 ] + 𝐸𝑢+1[𝑔𝑢+2
𝑗
]
 
Solving the simultaneous system yields a closed form solution for firm 𝑗 (representative firm): 
Even Periods Odd Periods 
𝜶𝟏𝟏
𝒋
 
𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘
𝜆1
+ (1 +
𝛼21
𝑗 )
𝜔11
𝑘𝜔13̂
𝑗
𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘+𝜔11̂
𝑗(𝑅2−𝜔11
𝑘𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘)
𝑅𝜆1
  
𝜶𝟐𝟏
𝒋
 
[(𝑅 + 𝜔11̂
𝑗)𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 − 𝜔13̂
𝑗𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘] ∗
𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘−𝜔11
𝑗𝜔11
𝑘
𝜆2
+
𝑅2
(𝑅+𝜔11̂
𝑗)𝜔11
𝑗+𝑅2𝜔13̂
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘
𝜆2
  
𝜶𝟏𝟐
𝒋
 
𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘𝜔13
𝑗
𝜆1
+ (1 +
𝛼21
𝑗 )𝜔13̂
𝑗 𝜔11̂
𝑗𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘+(𝑅2−𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘)
𝑅𝜆1
  
𝜶𝟐𝟐
𝒋
 
𝑅𝜔13
𝑗
𝜆1
+ (1 + 𝛼21
𝑗 )
𝜔11̂
𝑗𝜔13
𝑗+𝜔11
𝑘𝜔13̂
𝑗
𝜆1
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𝜶𝟏𝟑
𝒋
 
[(1 + 𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔21
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑘] ∗
𝑅𝜔22̂
𝑗
+𝜔22
𝑘(𝜔24̂
𝑗
𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘−𝜔22̂
𝑗
𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘)
𝜆3
+ 𝜔24
𝑘[(1 +
𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔14
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑘] ∗
𝑅+𝜔22̂
𝑗𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘−𝜔24̂
𝑗𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘
𝜆3
+ [(1 + 𝛼21
𝑗 )𝜔12̂
𝑗 +
𝛼22
𝑗 𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘] ∗
𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘−𝜔24̂
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘
𝜆3
+ [(1 +
𝛼21
𝑗 )𝜔14̂
𝑗 + 𝛼22
𝑗 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘] ∗
𝜔22̂
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘+𝜔22
𝑘𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘
𝜆3
  
𝜶𝟐𝟑
𝒋
 
[(1 + 𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔21
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑘 + 𝛼13
𝑗 𝜔22
𝑗] ∗
𝑅−𝜔22
𝑘𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘
𝑅𝜆4
+ [(1 + 𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔14
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑘 +
𝛼13
𝑗 𝜔24
𝑗]
𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘𝜔24
𝑘
𝑅𝜆4
+ [(1 + 𝛼21
𝑗 )𝜔14̂
𝑗 +
𝛼22
𝑗 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘]
𝜔24
𝑘
𝑅𝜆4
  
𝜶𝟏𝟒
𝒋
 
[(1 + 𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔21
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑘]
𝜔24̂
𝑗
𝜆4
+ [(1 +
𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔14
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑘]
𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘
𝜆4
+
𝛼13
𝑗 𝜔22
𝑗𝜔24̂
𝑗+𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘𝜔24
𝑗
𝜆4
+ [(1 + 𝛼21
𝑗 )𝜔14̂
𝑗 +
𝛼22
𝑗 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘]
1
𝜆4
  
𝜶𝟐𝟒
𝒋
 
[(1 + 𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔21
𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔14
𝑘 +
𝛼13
𝑗 𝜔22
𝑗]
𝜔22
𝑘𝜔24̂
𝑗
𝑅𝜆4
+ [(1 + 𝛼11
𝑗 )𝜔14
𝑗 +
𝛼12
𝑗 𝜔12
𝑘 + 𝛼13
𝑗 𝜔24
𝑗]
𝑅−𝜔24̂
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘
𝑅𝜆4
+ [(1 +
𝛼21
𝑗 )𝜔14̂
𝑗 + 𝛼22
𝑗 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘]
𝜔22
𝑘
𝑅𝜆4
  
 
Where: 
𝜆1 = (𝑅
2 −𝜔11
𝑘𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 −𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘)  
𝜆2 = (𝑅
2 −𝜔13̂
𝑗𝜔13
𝑘 −𝜔11
𝑗𝜔11̂
𝑗)(𝑅2 −𝜔13
𝑗𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 −𝜔11
𝑘𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘) − (𝜔11̂
𝑗𝜔13
𝑗 +
𝜔11
𝑘𝜔13̂
𝑗
)  
𝜆3 = 𝑅(𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑗𝜔22̂
𝑗 −𝜔22
𝑘𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 − 𝜔24̂
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘 −𝜔24
𝑗𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘) + (𝜔22
𝑗𝜔22
𝑘 −
𝜔24
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘)(𝜔22̂
𝑗𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 −𝜔24̂
𝑗𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘)  
𝜆4 = (𝑅 − 𝜔22
𝑘𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 −𝜔24̂
𝑗𝜔24
𝑘)  
The solution suggests that the pricing coefficients oscillate. Thus, empirical 
estimation of pooled cross-sectional data should employ full interaction models. Our analysis 
suggests that all pricing coefficients may be altered as the information set swings between 
periods with full disclosures {𝛼11
𝑗 , 𝛼12
𝑗 , 𝛼13
𝑗 , 𝛼14
𝑗
}⁡and periods with partial disclosures 
{𝛼21
𝑗 , 𝛼22
𝑗 , 𝛼23
𝑗 , 𝛼24
𝑗
}. These results provide a theoretical framework to the findings of Arif and 
De George (2018)  
We also note that the pricing coefficients of both firms may be altered, regardless of 
their disclosure policy. As evident from Equation (3.31a) and Equation (3.31c), in even 
periods the prices impound information based on the expected abnormal operating earnings 
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and operating assets of firm 𝑘 as well as on firm 𝑗’s disclosed information. In odd periods 
(Equation (3.31b) and Equation (3.31d)), the prices incorporate information disclosed by both 
firms. Although firm 𝑗 discloses information more frequently than firm 𝑘, firm 𝑗’s pricing 
coefficients may still vary from even to odd periods as its prices incorporate the disclosed 
information by firm 𝑘 in odd periods and expectations regarding firm 𝑘’s performances in 
even periods. 
2. Two Firms with the Same Reporting Frequency and Misaligned Reporting Period 
Consider an economy with two firms, 𝑖 = {𝑗, 𝑘},⁡∀⁡𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. We set 𝑢 = 2𝑡 such that 
firm 𝑗 discloses information in even periods (at time 𝑢, 𝑢 + 2, 𝑢 + 4, and so on) and firm 𝑘 
discloses information in odd periods (at time 𝑢 + 1, 𝑢 + 3, 𝑢 + 5, and so on). We assume the 
underlying information process is quarterly, as in Equations (3.26). Nevertheless, given that 
firms reporting periods are misaligned, external users may only observe one firm’s financial 
information in each period.37 
For external users, the information set in each period is incomplete, as they may 
update the information set based only on disclosed information. Thus, in each period the 
information set can only be updated using one firm’s disclosure. Nevertheless, we assume that 
external observers use the partial information set and based on an estimation, update the 
information set also for the firm that does not disclose financial information. The following 
denotes the firms’ information system based on the information disclosed to external users. 
Equations (3.32) denotes the expected information set for even periods: 
(3.32a) 𝐸𝑢[𝑜?̂?𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗
] = 𝜔11̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔12̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 +𝜔13̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘  
(3.32b) 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 ] = 𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘 +𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
(3.32c) 𝐸𝑢[𝑂?̂?𝑢+1
𝑗
] = 𝜔22̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 +𝜔24̂
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘  
(3.32d) 𝐸𝑢[𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑘 ] = 𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘 +𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
                                                          
37 Again, see the discussion and caveats in the previous footnote. 
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Equations (3.33) denotes the expected information set for odd periods: 
(3.33a) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗
] = 𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔21̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢−1
𝑗 +𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑘 +𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘  
(3.33b) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘] = 𝜔11̂
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝜔12̂
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘 +𝜔13̂
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢−1
𝑎,𝑗 +𝜔14̂
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢−1
𝑗
 
(3.33c) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
] = 𝜔22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢−1
𝑗 + 𝜔24̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘  
(3.33d) 𝐸𝑢−1[𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘] = 𝜔22̂
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢−1
𝑘 + 𝜔24̂
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢−1
𝑗
 
The information sets denoted by Equations (3.32) and Equations (3.33) are the 
expected information generating process based on firms’ observed information, where the 
values for periods in which a firm does not disclose are estimated based on the partial 
information set. 
Again, we note that the underlying data generating process may differ from the 
observed data and use a different notation for the estimated information generating processes, 
where {𝜔11̂, 𝜔12̂, 𝜔13̂, 𝜔14̂} are the response coefficients for period where the information set 
includes estimation of the other firm’s financial information (investors‘ expectations about 
firm 𝑘’s undisclosed information) and where {𝜔11̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔12̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔13̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝜔14̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} are the response 
coefficients for periods where the information set includes estimation of the firm’s own 
financial information (investors‘ expectations about firm 𝑗’s undisclosed information).  
We conjecture a linear price model for even (𝑔𝑢) and odd (𝑔𝑢+1) periods: 
(3.32a) 𝑔𝑢
𝑗 = 𝛼11
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼12
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼13
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗 + 𝛼14
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘  
(3.32b) 𝑔𝑢+1
𝑗 = 𝛼21
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼22
𝑗 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼23
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢+1
𝑗 + 𝛼24
𝑗 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑘  
(3.32c) 𝑔𝑢
𝑘 = 𝛼11
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼12
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼13
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢
𝑘 + 𝛼14
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢
𝑗
 
(3.32d) 𝑔𝑢+1
𝑘 = 𝛼21
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜𝑥𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛼22
𝑘 ∗ 𝑜?̂?𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗 + 𝛼23
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂𝐴𝑢+1
𝑘 + 𝛼24
𝑘 ∗ 𝑂?̂?𝑢+1
𝑗
 
We solve the pricing coefficients for even and odd periods by substituting Equations (3.30)-
(3.32) into Equation (3.23), using firm 𝑗 as a representative firm: 
{
𝑅 ∗ 𝑔𝑢
𝑗 = 𝐸𝑢[𝑜?̂?𝑢+1
𝑎,𝑗
] + 𝐸𝑢[𝑔𝑢+1
𝑗
]
𝑅 ∗ 𝑔𝑢+1
𝑗 = 𝐸𝑢[𝑜𝑥𝑢+2
𝑎,𝑗 ] + 𝐸𝑢[𝑔𝑢+2
𝑗
]
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The partial information sets imply that pricing coefficient should be solved as a system 
for periods where firm 𝑗 discloses and periods where firm 𝑘 does not disclose. A closed form 
solution exists, and this solution is similar to the solution outlined for two firms with different 
reporting frequency. As in the previous case, the theoretical pricing coefficients suggest that 
the pricing function is altered by the firms’ disclosure policy. In each period prices incorporate 
new information disclosed by one firm only and the expectation regarding the abnormal 
operating earnings and operating assets of the other firm. 
The assumed linear information dynamics with inter firm information transfers 
permits pricing firms in periods when they do not disclose information. As peer firms’ 
disclosures are informative with regards to the firm’s own operations, even in the absence of 
disclosure, external users are able to update their expectations about the non-disclosing firm. 
As such, our proposed approach allows pricing firms with misaligned reporting periods and 
different reporting frequencies. Our approach is also useful for valuation of private firms that 
rarely disclose financial information as well as private European firms that have lower 
disclosure requirements relative to public firms. 
 
 
 
  
164 
 
3.6 Figures  
FIGURE 3.6.1 
Cross Holdings and Firm Value 
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FIGURE 3.6.2 
Circular Ownership Structure Illustration 
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3.7 Tables 
TABLE 3.7.1 
Two Firms - Fair Value Method 
  
Panel A - Firm H without Equity Ownership (the source of this panel is Lundholm (1995)) 
𝐭 𝑩𝒕
𝑯 𝒙𝒕
𝑯 𝒅𝒕
𝑯 
0 100 0 -100 
1 (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻  𝑟 ∗ 100 𝑑1
𝐻 
2 0 𝑟 ∗ [(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻] + 𝑧𝐻  
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ [(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 −
𝑑1
𝐻] + 𝑧𝐻  
Panel B - Firm F Has Equity Ownership in Firm H;  
𝒕 𝑩𝒕
𝑭 𝒙𝒕
𝑭 𝒅𝒕
𝑭 
0 0.8 ∗ 100 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑝0
𝐻  0 -100 
1 
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 0.8 ∗ 100 +
0.2 ∗ (𝑝1
𝐻 + 𝑑1
𝐻) − 𝑑1
𝐹   
𝑟 ∗ 0.8 ∗ 100 + 0.2 ∗ (𝑝1
𝐻 + 𝑑1
𝐻 − 𝑝0
𝐻)  𝑑1
𝐹  
2 0 
𝑟[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 0.8 ∗ 100 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑑1
𝐻 − 𝑑1
𝐹] +
𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ (𝑝2
𝐻 + 𝑑2
𝐻 − 𝑝1
𝐻)  
(1 + 𝑟)[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹] +
𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ (𝑝2
𝐻 + 𝑧𝐻)  
Panel C - Firm F Has One-sided Equity Ownership in Firm H; Market Prices 
𝐭 𝑩𝒕
𝑭 𝒙𝒕
𝑭 𝒅𝒕
𝑭 
0 100 + 0.2 ∗
𝐸0[𝑧
𝐻]
(1+𝑟)2
  0 -100 
1 
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹 +
0.2 ∗
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐻]
1+𝑟
  
𝑟 ∗ 100 + 0.2 ∗ {
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐻]
1+𝑟
−
𝐸0[𝑧
𝐻]
(1+𝑟)2
}  𝑑1
𝐹  
2 0 
𝑟[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹] + 𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗
{𝑧𝐻 −
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐻]
1+𝑟
}  
(1 + 𝑟)[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹] +
𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐻  
Panel D - Firms G and F Have Two-sided Symmetric Equity Ownership; Market Prices 
𝒕 𝑩𝒕
𝑮 𝒙𝒕
𝑮 𝒅𝒕
𝑮 
0 100 +
0.2
0.96
∗
𝐸0[𝑧
𝐹+0.2∗𝑧𝐺]
(1+𝑟)2
  0 -100 
1 
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺 +
0.2
0.96
∗
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐹+0.2∗𝑧𝐺]
(1+𝑟)
  
𝑟 ∗ 100 +
0.2
0.96
∗ {
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐹+0.2∗𝑧𝐺]
(1+𝑟)
−
𝐸0[𝑧
𝐹+0.2∗𝑧𝐺]
(1+𝑟)2
}  
𝑑1
𝐺  
2 0 
𝑟[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺] + 𝑧𝐺 +
0.2
0.96
∗
[𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐺 −
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐹+0.2∗𝑧𝐺]
(1+𝑟)
]  
(1 + 𝑟)[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺] +
𝑧𝐺 +
0.2
0.96
∗ (𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐺)  
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TABLE 3.7.2 
Two Firms -Equity Method 
 
  
Panel A - Firm H: No Equity Ownership (the source of this panel is Lundholm (1995)) 
𝒕 𝑩𝒕
𝑨 𝒙𝒕
𝑨 𝒅𝒕
𝑨 
0 100 0 -100 
1 (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1𝐴  𝑟 ∗ 100 𝑑1𝐴 
2 
0 𝑟 ∗ [(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐴] + 𝑧𝐴  
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ [(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 −
𝑑1
𝐴] + 𝑧𝐴  
Panel B -Firm F: Equity Ownership in Firm H 
𝒕 𝑩𝒕
𝑭 𝒙𝒕
𝑭 𝒅𝒕
𝑭 
0 100 0 -100 
1 (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1𝐹 𝑟 ∗ 100 𝑑1𝐹  
2 
0 r[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹] + 𝑧𝐹 + 20% ∗ 𝑧𝐻  
(1 + 𝑟)[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1𝐹] +
𝑧𝐹 + 20% ∗ 𝑧𝐻   
Panel C -Firm G: Two-sided Symmetric Equity Ownership Between Firms F and G 
𝒕 𝑩𝒕
𝑮 𝒙𝒕
𝑮 𝒅𝒕
𝑮 
0 100 0 -100 
1 (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1𝐺  𝑟 ∗ 100 𝑑1𝐺  
2 
0 𝑟[(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺] +
𝑧𝐺+20%∗𝑧𝐹
96%
  
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ [(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 −
𝑑1
𝐺] +
𝑧𝐺+20%∗𝑧𝐹
96%
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TABLE 3.7.3 
Market-to-Book Ratios 
 
 
  
Panel A – Firm H, No Corporate Equity Investments (𝑃𝑡
𝐻/𝐵𝑡
𝐻) 
𝐭 Fair Value Method  Equity Method 
0 
1 +
𝐸0[
𝑧𝐻
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
100
 1 +
𝐸0[
𝑧𝐻
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
100
 
1 
1 +
𝐸1[
𝑧𝐻
1 + 𝑟]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻 1 +
𝐸1[
𝑧𝐻
1 + 𝑟]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻 
Panel B - Firm F, One-sided Cross Holding (𝑃𝑡
𝐹/𝐵𝑡
𝐹) 
𝐭 Fair Value Method Equity Method 
0 
1 +
𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐹
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
100 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐻
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
 
1 +
𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐻
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
100
 
1 
1 +
𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐹
1 + 𝑟]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐻
1 + 𝑟]
 1 +
𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐻
1 + 𝑟 ]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹 
Panel C - Firm G, Two-sided Cross Holding (𝑃𝑡
𝐺/𝐵𝑡
𝐺) 
𝐭 Fair Value Method Equity Method 
0 
1 +
𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐺
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
100 +
0.2
0.96 ∗
𝐸0[𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐺]
(1 + 𝑟)2
 
1 +
1
0.96
∗
𝐸0 [
𝑧𝐺 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐹
(1 + 𝑟)2
]
100
 
1 1
+
𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐺
(1 + 𝑟)
]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺 +
0.2
0.96 ∗
𝐸1[𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐺]
(1 + 𝑟)
 1 +
1
0.96
∗
𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐺 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐹
(1 + 𝑟)
]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺  
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TABLE 3.7.4  
Return on Equity 
   
Panel A – Firm H, No corporate equity investments (𝑋𝑡+1
𝐻 /𝐵𝑡
𝐻) 
𝐭 Fair Value Method Equity Method 
0 𝑟 𝑟 
1 
𝑟 +
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐻]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻 𝑟 +
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐻]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐻 
Panel B - Firm F, One-sided cross holding (𝑋𝑡+1
𝐹 /𝐵𝑡
𝐹) 
𝐭 Fair Value Method Equity Method 
0 𝑟 𝑟 
1 
𝑟 +
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐹]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝐸1 [
𝑧𝐻
1 + 𝑟]
 𝑟 +
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐻]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐹 
Panel C - Firm G, Two-sided cross holdings (𝑋𝑡+1
𝐺 /𝐵𝑡
𝐺) 
𝐭 Fair Value Method Equity Method 
0 𝑟 𝑟 
1 
𝑟 +
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐺]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺 +
0.2
0.96 ∗
𝐸1[𝑧𝐹 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐺]
(1 + 𝑟)
 𝑟 +
1
0.96
∗
𝐸1[𝑧
𝐺 + 0.2 ∗ 𝑧𝐹]
(1 + 𝑟) ∗ 100 − 𝑑1
𝐺  
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